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Abstract 
This thesis studies how an organization maintained its legitimacy in response to the 
changing ecology. Through this study, the dynamics between state and social service 
sector in Hong Kong in the past two decades will be illuminated. This study draws 
on concepts from literature on organizational legitimacy, stakeholder analysis, and 
nonprofit studies. Through a qualitative case study, I attempt to illustrate how a 
social service organization (SSO), Hong Kong YWCA, differed in strategies of 
legitimacy repair after challenges from a Tai O rural consultative body, government 
departments, and other parts of the society in two time periods: the District Board 
election in 1988 and post-disaster relief during 2008-10 (the River Crab Saga). 
I aim to provide an explanation of more consistent, unified, and less complied 
response in the earlier case but less consistent, unified and more compliance with 
stakeholders' demands in the latter case - the high level of change in salience among 
YWCA stakeholders in the latter dispute. Two factors resulted in such a change: 1) 
the less stable funding environment due to Lump Sum Grant System, and 2) the 
intensified struggle between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy factions due to party 
penetration of society and rise of popular political awareness. In the River Crab Saga, 
YWCA had to deal with more stakeholders with contradictory demands. The 
stakeholders also varied in salience as defined by YWCA. Especially, the rural 
i i i 
consultative body seeking the support of a government minister enhanced its salience 
and increased stakeholder multiplicity. YWCA faced greater obstacles in satisfying 
all stakeholders and their demands. This made the legitimacy repair to stakeholders 
more fluctuating. In the 1988 case, there were fewer stakeholders, due to fewer 
funding sources and less intensive struggle between political camps. There were no 
obvious linkages between stakeholders. Hence stakeholders showed less variation in 
salience. The relationship between government and YWCA was more balanced in the 
1980s, leading to YWCA's high bargaining power and stronger autonomy. This study 
has confirmed the dynamic nature of legitimacy across time, and offers several 
implications on Hong Kong study: the tension of large SSOs in Hong Kong between 
the role of operator and advocator under heavy reliance on government subvention, 
as well as the debates over Beijing's intervention and undermining of Hong Kong's 
political autonomy. 
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Section 1 Introduction 
According to a research report about the social service sector in Hong Kong, there 
were 381 social service organizations (SSOs), with more than 2,358 social service 
units or branches until 2009, serving the elderly, children, ethnic minorities, the 
handicapped, and other communities. More than ten percent surveyed operated more 
than ten branches. More than 60% were set up for more than two decades 
(HKUCCSG 2009). The sector constitutes a substantial part of Hong Kong society, 
and has continuously been undergoing changes. Scholars and practitioners have 
pointed out that changes in funding mode and sovereignty are the two major factors. 
While many of them have portrayed the effects of the changes, few have done an 
empirical comparison before and after the changes. This study attempts to fill this 
gap and provides an empirical study on government-social service sector dynamics 
from the 1980s to the 2000s. My case is Hong Kong YWCA and its social service 
unit in Tai O. This social service organization involved in two local disputes: the 
District Board (now District Council) election in 1988 and debates over post-disaster 
relief (named as River Crab Saga) in 2008-2010. Both events were related to 
interactions with Tai O Rural Committee (TORC), an elected consultative body 
which represented villagers. 
The two events are the core of this thesis. In describing the events, I find that 
1 
although the challenges were of similar nature, YWCA reacted differently in terms of 
forms and consistency of the strategies. By comparing and contrasting the strategies 
which YWCA utilized, I raise the research question: 
Why were legitimacy repair strategies of YWCA in 1988 more consistent than 
that in 2008-10 upon similar challenges by the TORC and pro-TORC groups? 
I begin by reviewing key concepts about SSOs and with a brief overview of SSO 
development, followed with an overview of conceptual development of 
organizational legitimacy and repair strategies, and stakeholder politics. After 
introducing the conceptual framework and methodology, I introduce the case, which 
explains the establishment of Tai O YWCA (TOYWCA). Then, I provide a detailed 
description of the two disputes, including the origin, stakeholders involved, and 
strategies of YWCA legitimacy repair. Next, I offer an explanation of the more 
consistent and unified response in the 1988 dispute but less consistent and unified in 
the 2008-10 case - the higher level of change in salience among YWCA stakeholders 
in the latter dispute. Two factors resulted in such a change: 1) the less stable funding 
environment due to Lump Sum Grant System (LSGS), and 2) the intensified struggle 
between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy factions due to party penetration of society 
and rise of popular political awareness. In the River Crab Saga, YWCA had to deal 
with more stakeholders with contradictory demands. The stakeholders also varied in 
2 
salience as defined by YWCA. Especially, TORC sought the support of government 
bureau to enhance its salience. YWCA faced greater obstacles in satisfying all 
stakeholders and their demands. This made the legitimacy repair process to 
stakeholders more fluctuating. In the 1988 case, there were fewer stakeholders, with 
no obvious alliance between them. The challenge with YWCA was less fierce and 
easier to settle, even though legitimacy repair was not satisfactory. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that heavy government funding might stifle autonomy, 
including advocacy and other political activities, which implies that reducing the 
proportion of government subvention may help enhance autonomy. This research 
adds nuance to the intuition, showing that decrease in proportion of government 
subvention strengthened YWCA's awareness in maintaining favorable relationship 
with the government and avoided antagonizing this funding source. One possible 
reason is that the government showed less dependence on SSOs on service delivery 
whereas SSOs were facing more volatile funding environment. This heightened the 
need of YWCA to repair legitimacy with the government and other stakeholders 
when controversy endangered financial support, This thesis concludes by 
summarizing the findings of this case study and addresses the implications of the two 
disputes on social service sector and civil society in Hong Kong at large. 
3 
Purpose of the study 
There have been few studies on the comparison of social service sector before and 
after reform of social service and welfare policies, and on the impact of regime 
change. Some trace the differences in terms of regulations on SSOs before and after 
LSGS (such as Fan 2008; Ng 2008; Rong 2009), some account for evolution of 
nonprofit sector under Hong Kong's statist-corporatist welfare regime (Lee 2005). 
This study contributes knowledge about empirical changes in terms of differences in 
legitimacy repair strategies of an SSO. 
This study also aims at understanding legitimacy repair in two aspects: it examines 
how and why the transformation of institutional settings of social service sector in 
Hong Kong shaped the different responses of an SSO upon similar challenges by 
stakeholders across time; it also highlights the dynamics (alliance or conflict) 
between stakeholders in relation to their capacities to influence the focal 
organization's action. 
This study contributes to local studies in two aspects: it provides an empirical study 
of the change of government-SSO relationship before and after handover, as well as 
before and after social service reform; it also provides an empirical study of the 
effect of expansion and alignment pro-Beijing force since the 1980s on rural politics, 
which is also a microcosm of political change in Hong Kong. 
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Section 2 Historical development of social welfare sector and YWCA 
Before discussing the details of the two events concerning YWCA, it is necessary to 
outline the historical development of social service sector in Hong Kong from the 
colonial era. The section starts by conceptualizing NGO and classifying YWCA as a 
member of a sub-type of NGO. 
Conceptualizing NGOs 
The Central Policy Unit (CPU) conducted a research on the third sector in Hong 
Kong in 2004. It defines NGO as 'non-profit, voluntary, nongovernmental 
institutions which are distinctly different from those in the government and market 
sectors in their aims, structures and operations' (CPU 2004: 1). NGOs are non-profit 
not because they cannot make revenues, but because they cannot distribute profits to 
shareholders, members, owners, or directors. Revenues are used to pay for staff and 
activities that help them attain their aims. This characteristic can distinguish NGOs 
from for-profit companies (Martens 2002). NGOs are voluntary in the sense that their 
formation, planning and execution of activities towards their aims out of their 
willingness and availability, not by compulsion (Anheier 2005). NGOs are 
non-governmental in that they do not seek governmental power, and not belong to 
the government, although they can maintain co-operative, contractual, or adversarial 
relationship with the government. They can receive funding from the government, 
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but not substantial. NGOs are organizations, thus differ from loose groups of 
individuals, in that they have a more concrete organizational structure, with staff 
members, funding, and obligation to state regulations. 
Chow (2004) notes that popular usage of the term NGO in Hong Kong is a recent 
thing. In earlier times, people named this kind of entity 'charitable organizations', 
followed by 'voluntary agencies' (VAs) in the 1970s, and 'NGOs' from the 1990s\ 
Until now, people within and outside the sector often use the three terms 
interchangeably. 
Defining SSOs 
Due to heavy subvention by government from the 1960s, many NGOs in Hong Kong 
are not wholly independent of the government. We need a narrower term to 
demarcate this type of NGOs from others. The CPU classifies Hong Kong NGOs 
into 14 categories, according to the International Classification of Non-profit 
Organizations (ICNPO) scheme with local modification. Welfare services are one of 
the categories. Within this category, it includes eight kinds of services . YWCA is 
‘ 'Chari table organizations' indicate that poverty relief was the chief function during that period. 
‘VAs" indicate that having voluntary spirit in welfare provision is the most important. 'NGOs' indicate 
the close relationship with the government (Chow 2004). On the other hand, the term 'non-profit 
organizations' (NPOs) / 'nonprofits' has been used popularly. Recently, within the sector, people start 
to speak of ‘the third sector', distinguishing from the first (the government) and the second (the 
market). NGO belongs to the third sector. 
2 The eight kinds are: 
(a) child welfare services, child services and day care; 
(b) family services (including family education, agencies and services for single parents and family 
violence shelters and services; 
(c) youth services and youth welfare (including delinquency prevention services, youth centers and 
clubs (e.g., YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts); 
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listed as an example of youth services and youth welfare. But as the research reminds 
us that some NGOs, like YWCA, provide multiple services (including advocacy 
work) (Chan et al. 2004: 199, 222). I specifically state YWCA and other NGOs 
providing social services as social service organizations (SSOs)^. 
Having defined SSOs, I offer a brief account on development of social service sector, 
using YWCA as a typical example"^. 
Early colonial period to WWII: Formation of charity organization under 
minimal welfare provision of the government 
Indigenous Chinese organizations composed of local elites and church groups 
composed of foreign missionaries were two major groups providing social service in 
the initial period of colonial rule. Examples of the first group were Tung Wah Group 
of Hospitals (TWGHs) (1870) and Po Leung Kuk (PLK) (1878); examples of the 
second group were YMCA (1901) and YWCA (1920). There were also some kaifong 
and tongheung associations composed of clans or ethnicities. They had different 
(d) services for the elderly (including geriatric care services, homemaker services, transport facilities, 
recreation and meal programs); 
(e) community development services; 
(f) services for the disabled (including homes other than nursing homes, transport facilities, recreation 
and other specialized services); 
(g) services for disadvantaged groups (including offenders, women, unemployed, new arrivals, gays 
and lesbians, homeless); 
(h) support services (including training and research) (Chan et al. 2004: 199, 222) 
3 In other words, SSO is a subset of NGO. 
4 The reason of focusing on government-social service sector relationship rather than 
govemment-non-governmental sector relationship in Hong Kong is that some well-known advocacy 
NGOs had been considered as adversarial to colonial government for in the late 1970s, such as SoCO 
and CIC. But the majority of non-govemment-subsidized SSOs has been co-operative in the eyes of 
both colonial and SAR government. Excluding these 'outliers' can provide a more consistent 
investigation. 
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missions and provided different kinds of services, or advocated for more protections 
and addressed various social problems arising from poverty and influx of Mainland 
immigrants (Lui 2010). 
Birth ofYWCA 
In the beginning of the 20th century, as more young girls from the Mainland went to 
study overseas through Hong Kong, a church member invited them to stay in her 
home. Then, she and three more women started to provide hostel service to women, 
education and clubs to youngsters, and voluntary and recreational services from 1915. 
Later they sought assistance from the National Council of the Chinese YWCA to 
form HKYWCA in 1920. In the 1930s to 1960s, it advocated for gender equality and 
raised women's status, such as providing literacy classes, evening schools, lobbying 
for monogamous marriage, abolition of concubines, and equal pay for equal work. 
YWCA became more formalized in 1938, like establishing elections and setting up 
different departments, and was a prototype of the modern one (HKYWCA 2000). 
Before WWII, government provision of social service was minimal. Lee (2005) 
argues that the reluctance of welfare provision to Chinese population because the 
government feared attraction of more poor Chinese to come to Hong Kong. Also, the 
order from the Britain that Hong Kong should be financially independent, and the 
dominance of Western elites who favored low tax rates and minimal government and 
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who had little attention to local affairs, explained the limited involvement in social 
welfare. The colonial government only regarded social welfare as a means to 
maintain order and stability, that is, economic growth (Tang 1998). 
Post-WWII to 1960s: Government in need of SSOs for relief work and against 
communism 
After WWII, voluntary associations, tongheung and kaifong associations were more 
deeply involved in solving housing, education, hygiene, and medical problems, to 
cater for the need of huge amount of refugees from the Mainland. HKCSS was 
formed in 1947 as an initiator and later coordinator of NGOs on relief work, and a 
collaborator with the government. The SWD was formed in 1958, to help SSOs to 
express their full potential and to commit to long-term well-being of refugees (Lui 
2010). The colonial government also believed that Catholic and Christian church 
organizations, through providing welfare and education, could contain the spread of 
communism and leftist organizations from China (Lee 2005; Ma 2007). 
YWCA becoming a multi-service voluntary organization 
YWCA joined the bandwagon of social welfare expansion. Besides providing 
refugee work and poverty relief, it offered labor hostels, job training, evening schools, 
and nursery for working women. It strengthened social support for schoolgirls, built 
its headquarters, youth camp and other facilities. 
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1960s to 1990s: Expansion of social welfare and state incorporation of SSOs 
In the 1960s, Hong Kong took off its route of industrialization. With the removal of 
refugee relief status when Hong Kong started development, foreign donations to 
SSOs started to reduce. They needed to look for other sources (Lee 2005). The 
Community Chest started up in 1968 to coordinate local fundraising (CPU 2004). 
The SWD was another target funder (Leung 1990). The 1966/67 riots marked a 
turning point on colonial governance. The government believed that poor working 
and living conditions among the grassroots, with inadequate communication between 
government and the mass resulted in social unrest. To stabilize the society, the 
government decided to increase social participation of its people and cultivate their 
sense of belonging to Hong Kong^. Social service sector again played a pioneer role 
in addressing social needs. Furthermore, the British Labor Government allowed the 
Hong Kong government to develop its own social policies (Tang 1998). Therefore, 
the government decided to increase substantially social welfare spending in the 
1970s, including subvention to SSOs. 
YWCA becoming a government-subvented SSO 
It was no surprise that established voluntary associations like YWCA grew quickly 
during the 1960s and 1980s, with government's 'financial blessing'. In 1968, it 
5 For example, the government launched territory-wide campaign like 'Keep Hong Kong Clean 
Campaign' and 'Fight Violent Crime Campaign' in 1972 and 1973 to encourage social participation. 
1 0 
became a member of the Community Chest (YWCA 1995, 2000). Addressing social 
problems and implementing its social welfare policies, the colonial government 
added weight onto youth and community services. YWCA started a number of youth 
centers, social service centers, community development teams, and school social 
work services^. Large-scale subvention from the government also marked the reform 
of its service in the early 1970s. In tts Anniversary Commemorative Issue, it 
welcomed state incorporation, 
A more principal reform was started from 1971, services from voluntary welfare 
organizations could obtain full subvention if required by the government, including 
salaries and activity fees. To ensure service quality, [the government] required social 
workers to have professional training. Of course if Hong Kong had not been that 
prosperous, [or] if its fiscal support had not been strong enough, such promises 
would not have been guaranteed. Owing to the Community Chest and government 
subvention, [YWCA] no longer needed to raise money for operation, and could pay 
attention to service development. But for those departments not 
government-subvented, except from Community Chest, they had to self-finance. This 
restricted their development. (YWCA 2000: 39) 
After the rapid expansion of social policy in the first half period of the 1970s the 
government turned to a more incremental approach afterwards. Increase in social 
welfare expenditure, to a certain extent pushed by social workers and pressure groups, 
was controlled by economic growth and taxation (Tang 1998)7. 
Anyway, SSO revenue was stabilized because the mode of subvention was based on 
6 For example, in 1985, YWCA started six working units (HKYWCA 1986). 
7 The government provided compulsory education, improvement in medical services, and large-scale 
public housing. Still, the rejection of long term social protection such as compulsory social insurance 
(until 1990s when the government suggested statutory pension scheme) revealed hesitation of the 
government to commit to social welfare. 
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actual costs of each SSO. In the 1980s, The SWD imposed input controls with regard 
to SSOs' staffing structures, pay levels and individual items of expenditure. The 
salaries were linked to the scale of civil servants. In 1995, YWCA received nearly 
70% of government subvention (YWCA 1995: 20). Apart from resource stability, the 
government and the social welfare sector maintained collaborative relationship, as 
seen in participation in social welfare policy planning. According to Lui (2010: 142), 
the 'voluntary' dimension did not fade even though the social welfare sector tended 
to become an 'executive arm' of the government. The government needed the sector 
to establish standards and regulations for new and expanding social services. The 
government could also make use of the sector's frontline experience and flexibility to 
deal with social problems. The sector, in turn, needed the government to enhance the 
quality of social service. 
From the 1990s: Towards a contractual relationship between SSOs and 
government in uncertain times 
The relatively peaceful period ended in the 1990s^. With the wave of New Public 
Management (NPM) coming to Hong Kong in the mid-1990s, there was an 
increasing demand of performance measures and efficiency for public services. 
8 Indeed, in the early 1990s, officials from China warned that Hong Kong should not unrcstrictcd 
social welfare expansion which damage fiscal security. Even the last governor Chris Pattern regarded 
social welfare as 'safety net for only the most vulnerable and disadvantaged' (Tang 1998: 78). 
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Followed by a 1995 consultation report on improving subvention system^ and the 
Asian financial crisis, the government tightened the control of public expenditure. 
These factors, with pilot scheme in elderly care in 1991, gave birth of Service 
Performance Monitoring System (SPMS) and Lump Sum Grant System (LSGS) in 
1999 and 2000 respectively. 
Details of the two systems are beyond the discussion of this study. As far as this 
essay is concerned, LSGS claimed to introduce flexibility in staff deployment and 
subvention allocation, when compared with the previous input-based standard cost 
system. The staff salaries were no longer linked to the civil service scale, but pitched 
at the benchmark at mid-point of the prevailing civil service pay scale. To enhance 
transparency, accountability and performance measurement, the SPMS was 
introduced to assess the cost-effectiveness of the service. It consisted of Service 
Quality Standard (SQS) and Funding and Service Agreement (FSA). The FSA listed 
out the roles and responsibilities of the funder and the funded, that is, the SWD and 
the individual SSO. Essentially it was a contract between the government and each 
SSO. The SQS defined the level of quality each service unit was expected to attain, 
facilitating measurement of service performances. To enhance the efficiency of 
resource and service allocation, competitive bidding was introduced. Which SSO 
9 In 1995, the then Director of SWD agreed that SSOs needed to enhance flexibility, enhance 
monitoring mechanism, establish incentive and punishment system, and list out clear funding and 
service agreement (Leung 2002). 
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could run new projects or in-situ expansion, mostly short-term, was determined by 
open tender at a fixed cost, while private organizations were also welcome. The 
SWD hoped to see more innovation in devising SSOs' own manpower plans (Lump 
Sum Grant Independent Review Committee (LSGIRC) 2008). Until 2011, 164 out of 
171 subvented SSOs joined the LSG subvention mode (SWD 2011a). Also, the 
whole public sector needed to reduce expenditure to cope with financial pressure. 
The new funding and monitoring mechanisms has brought about substantial changes 
in organizational environment. SSOs had to adapt to new forms of funding 
acquisition and corporate governance. Relevant to this study are the following points: 
Demands for charity transparency and accountability increased since the past 
decade. HKCSS launched the WiseGiving platform in late 2007. Originally for 
internet d o n a t i o n its purpose finally provided information about governance 
and finance, and how NGOs use their resources, in the hope that people will 
make informed donation choices (WiseGiving 2011). Until January 2011, there 
were 188 WiseGiving charities; 150 of them were HKCSS members, which 
accounted for around 40% of HKCSS membership". This reflected the need of 
SSOs to seek donation from individuals and corporations. 
10 Originally, WiseGiving aimed at providing an alternative channel for collecting donation in the 
internet. However, the Community Chest complained that it would resulted in competition and reduce 
the amount donated to the Chest. The Chest would demand deducting the donation to charitable 
organizations earned from WiseGiving. In the end, WiseGiving cancelled the function and reduced its 
role to enhancement of public accountability and transparency of charities (Ming Pao 2007). Website 
of WiseGiving: http://www.wiscgiving.org.hk/ 
‘ ‘Unt i l October 2010, there were 377 HKCSS members (HKCSS 2010). 
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SSOs have been more eager to diversify income sources. However, about half of 
them found insufficient donations for achieving their purposes, meaning that 
they had difficulties in funding diversification. The most important funding 
body is still SWD, followed by the Community Chest and Hong Kong Jockey 
Club (HKJC). Also, according to the HKUCCSG (2009) survey, more than half 
of SSOs did not have interaction with the business sector. Those who had 
interaction were mainly in the form of fund raising and volunteer recruitment. 
The fact that SWD reduced subvention to all sub vented SSOs required them to 
save up recurrent funding, which amounted to $452 million in total (LSGIRC 
2008). On the other hand, SSOs not having full reimbursement from SWD did 
not mean all SSOs would immediately get into trouble. Over 80% of SSOs 
joined LSGS accumulated reserves up to one-third of their operating 
expenditures in 2006-07, when the rule was set at 25%. Some NGOs admitted 
that the reserves were 'mainly for honoring their commitments to Snapshot 
Staff , and were ‘necessary for the NGOs' operation and sustainability in the 
long term' (LSGIRC 2008: 43). Obviously this was a strategy of SSOs to cope 
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with funding uncertainty . 
Ken, the YWCA social work supervisor informant, explained that one of the motivations to seek 
alterative funding was the LSG subvention cap with the increasing expenditure to pay for senior 
employees. YWCA needed to reserve money for colleagues. 
It was even reported that some large SSOs, in order to guarantee success in new projects, bid the 
projects for a low price and later subsidized from the reserves (see MingPao 201 lb). 
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YWCA adapting to the new environment 
YWCA followed the service reform. It joined the LSGS and SPMS in the first place. 
The organization adjusted organizational structure, and imported management 
system and professionals from business sector to 'catch up with the state of the art'. 
It also strengthened connection with business corporations, developed new services 
through competitive bidding, launched social enterprises, enhanced national 
education, and reinforced family support, elderly care, re-employment and life-long 
learning. It disclosed its revenue and expenditure distribution since its 2000-01 
annual report. Until 2010, the organization consisted of 74 service units in the whole 
Hong Kong territory (YWCA 2000, 2003, 2009, 2010a). Although maintaining its 
distinctiveness in women's movement, Christian ministry, and membership 
movement, YWCA bore high similarity to other mature SSOs in terms of social 
service provision. 
YWCA has followed the footsteps of social service sector 
At this stage I have sketched the transformation of social service sector in Hong 
Kong, using YWCA as a typical case. Although the level of analysis of this study is 
organization, not sector, one can hardly understand organizational changes of YWCA 
without knowing the social service sector. Also, YWCA has mostly followed the 
footstep of the sector, in times of origin, welfare expansion, and welfare reform. As 
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the resource environment became less stable since the 1990s, YWCA was more 
aware of new expectations from the government and the public, such as transparency, 
and garnering support from bodies apart from the government, such as the business 
sector. Government and users were no longer the only parties that YWCA can secure 
legitimacy in normal and crisis moments. 
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Section 3 Conceptualizing legitimacy repair 
Why legitimacy? 
There are different ways to understand organizational responses. One way is to look 
at dynamics within organization, such as power, authority, and leadership. According 
to nonprofit scholar Helmut Anheier (2005), nonprofits are different from other types 
of organization in that they are value-driven. Values, rather than profits, are 
supposedly the soul of nonprofits that adheres members from frontline staff to the 
board. Power is frequently codified in contracts and staff regulations; authority refers 
to the legitimate source of power; having leadership means a staff member (often in a 
higher hierarchy) can exercise influence on another (often in a lower hierarchy) out 
of power and authority relations. Organizational politics occurs when power is 
mobilized, often due to value conflicts. Therefore, to study organizational decision, it 
is straightforward to look for answers in strategies within organization, such as 
changes in authority, expertise, ideology, or struggle between the board, mid-level 
managers, and the rank-and-file. 
Indeed, social service sector and its members in Hong Kong have experienced 
changes in funding system, corporate governance, and performance assessments at 
the turn of the new m i l l e n n i u m ! 4 . For example, differences in level of managerial 
'4 The Lump Sum Grant funding mode delegates power to SSOs to allocate government subvention 
and staff salaries. Power differential between executives (who can allocate resources) and frontline 
staff enlarges. New staff members receive different salaries, and most of them are lower than the 
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discretion may explain tolerance of frontline workers' level of resistance. However, 
the impact of the above-mentioned changes on organization decision-making is 
almost unable to investigate unless the researcher immerses into the setting (YWCA 
in my case), or there have been collections of sufficient and credible data from 
different hierarchies of employees to understand power and resistance'^. In this study, 
although informants provided some information on politics within YWCA during the 
two disputes, it was far from comprehensive. I have drawn a black box on the 
mechanisms. 
A more feasible approach is to look for how YWCA as a whole reacted to 
environmental challenges, such as how it buffered, bargained, or conformed to the 
environment that influenced core characteristics and behavior of the organization. 
Such an open-system approach rejects the past closed-system approach, which 
assumes that an organization can sustain in isolation as long as it can efficiently 
produce outputs from inputs, or that there is one best way of management. 
An NGO is normally situated in its material-resource and institutional environments. 
Barman (2002) argues that NGOs are embedded to institutional environments more 
experienced ones. This greatly hinders frontline collective resistance within organization and across 
the field. The change from input-based to output based assessment has increased the need to enhance 
service productivity; failure to satisfy demands from SWD or other funders may result in withholding 
or termination of subvention and position (Vyas and Luk 2010), which increased the pressure to 
workers and the agency. Facing insecure positions, they may be more reluctant to go against the 
management due to the threat of punishment. 
An exception is Pun's (2005) ethnographic study of mainland electronics factory, in which she 
worked as a dagongmei (female peasant workers), and experienced their colleagues' anger and 
frustration from pain and social exclusion. 
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because they, unlike manufacturing firms, cannot objectively prove their success by 
efficiency. Instead, they are assessed by conforming to laws, regulations, or 
professional standards (Powell and DiMaggio 1983) 6 Gradually, scholars argue that 
in order to be recognized, organizations pursue legitimacy, which is understood as 
congruence between perceived organizational behavior and societal expectations. 
Applied to this study, transformation of local social service sector in the 2000s 
implies that SSOs have been more sensitive to public scrutiny, first due to the need to 
enhance transparency and accountability initiated by the government, which was in 
turn promoted by new managerialism; and second due to the need to increase 
popularity to acquire resources when the government no longer guarantees full 
subvention. SSOs have to demonstrate that their actions meet the more demanding 
expectations of Hong Kong society. On this ground I argue that legitimacy is an 
appropriate conceptual tool to assess YWCA's ability to respond to challenges across 
the time of study. 
Conceptualizing and defining legitimacy 
Conceptual origins of legitimacy can be traced to Weber (1978), who suggests that 
adherence to rationality brings about legitimacy; and Parsons (1960), who brings in 
the concept into organizational studies. Suchman (1995) notices that subsequent 
16 However, as illustrated in later sections, SSOs in Hong Kong have been undergoing administrative 
reform since 1990s. More output assessments are implemented to show their effectiveness, in terms of 
cost-efficiency. 
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development of legitimacy rests on two tracks: the strategic and the institutional. 
Sociological literature tended to focus on institutional view. The cultural approach 
stresses that organizations conform to laws, norms, and regulations because the 
socio-political environment constructs such practices as taken-for-granted and proper. 
The managerial literature tends to focus on the strategic view, in which an 
organization has agency, is motivated by interests, and is capable of manipulating the 
environment, such as differentiation (Barman 2002) or co-optation (Selznick 1949). 
This paper attempts to take a balanced view. While acknowledging that organizations 
can manage institutional pressures, the strategies are adopted with reference to their 
own institutional environment. Putting it in another way, this study follows the 
sociological approach proposed by Dobbin and Baum (2000: 2): 
'...the most basic method in strategic management is to observe the winners and look 
for what makes them win. The most basic method in economic sociology [and 
organization theory] is to observe large numbers of firms and look for what explains 
differences in their behavior ...the new strategies they choose are shaped by public 
policy, imitation, network position, power, and historical happenstance . (cited from 
Scott and Davis 2007: 311) 
With consideration of strategic and institutional view, Suchman (1995) defines 
legitimacy as: 
‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions ‘ (p. 574). 
With legitimacy, an organization can enhance survival (Riief and Scott 1998), 
enhance credibility (Suchman 1995), and attract resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
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1978). Legitimacy is a variable, so one can say that legitimacy of an organization is 
increased or decreased, more or less, gained or lost, or that an organization is 
legitimate or illegitimate (Ruef and Scott 1998; Glynn and Marquis 2004). 
Typology of legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept. Researchers develop typologies in 
different ways. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) suggest two types: sociopolitical and 
cognitive. The former consists of acceptance of a new venture by powerful or 
important bodies, such as government, as appropriate and right; the latter consists of 
a new venture as a taken-for-granted feature of the environment. Scott (2001) 
consists of regulative, normative and cognitive, and argues that sociopolitical 
legitimacy is more or less the combination of his regulative and normative 
components. Suchman (1995) suggests pragmatic, moral and cognitive components 
This essay adopts Suchman's typology and Scott's regulative approach. 
Regulative legitimacy: Conformity to rules and laws devised by legal or regulatory 
bodies in an institutional environment grants an organization's regulative legitimacy. 
Deviation of such demands may face sanctions and punishment. Often, the regulative 
bodies hold critical resources, or have sovereign power over a given sector (such as 
social service) (Lister 2003; Scott 2001; Breitsohl 2009). 
17 Rucf and Scott (1998) note that Suchman's (1995) moral legitimacy is similar to their normative 
one, whereas Suchman's pragmatic legitimacy is a broader conccpt than their regulative component to 
"includc all conformity based on 'sclf-intcrcstcd calculations'" (p. 879). 
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Pragmatic legitimacy The keyword of pragmatic legitimacy is 'self-interest'. An 
NGO is perceived to have pragmatic legitimacy if it can satisfy needs and benefit its 
stakeholders IS (Suchman 1995; Lister 2003). 
Moral legitimacy: The key phrase of moral legitimacy is 'positive normative 
evaluation'. An organization can claim moral legitimacy when it 'reflect[s] beliefs 
about whether the activity effectively promotes societal welfare, as defined by the 
audience's social constructed value system'^^ (Suchman 1995: 579). Evaluations are 
classified into four types: consequential legitimacy - from organizational outputs or 
performance (e.g. member participation rates), procedural legitimacy - from socially 
recognized techniques and procedures (e.g. accreditation, licensing, monitoring), 
structural legitimacy - from structural characteristics (NGO, being non-profit and net 
revenues reinvested into the organization, is more legitimate than for-profits to 
provide social service) (Brinkerhoff 2005), and personal legitimacy - from charisma 
of individual organizational leaders and staff. 
Cognitive legitimacy: The keywords of cognitive legitimacy are ‘comprehensibility' 
and 'taken-for-grantedness'. By comprehensibility, it means an organization's 
IS An organization can: 1) provide goods or services that fulfill welfare recipients' needs and 
expectations (exchange legitimacy), 2) responds to the larger interests like food safety (influence 
legitimacy), or 3) possesses positive attributes like honesty, trustworthiness or decency (dispositional 
legitimacy) (Suchman 1995). 
The major difference between moral and pragmatic legitimacy is that it is not evaluated based on 
whether an individual obtains benefits from the organization, but on whether the organization 
contributes to social good. Also, it is harder to changc moral order than pragmatic considerations in 
the institutional environment (Suchman 1995). 
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activity will prove predictable, meaningful and inviting, therefore conforming to the 
cognitive maps in the society. If an organization gamers cognitive legitimacy, the 
audience ‘makes sense' to what it does^^. By taken-for-grantedness, it means an 
organization behaves in ways that are otherwise unthinkable (but not necessarily 
positive^'), thus pre-empting questioning and challenges. Suchman (1995) notes that 
it is the most subtle yet powerful type of legitimacy. On the other hand, innovation 
requires destroying the taken-for-grantedness by explicitly questioning existing 
beliefs or practices. Therefore, when a challenge does occur, it can shake the entire 
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organizational field or institution . 
Clearly, the concept of legitimacy stresses the moral and cognitive dimensions of 
legitimacy. These two dimensions are arenas of negotiation and contention. Scott 
(2003) points out that organizations 'perceive themselves to have choices when 
institutional systems are not unified' (p. 215), therefore that legitimacy is also subject 
to power and political dynamics. Owing to such premises, this essay focuses on these 
two types of legitimacy, although mention about the regulative and pragmatic 
components will be made when necessary. 
20 Discursive strategy and combining the action with legitimate local practices or cultural models are 
examples of an organization to gain acccptance from the society (Boxembaum 2008; Jensen 2003). 
21 Schools, hospitals, and voluntary organizations, for example, have become so common in societies 
nowadays, that it is difficult to think of alternatives in education, mcdical care, and social service 
sectors. 
22 It should be reminded that the different types of legitimacy arc interrelated. Provision of adequate 
and sufficient resources to the poor can increase an organization's pragmatic and moral legitimacy. 
Also, stakeholders often value one type of legitimacy more than the other two, which may result in 
contradictory demands (Suchman 1995; Alexander 1998; Rucf and Scott 1998; Osscvvaardc ct al. 
2008). 
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Measurements of legitimacy 
It is difficult to measure legitimacy. Ruef and Scott (1998) use number of survived 
hospitals which conformed to a new organizational form as an indicator under 
institutional change. Board interlocks, or collaboration with publicly recognized 
organizations are another sign of legitimacy (Galaskiewicz 1985). Similarly, Glynn 
and Marquis (2004) use the falling number of listed companies using dot.com names 
to confirm illegitimacy of symbols during internet euphoria. Deephouse and 
Suchman (2008) remark that while it is easy to confirm legitimacy with evidence 
which shows support of organizations, it is more difficult to confirm absence of 
legitimacy. They draw from previous research and suggest that, not without dispute, 
'questions, challenges, and rejections, rather than on positive accounts, 
endorsements and adoptions ...the absence of legitimacy challenges is an indicator of 
whether the organization is "accepted” in the sense of being left to pursue its 
activities without interference from cultural authorities ‘ (p. 57). 
Legitimacy repair 
The merit of Suchman's (1995) typology of legitimacy not only appears in its 
detailed classification, but also considerations of different strategies to manage 
legitimacy, that is, acquisition, maintenance and repair. Organizations inevitably need 
to cope with such pressures from internal and external challenges. When legitimacy 
of an organization is undermined, most likely it will try to repair it (Pfarrer et al. 
2008; Breitsohl 2009). This is because previous claims to legitimacy are no longer 
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effective, yet constrain the ability of management to respond (Suchman 1995). 
Therefore, the organization 'suffer[s] from diminished stakeholder support and will 
have more limited access to resources and a high probability of failure than will 
legitimate organizations' (Pfarrer et al. 2008: 731). Communication and providing 
accounts are ways of managing legitimacy with stakeholders (Suchman 1995). The 
present study focuses on the repair process against the broader social and cultural 
processes that define and legitimize rules, norms, and values. 
Breitshol's (2009) typology expands Suchman's (1995) construction of repair 
strategies, and reassigns strategies in relation to its influence on different types of 
legitimacy. He sets out four types of strategies based on four steps of criteria: 
The organization does not acknowledge that a problem exists, regardless of 
stakeholders' perceptions; 
• The organization acknowledges that a problem exists; 
• Upon acknowledgement, the organization accepts responsibility or not; and 
• Upon acceptance, the organization actively attempts to solve the problem or not. 
The four reaction types of strategies are evasive, defensive, appreciative, and 
accommodative (Table 1): 
Evasive strategy: The organization avoids any connection to the problem and 
stakeholders' disapproval, ranging from withdrawal (retreat), not letting stakeholders 
know or provide deceptive information (concealment), to outright denial of the event. 
Defensive strategy: The organization acknowledges the problem, but chooses among 
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asserting no relation with the problem (dissociation), downplaying the organization's 
responsibility (excuses), and defining the situation as 'apparently discrediting, but 
really harmless'. 
Appreciative strategy: The organization accepts the problem and responsibility, but 
does not provide any solutions. The organization can choose from among conforming 
while avoiding the necessity to redesign the system (explanation), providing an 
account of positive consequences of the event which outweighs its harm 
(justifications), to confessing for the problem (apologies). 
Accommodative strategy: The organization provides remedial measures, ranging 
from compensating to the affected parties (restitution), divorcing from the problem, 
to devising methods to prevent the problem from happening again (restructuring). 
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Table 1 Reactions to organizational crises 
Organization 
Acknowledges Accepts Actively Strategies 
problem responsibility seeks 
resolution 
Evasive No No No Retreat 
Concealment 
Denial 
Defensive Yes No No Dissociation 
Excuses 
Defining 
Appreciative Yes Yes No Explanation 
Justification 
Apologies 
Accommodative Yes Yes Yes Restitution 
Divorce 
Restructuring 
(Source: Breitsohl (2009: 19)) 
Stakeholder and stakeholder politics 
Besides the multi-dimensional nature of legitimacy, SSOs and other organizations 
have to address the heterogeneity of environment, in which various stakeholders can 
make claims on them. Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders broadly as 'any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives' (p. 46). Examples of NGO stakeholders include the government, donors 
(individual or corporate), service users, unions, and even media (Lister 2003; 
LeRoux 2009; Cordery and Baskerville 2010). As Lister (2003) argues, incorporation 
of stakeholder identification and analysis into legitimacy assessment can help 
researchers and practitioners explore '"which legitimacy matters" and the relative 
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"weights" of different organizational stakeholders in determining legitimacy' (p. 
184). 
Stakeholder salience and stakeholder multiplicity 
A mere mapping of stakeholders cannot reflect the complexity of relationship with 
organizations; an assessment of their salience can fill this gap. A concept developed 
by Mitchell et al. (1997), salience is defined as ‘the degree to which managers give 
priority to competing stakeholder claims' (p. 854), or in short, 'who or what really 
counts' (p. 864). Stakeholder salience is perceived and assessed by managers. 
Stakeholders possess one or more of the three attributes: power, legitimacy, and 
urgency. The more attributes possessed, the greater the salience of a stakeholder to 
influence an organization. 
A stakeholder is said to be powerful when it can get the organization to do something 
that the organization would not have done otherwise and despite resistance. The type 
of power can be coercive (compliance by physical control), utilitarian (material 
rewards), or normative (manipulation of symbols such as prestige, esteem, or 
acceptance) (Mitchell et al. 1997). For legitimacy, the authors adopt Suchman's 
(1995) idea. The third attribute is urgency. A stakeholder claim is regarded as urgent 
when the claim needs immediate attention. Mitchell et al. (1997) set two conditions 
for urgency: time sensitivity, or ‘the degree to which managerial delay in attending to 
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the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder'; and criticality, or ‘the 
importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder' (p. 867). Combination 
of one or more attributes increases a stakeholder's salience. 
As it is impossible for an organization to answer to all demands from all stakeholders, 
stakeholder identification gives the organization an opportunity to prioritize 
stakeholders and their claims, and consider appropriate responses. Worth noticing are 
stakeholders' motivations, identities, ideologies, actions, and their consequences for 
the organization. The importance of the tripartite attributes lies in its dynamism 
(Mitchell et al. 1997: 879-880). An organization is more likely to repair its 
legitimacy in repsonse to the demands of salient stakeholder groups. As Pfairer et al. 
(2008) argue, when there are multiple salient stakeholders with divergent demands, it 
will 'increase the discourse among them, potentially delaying feedback and 
concurrence on organizational actions' (p. 742). Frooman (1999), for example, 
emphasizes how stakeholders influence the organization's decision-making and 
behavior before managers' strategic action. Whereas salience aims to assess 
stakeholder influence, Neville and Menguc (2006) notice that interactions between 
stakeholders occur, such as a stakeholder forming alliance with another stakeholder 
to enhance salience (Frooman 1999). The two authors employ the concept of 
stakeholder multiplicity, or ‘the degree of multiple, conflicting, complimentary, or 
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cooperative stakeholder claims made to an organization' (Neville and Menguc 2006: 
380), which is beyond the consideration of independent, dyadic relationship between 
stakeholder and organization. 
This section explains why organizational legitimacy is an appropriate concept to 
explore the interaction between YWCA as an SSO and its organizational 
environment, due to its necessity to gain acceptance in the society and research 
constraints if using other conceptual tools. Using Suchman's (1995) and Scott's 
(1995) typology of legitimacy, I decide to stress on the cognitive and moral 
dimensions as they highlight the contested nature of the concept. When an 
organization comes to crisis, it has to repair its legitimacy from stakeholders to 
secure survival and support. Because of the varying importance of stakeholders, the 
focal organization has to prioritize stakeholders' demands in terms of salience and be 
aware of their alliance and conflicts. 
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Section 4 Analytical framework 
This study attempts to construct an analytical framework to explain level of 
consistency of repair strategies of YWCA legitimacy (Figure 1). 
By consistency, it means 'providing the same account to all stakeholders' (Massey 
2001: 158). Massey's (2001) study finds out that consistent response strategies are 
more effective than inconsistent ones for legitimacy management. 
Determinants of degree of consistency of legitimacy repair strategies 
An organization confronting with more stakeholder groups will be more difficult to 
satisfy all their demands, as 'the satisfaction of one constituent often requires the 
organization to ignore or defy the demands of another' (Oliver 1991: 162). Frequent 
change in salience among stakeholders makes the organization keep changing repair 
strategies to satisfy the demands of salient stakeholders each time. For example, 
stakeholder group A, although having all three stakeholder attributes among all other 
stakeholders of a focal NGO, fails to sustain its salience for long because it involves 
in a scandal, and caught up by a more powerful stakeholder group B. This indicates 
organizational environment can be turbulent which can decrease the likelihood of 
consistency in response strategies of legitimacy repair. 
Specific to the situation of Hong Kong social service organizations, the study 
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proposes two factors which affect stakeholder salience^^. The first one is the degree 
of stability of funding sources. If the funding environment is stable, programs and 
operations of SSOs could maintain quality and sustainability. When funding 
environment is volatile, SSOs needed to acquire various funding from diverse 
sources (at the same time or successively), and through different ways (such as 
competitive bidding, or application of projects from foundations). The multifarious 
nature and background of funding sources in the business, public, or social sector, 
often bring out difficulties in managing their demands and hence unstable funding 
environment. This would increase the likelihood of change in stakeholder salience. 
The second one is degree of struggle among political factions. When the struggle is 
intense, a likely consequence was more frequent 'politicization of social issues' 
(Chill and Lui 2000: 17). In the context of Hong Kong, it means the degree of 
struggle between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps. It follows that more groups 
would interfere in these issues, and struggle would entail stakeholders engaging in 
conflicting, complementary, or cooperative relationships and claims. This increased 
the likelihood of more frequent changes in stakeholder salience as a controversy 
developed. 
2 Given that most of the SSOs are heavily subsidized by the government (mostly by SWD) in Hong 
Kong, government funding alone cannot determine the difference of strategies of YWCA. 
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Degree of struggle between 
Degree of stability in pro-Beijing and pro-
funding environment democracy factions 
\ / 
Level of change in salience among stakeholders 
i 
Degree of consistency of 
YWCA legitimacy repair 
Figure 1 Factors affecting degree of consistency of YWCA legitimacy strategies. 
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Section 5 Methodology 
A longitudinal single case study 
Investigation of differences (and similarities) of a single case in two or more time 
points comes up with what Yin (2003: 42) calls a longitudinal case^ "^  study. A case 
study is not a research method, but a research strategy, which is 'based on the 
in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to 
explore the configuration of each case, and to elucidate features of a larger class of 
(similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating theoretical explanations' 
(Vennesson 2008: 226). Investigation of the case in two time points can help find out 
factors that produced the controversies, and the social change that have taken place 
in between. 
Some may criticize case study research for its inability to generalize from a single 
case, or its in-built researcher bias, while others may think it is only a preliminary 
stage to a large-N investigation. This essay does not intend to launch a rebuttal 
against criticisms; the emphasis here is that a careful and strategic case selection can 
actually reveal much more about deeper causes of a social problem \ 
Even though it is a longitudinal case study, the distinctiveness of 
24 A case is defined as ‘a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analyzed empirically 
as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events' (Vennesson 2008: 226). 
A well-known example is Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's (1956) study of democratic decision 
making in the International Typographical Union (ITU). The investigation of one deviant case could 
vividly illustrate the condition of collective leadership within an organization, and therefore broke 
Michel's ( 1 9 1 ” 'iron law of oligarchy' (another singlc-casc study). 
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organization-environment dynamics between the two events approximates a 
comparative case study. 
A qualitative research 
Another clarification is that a case study is not necessarily a qualitative research. 
While it is common to think that case study research is qualitative in nature, or 
qualitative research must employ case studies, Yin (2003) states that such thinking is 
a confusion. A case study can contain qualitative, quantitative data, or both (see 
Eisenhardt (1989)), whereas a qualitative research may not be a case study. 
Having said that, this study is a qualitative research. One merit of qualitative method 
is that we can find out how and why similar events are interpreted differently, and 
sometimes contradictorily, among different groups. Differences in interpretation can 
result in differences in action. As della Porta and Keating (2008) state, 'context is 
central to ethnographic and interpretivist approaches, where it is deeply textured and 
rich, but is also used in neoinstitutionalist analysis' (p. 35). As a result, in this study, 
qualitative method is more appropriate than quantitative method. 
Why TO YWCA? 
Previously I mentioned that there has been no systematic empirical study on the 
effect of social service reform on government-SSO relationship. The River Crab 
Saga became an entry point. The case of TO YWCA serves an additional merit. Its 
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headquarter YWCA even has been serving Hong Kong for more than 90 years, which 
is a key member of the social service sector. The Tai O team started in 1978, and was 
the first group of NLCDP in service and still existent. TO YWCA has been a witness 
of socio-political change in Tai O, and sovereignty change and welfare reform in 
Hong Kong. 
Research method 
As this study involves investigation of both recent and past events, my data 
collection period was in two stages. I used multiple methods to acquire data, and 
described in detail the utility of each method in each stage below. 
Stage 1: August 2009 - January 2010 Member of Anti-False Harmony Alliance 
I joined Anti-False Harmony Alliance from its start. This was the time after the River 
Crab Saga became known in the media and public. Not an active member in the 
group, I assisted in taking notes in events like press conference and forums, and 
organized data in a report about social workers' perceived level of oppression by 
their work organizations. The chief methods were participant-observation of actions 
of those concerned social workers, and collection of written records from mass media 
about how different parties responded to the Saga. 
Stage 2: March 2010 -April 2011 -A research student 
Since March 2010, I got in touch with Tai O community. I took a short trip in Tai O 
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during Dragon Boat Festival. I lived in a stilt house in Sun Kei for four days, from 
June 17 to 20, 2010, and went to observe two Dragon Boat competitions on June 16 
and 20. To familiarize myself with community dynamics, I introduced myself as a 
university student, observed and took field notes in key incidents, such as 
consultation meeting on improvement works in June, the disaster prevention work 
for Typhoon Megi in September, and the annual Wedding-on-the-Sea ceremony in 
November. I also did volunteer work for TO YWCA and TOFWS, so that I could be 
more familiar with informants. Meanwhile, I also took interviews with non-Tai O 
people but relevant to my study. 
I conducted semi-structured in-depth interview, observation, and written records. The 
distinctiveness of in-depth interview is "to gather concrete descriptions of something 
a respondent has witnessed, which includes scenes external to the respondent and his 
/ her own thoughts and feelings" (Weiss 1995: 66). This was especially important in 
gathering data about the 1988 election, since informants' accounts and participation 
was the only source (except a few newspaper reports). Interview guides were 
prepared before interview. Semi-structured interviews were appropriate in that 
respondents could provide rich data about their experiences and interpretations 
without losing track of the interview process. Observation allowed me to notice and 
record events and objects, as well as people's interactions in the social settings. This 
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enhanced my knowledge about social patterns in the village, such as friendship or 
cleavage among members. Various primary and secondary written records were 
collected or recorded, including newspaper reports, YWCA annual reports, 
anniversary publication of Tai O local organizations, as well as past writings of Tai O 
from scholars and local people. Combination of methods can offer chance of data 
triangulation and increase validity and clarify meaning (Stake 2003). 
Field roles and field relations 
My research roles in the two stages were not the same, and need an explanation. In 
stage 1, my prior acquaintance with Alliance members reduced the barrier of entry of 
the field. My student identity helped keep distance from the members, therefore 
avoid being too involved in the Alliance to be ‘discovered’ by Tai O villagers. In 
stage 2, I introduced myself as a university research student. Whereas my identity 
was overt, I did not simultaneously told informants I had been an Alliance member. 
Otherwise, there would be a high risk that they would have hesitated in expressing 
views about TO YWCA, a rival of TORC, or would have even rejected my request. 
Conversely, residents had been used to interview since Tai O is a famous place for 
research, for both secondary and university students. This would lower the difficulty 
of field access. Another reason for maintaining my student identity was to 'maintain 
marginal position' (Hammersley and Atkinson 2003: 86) that is to keep an emotional 
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and relational distance from either pro-TORC or pro-TOYWCA camp. Also, I 
intended to arrange interviews in Tai O, if possible. Not only could this increase my 
familiarity in the community, but also observe interviewees' relationships with 
villagers, such as when they met one another. In this way, interview became a time 
for participant observation. However, the student role had its limitation in getting 
into the rural leaders' social circle. Their social relations were indeed a product of 
neighborhood or kinship ties, and numerous exchanges of interests and emotions for 
decades. Even TORC leaders perceived the thirty-year-old TO YWCA as an 'outsider 
organization not to mention a young student living in urban area. It was hard for me 
to gain full acceptance of those leaders by just meeting a few times. Although they 
recognized me as I went to Tai O more often^^, our relationship was not deep enough. 
For example, I was not invited to 'their gatherings' like celebration dinner of 
National Day. 
Informant selection 
Informant characteristics and detailed process of informant selection are listed in 
Appendix 1. Briefly speaking, I conducted 30 in-depth interviews and one casual 
interview, all with informed consent. Each in-depth interview lasted for about 75 
minutes on average, ranging from 60 to 90 minutes. Four informants were 
A few informants told me that ‘I saw you wandering along a few times'. We greeted with each 
other when met by. 
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interviewed more than once. 19 out of all in-depth interviews were tape-recorded, 
while all of them took extensive notes during interviews. Informants included Tai O 
people, and those involved in Tai O-related controversies. 
A note on the role of media 
A number of scholars point out that media serves two roles on legitimacy research: a 
source of legitimacy and indicator of legitimacy, especially the moral dimension 
(Deephouse and Carter 2005). This is because press coverage reflects as much as 
influence public opinion (Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Pfarrer et al. 2008). Pfarrer 
et al. (2008) propose that media exerts effects on organizations, when they discover 
the wrongdoing, ask for reasons of wrongdoing, and ask for ideas of sanction. 
Organizations, in return, make use of media to manage their legitimacy by delivering 
their accounts. As I will show in the case study, media exposures steered YWCA's 
response of the 2008 controversy in the later part. 
The study collected newspaper articles, television and radio news reports which are 
related to the two controversies. I could only gather two newspaper articles 
concerning the 1988 case, the remaining 217 articles and 94 electronic media reports 
concerned the more recent one. It may be due to limited resources available, but at 
the same time convey the message that the River Crab Saga received much more 
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media attention ?. 
Similar to Germany's situation, newspaper agencies have explicit political 
orientations. As a result, reports 'could have been strategically manipulated by the 
media themselves through processes such as framing or agenda-setting' (Patriotta et 
al. 2011: 10). The study intends to collect newspapers across the political spectrum, 
and mentions the relationship between their stances and the reported information. 
Ethical issues in this study 
Confidentiality 
Informants' accounts were kept confidential. Nevertheless, I sometimes 
cross-checked information among informants. One example was that Informant 
Uncle Law told me that victims of 2000 stilt house fire demanded for the step-down 
of him and Mr. Lung, the chairperson of TORC. They accused TO YWCA for being 
the initiator. On the other side, Luke, chairperson of the Concern Group, and John, 
the then center-in-charge, denied the accusation. The latter two admitted that some 
villagers were very angry at that time because TORC did not offer much help. Luke 
said he was the one to mediate the tense relationship. John suspected that the 
pro-TORC camp did not clearly distinguish past and existing workers, but labeled 
them as troublemaker as a whole. Such instances of triangulation helped clarify facts 
27 Also, one may say news reported in television and radio is more important and influential, but in 
Hong Kong, public opinion is more likely to be shaped by print media. As a result, I only conduct 
analysis on newspaper articles (including reports, columns, letters to the editor, and editorials) but not 
electronic news reports. 
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and rose up further queries for diverse views over the same issue. Also, I received a 
series of documents from one of my informants, which were written communications 
among YWCA, LegCo, and the involved social workers concerning the River Crab 
Saga. These documents will not be disclosed as required by the informant. 
Anonymity 
Since all the informants involved were still alive at the time of thesis publication, and 
the study concerned was controversial, disclosure of identity bears the risk of stirring 
up tensions in the field. All informants in this study remain anonymous. 
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Section 6 The setting: Tai O 
Tai O is situated in the southwestern part of Lantau Island, which, in return, the 
southwestern part of Hong Kong. From a broader view, Tai O is at the eastern part of 
Pearl River, facing Macau. It was an important and famous fishing port until the 
1960s. Tai O consists of a small island and a low-lying land belonged to Lantau 
Island, split by a Y-shaped creek called 'Chung'. Human settlement can be traced to 
as early as in Sung dynasty (Leung 2007:14). The physical environment and the 
climate made the place suitable for fishery, agriculture, and salt production, and 
therefore trading and business (including smuggling) with cities around the Southern 
China, such as Pan Yu, Kai Ping, and Xin Hui . It was also the market center of the 
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western and northern part of Lantau . 
Tai O is famous of its cultural traditions. Temples are well preserved. People 
endeavour to maintain celebrations and festivals. Chinese operas are organized in 
deities' birthdays. The most important festival is Dragon Boat Festival and the 'water 
parade' ritual the day before. Even family members who move out of Tai O to live 
come back to join the boat races or gather together. They also donate money for 
From Liu and Cheung's (2006) study on origin donors' origin of Tai O temples and folk songs. 
A collection of written reports about the District Officers responsible for the Southern 
Administrative District in 1950s (and also 1910s to 1920s), edited by Strickland (2010), illustrate the 
connection between Tai O and villages like Fan Lau, Shek Pik, Sham Wat, Sha Lo Wan, and San Tau 
• Fun Lau participated in deities' birthdays in Tai O (Coates) 
• Farmers in Shek Pik sold pigs to Tai O (Coates) 
Some children of Sham Wat studied at Tai O. (Hayes) 
• Villagers from Sha Lo Wan bought rice from Tai O shops. (Hayes) 
Villager from San Tau exchanged rice for other goods with Tai O shops. (Hayes) 
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activities. Through festivities, Tai O people express their local solidarities, 
attachment to the village, and their territorial boundaries^^ (Liu and Cheung 2006). 
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Figure 2 Tai O (the red dot) is situated in the southwestern part of Lantau Island, which, in return, the 
southwestern part of Hong Kong. (Source: zh.wikipedia^') 
Both land people and boat people hoped the deities would protect them from uncertainty, such as 
weather and fishery. During Chinese festivals or deities' birthdays, Tai O people organized lots of 
activities and celebrations. When deities' birthdays came, villagers organized themselves to raise 
funds for Chinese operas. People endeavor to maintain local religious celebrations and festivals. Right 
on the deities' birthdays, the person who snatched flower-cannon (later by lottery) could receive 
blessing from the deity throughout the year. People organized themselves according to their religion, 
locality or ethnicity, to increase the chance of getting the flower-cannon. Thus, flower-cannon 
associations were formed every year, and were an important way of maintaining social relations. The 
most important festival is Dragon Boat Festival and the 'water parade' ritual the day before. The 
purpose of water parade was to get rid of 'dirty' ghosts, which implied bad luck. Even families 
members who move out of Tai O to live come back to join the boat races or support their family 
members. They also donate money for activities. Also, Ching Ming, Lunar New Year and Mid-autumn 
Festival are occasions where family members gather together and perform religious activities. This 
expresses their local solidarities, attachment to the physical and social environment, and their 
territorial boundaries (Liu and Cheung 2006). It is safe to say that Tai O people, to a large extent, have 
a strong sense of belonging to the village, visible in the cultural practices. Some of my informants like 
Tumin, Ah Cheung, and Ms. Fan had a strong sense of place because Tai O was surrounded by natural 
environment, and was the place where they had grown up. 
31 The hyperlink: 
littp://upload.wikiniedia.org/wikipedia/comnions/tluinib/c/cc/Taio4ing/250px-Taio.png 
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Figure 3 Tai O and its neighboring region. (Source: Wikipedia Commons]:) 
Although not totally segregated' ‘, there is differential status between boat people and 
land people (Liu 2001). Called Tankas, boat people were demeaned during the 
imperial era until Qing dynasty. Their literacy level was far lower than the land 
people until mid-20th century (Liu 2001; Liu and Cheung 2006). The stilt houses 
were so built along the river bank]* originally to accommodate their children and 
elderly who could not fish with adults, because they were not allowed to build their 
home on land. Until now, boat people did not gain the status of original inhabitants as 
32 The hyperlink: 
http://upload.wikimedia.0rg/wikipedia/cornmons/thumb/c/ce/Taio.png/8OOpx-Taio.png 
In the past, land people, for example, had to depend on boat people for fish to live and to do 
business. Land people and boat people cooperated in temple repair works. The organizers, mostly the 
land people, were also local leaders (Liu and Cheung 2006:29-32). Inter-group marriage did happen, 
although rare. Also, there were people who had changed from fishermen to peasants after British 
takeover. 
34 Since 1982, the colonial government classified stilt houses as squatter houses. Once demolished, 
one cannot re-build a new one (except in the case of the 2000 fire damage, when victims struggled 
against the government for reconstruction). 
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land people in, say, Leung Uk, a nearby village, or Yuen Long and Sheung Shui, even 
though they have had their roots before British takeover. An obvious example was 
that stilt houses were only considered as boat squatter, which were illegal and ready 
to be demolished. Boat people, having a lower status, gradually cultivated an 
inclination to avoid trouble^^ (Ward 1985). With universal compulsory education and 
increased family income, the new generation of the boat families, now in forties and 
fifties, has increased living standard and status of boat people, although not 
completely equal^^. In the political arena, the victory of Mr. Chik in the District 
Board election in 1985 was a landmark of representation of fishermen groups in 
district levels. 
Land people built their concrete houses and shops. Many of the house and shop 
35 Beforehand, they were not allowed to live on land and joined examination (and therefore 
bureaucracy). The purpose was to control and stigmatize a group of people with no stable residence. 
They have no proper lineage record due to illiteracy (Liu 2001; Liu and Cheung 2006). Barbara Ward 
(1985), after her ethnographic study on Kau Sai, another Tanka population in Sai Kung, provided 
three explanations about fishermen's inclination to avoid trouble: 
...in part it comes from the positive teaching that the avoidance of trouble has in itself a high value, 
this is common to most Chinese training; in part it can be ascribed to the fact that the water-people, 
being mobile, can in fact very often avoid trouble simply by going away until it is all over; but thirdly, 
and, I think, at least in the fishermen ’s own consciousness, most importantly, is the feeling they have of 
being members of the despised Tanka class, unfamiliar with the things that go on land and fearful of 
being cheated by landsmen, who look down upon them. There is a saying that a Tanka who on the 
water is a vertitable dragon, on land is only a miserable worm. Unfortunately, they tend to believe it 
themselves (p. 21). 
36 The change was not as optimistic as anticipated. Uncle Wong and Luke told me that they were 
'cheated' and 'betrayed' by former fishermen representatives in TORC. They said during 1979 and 
1982, the government and fishermen representatives asked residents to sign a document about 
provisional use of Crown land during 1979 and 1982. The document stated that the government had 
the authority to ask residents to leave within three months, without prior notification and 
compensation. Moreover, if they did not sign the document, they would remove their stilt house. 
Many people were not literate, and signed. It was too late when they knew the document was a 
contract turning the ancestral house into a squatter. 
Therefore, a small number of boat people did not involve in the representative fishermen associations. 
Furthermore, after the 2000 fire, a portion of victims turned the Concern Group for assistance rather 
than TORC. 
4 7 
owners came from Pearl River Delta. Salt fields and paddle fields were once located 
in the southern part of Tai O. Workers and their families lived in Leung Uk and Wang 
Hang, a twenty-minute walk from the commercial centre. The salt producers were 
mainly Hokklos, and farmers mainly Hakkas. Altogether they were named as the 
land people. Since the 1960s, many of the paddle fields are abandoned. Part of the 
salt fields has now become a wetland, while part of them has turned into public 
housing estate. Today, the land people, boat people, and newcomers living in public 
estates comprise the around 3,000 residents in Tai O. Also, basic facilities such as 
social service agencies, public libraries, clinics, post offices, kindergartens, primary 
and secondary schools, have been set up gradually around the village (Liu and 
Cheung 2006). Since the completion of Tsing Ma Bridge in 1997, they can choose to 
take the bus or MTR via Tung Chung. Tai O has been more integrated into the Hong 
Kong territory, socially, economically, and politically. 
The administrative-political setting 
This part provides an overview of the present two-level but interrelated 
administrative and political system: the village and district-wide representative 
system. Local politics in Tai O is the focus in this study, and worth detail discussion. 
• The village representative system: HYK and RCs 
The village representative system follows a two-tier structure. HYK started in 1926 
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and prototype of RCs started during Japanese occupation. The two systems got 
formalized in 1959 when the HYK Ordinance was passed. RCs have formed the 
lower-level of the representative system in Tai O along with 26 other rural areas in 
Hong Kong37. Election was routinized in every four years since 1995. Land people 
dominate in TORC in terms of number of seats and power (Liu and Cheung 2006). 
The administrative area of TORC includes Tai O and ten nearby places such as 
o o 
Ngong Ping, Sha Lo Wan and Yi O . Composed of indigenous and residents' 
representatives, village representatives are mediators between the village and the 
district administration (especially the District Officer), spokesmen for their village, 
and advisors on rural issues for the government. As Lee (2003) points out, the power 
of RCs is authorized by the government, 'unlike the scholar-gentry whose power was 
based on academic qualifications' (p. 604) in the past. 
The Chairperson and Vice-chairpersons of all 27 RCs are eligible to join the HYK as 
ex-officio members39. Together with special councilors and co-opted councilors, the 
Kuk as a statutory body represents the indigenous population and advises the 
government on issues concerning the NT. Councilors elect one Chairperson and two 
37 The particularity of Tai O and some outlying islands like Peng Chau is that their importance from 
the eyes of HYK and the government was less than Tai Po or Yuen Long, where they had much more 
indigenous people and land owners. Until now, no HYK chairperson has come from the Southern 
District (see Note 13). When modernization and urbanization was in full swing during 1950s and 
1970s, the government kept close relationship with the other two districts. It was since the 1990s, 
when tourism and infrastructure development extended to the Lantau, that the Southern District 
became more important. 
- The ten nearby places were Fan Lau, Keung Shan, Leung Uk, Nam Tong Sun Tsuen, Ngong Ping, 
San Tau, Sha Lo Wan, Sham Shek, Tai Long Wan, and Yi O. 
-39 Other ex-officio members include the JPs. 
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Vice-chairpersons'^^. This forms the upper tier of the system. 
• The district-level representative system 
In the district level, Tai O belongs to the Lantau constituency under the Islands 
District Council. The constituency also includes areas like Shek Pik, Pui O, and Mui 
Wo. District Councils (DCs) are statutory bodies, which play an advisory role on 
district matters, reflect public opinion, promote community building, and monitor the 
delivery of public services (HAD 2011). The government also consults DCs for 
government policies and programs. The Island DC comprises of 22 members (10 
elected, 8 ex-officio, and 4 appointed). The ex-officio members are the RC 
chairpersons. 
Legislative Coiiiicil (LegCo) 
^ f thni. HYK Functional \ 
thni. District Co il / Constttiiency ^ 
Functional Coiistitueiicv/ ‘ Election Commitfee 
/ Heilug Kuk (HYK) (HYK subsector) 
/ [y 
District Coimdl ‘ ai.™aiid\lce-chaimi«iofRCs 
C h ™ o f R ( J ] R Committee (RC)-
Indigenous Iiihnbitaiit Resident 
RepreseutJitives (IIRs) Representatives (RRs) 
t 
Candidates Caudiclates 
(Indigenous luhabitaiits. (Village Residents, 
including (a) Indigenous mchiding (a) Indigenous 
Villagers livmg m the village; Villagers Inang m the village; 
and (b) Indigeiious Inhabitants aiid (b) Non-indigenoiis 
living oirtside the village) ViUageis) 
’ t 
Votei Voters 
(Indigenous loiiabitants) (V ILige Residents) 
Figure 4 The rural political system in connection with the SAR political system (Source: Cheung 
(2004:91) 
The Southern District, Tai Po District, and Yuen Long District constituted each of the three 
chairpersons of HYK. 
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• The district administration system 
Tai O belongs to the Islands District classified by the Home Affairs Department 
(HAD), with the District Officer as the head of the Islands District Office. The 
District Officer is the representative of the government at the district level. 
Community building, liaison, coordination with different governments, and 
information dissemination are the Officer's responsibilities. Village Representatives 
(VRs) of each RC are responsible for maintaining contact with the corresponding 
District Office. Other parts of the district administration system include District 
Management Committees, Area Committees, Mutual Aid Committees, and Owners' 
Corporation, with the last two irrelevant to Tai O. 
Local associations in Tai O 
Besides formal political system established by the government, there are a number of 
active local associations in Tai O which do not hold any office. Some of them 
represent their industries (like Hong Kong Fishermen's Association, Tai O 
(HKFATO), and Tai O Chinese Chamber of Commerce (TOCCC)), some are more 
specially for festivals (like dragon boat associations), while some serve for residents 
(such as Tai O Residents' Association (TORA)) in general. They are usually friendly 
with TORC. Most of the time they do not involve in formal local politics, but will 
express their stances in elections or when mobilized during great political events. On 
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the other hand, these organizations have influence on local affairs since some of their 
leaders are also TORC members. 
• Other incoming voluntary organizations 
On the other hand, there are a number of voluntary organizations from outside 
starting service in Tai O, usually with Catholic, Christian, and more recently 
Buddhist background. They provide charitable services, organize recreational 
activities, kindergarten, primary and later secondary education, while fulfilling their 
missionary role^ Except TO YWCA, others rarely involve in formal politics. 
This section describes the background and socio-political pattern in Tai 0 and the 
types of relationship between different types of organizations. In fact, the rural 
political system is far more dynamic and complicated, especially after WWII and 
district administration reform. The gradual integration of Tai O and the urban Hong 
Kong inevitably created tensions. This helps answer why the incoming TO YWCA 
and locally-constituted TORC (yet power endorsed by the government) generated 
conflicts on community issues. 
In 1957, Tai O Alliance Church was formed. It not only preached the gospel, but also provided 
kindergarten education for the community. A catholic missionary started the Wing Chor School in 
1937 (closed in 2003). The World Vision provided services for mentally-retarded children for several 
years in the 1970s. The Buddhist Fat Ho Secondary School opened in 1977. 
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Section 7 Legitimacy challenge on YWCA during 1988 District 
Board election 
This section illustrates the first instance of legitimacy challenge on YWCA by TORC 
and pro-TORC groups. While it does not mean there had not been conflicts 
beforehand, the dispute arrived at the peak when the TO YWCA center-in-charge 
joined election and contested with the representative of a local fishermen group. First, 
I will outline what resulted in the entry of YWCA in 1978. Second, by explaining the 
origin and development of the election and the parties involved, I will show the 
discrepancy between TO YWCA and pro-TORC stakeholders on beliefs and mental 
models of an SSO and its actual performance. Such incongruence constituted the 
legitimacy challenge in moral and cognitive dimensions. 
Entry ofYWCA 
According to Leon, the YWCA social work officer in 1980s, YWCA started service 
in Tai O for two reasons. First, Tai O fulfilled the definition of 'priority areas' 
selected by the NLCDP Committee composed of NGOs, CNTA, HKCSS, Housing 
Department, and SWD: 
an area with a population between 3,000 and 15,000; 
• the area not to be cleared within three years; 
low income areas; and 
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geographically isolated communities not accessible to welfare services. 
But why was YWCA the operating body? This comes with the second reason: 
YWCA already had a camp site in Shan Shek Wan in Lantau. Since the agency was 
more familiar with the areas, and therefore having more local connections and trust 
of local people, the difficulties in establishing new services were reduced"^^. 
This begs two questions. First, why did Tai O become a 'deprived area' as defined? 
Second, what distinguished NLCDP from other community projects in promoting 
residents' well-being? These point towards exploring the legitimating environment 
(Lister 2003) which defines legitimacy of TO YWCA. 
Tai O became increasingly difficult to live on its own 
Fishing business, poultry and agricultural industry went downwards since the 1960s, 
and salt production waned during the 1960s and 1970s; the growth of light industry 
like plastics, light bulb, embroidery, and electronics did not last long and declined in 
the 1980s. There were still stores selling daily necessities, but the scale was not 
comparable to the market town before (Liu and Cheung 2006; Vicky's interview). 
Urbanization of Hong Kong, marginalization of Tai O 
The decline of Tai O industries was exacerbated with rapid urbanization and 
42 Leon was the YWCA official representative of NLCDP Committee, the chairperson of Community 
Development subcommittee in 1978-1979 in HKCSS and later the chairperson of planning 
subcommittee in 1979-1980. He said that the guiding principle of selection was YWCA only chose the 
areas where the agency had services nearby. For example, the selection of Wang Tau Horn squatter 
was because they had existing services in Wong Tai Sin. A workman working at the Shan Shek Wan 
campsite was well-educated and knew some people in Tai O, hence the workman was the middleman 
during the foundation period. 
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modernization in the urban Hong Kong, where more job (and life) opportunities were 
available. Fewer youngsters would like to succeed their parents' harsh jobs full of 
uncertainty. The long travelling distance to the urban decreased their willingness to 
live at home and instead move to the u r b a n . As seen from the population 
composition, a large outflow of youngsters and mature adults occurred during the 
1970s and 1990s, leaving behind children and the elderly. The gradual increase of 
public facilities like public library, post office, public housing, town halls, clinic and 
fire service since the 1950s, certainly did little to retain residents. On the contrary, 
children and the elderly were in need of more assistance. This created the need of 
voluntary agencies to provide services and help solve community problems in Tai O. 
Table 2 The population composition in Tai O from 1961 to 2006. 
Age / Year 1961 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
0-9 2555 1931 1520 1076 875 415 171 314 110 
10-19 1252 1626 1200 1324 798 506 357 490 303 
20-29 1634 401 530 473 406 204 102 335 107 
30-39 2673 1995 420 360 469 307 197 488 440 
40-49 430 448 322 295 387 491 342 
50-59 510 514 476 338 222 356 468 
60+ 719 1205 620 955 987 832 787 920 1175 
Total 8833 7158 5230 5150 4333 2897 2223 3394 2951 
% compared from 1961 100 81.0 59.2 58.3 49.1 32.8 25.2 38.4 33.4 
(Source: Du and Zhang 1981; Census and Statistics Department 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 2002, 2007; 
TOY WCA 1982.) 
Road connection from Tai O to Mui Wo completed in the 1960s. Tung Chung Road opened for 
public use in 1966. Tai O Road was completed in 1971. Bus services for Tai O started in 1973. But 
this did not help residents stay in Tai O. 
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Expansion of government-initiated community development project 
Government involvement in community development can be traced back to 1949, 
mostly implemented in the urban Hong Kong. But the concept of community 
development project in Tai O came from, again, 1966-67 riots, as mentioned in 
Section 2. Numerous protests and demonstrations occurred throughout the 1970s. 
The government worried that such actions would be out of control. At the same time, 
a pioneer community development project in Tze Wan Shan, run by SWD, failed to 
achieve collective participation, because it faced the opposition from District Office, 
which itself was cultivating their own residents' groups. However, the government 
recognized the role of social workers in controlling people's manner of grievance 
expression (Leung (1986) called it 'ventilation role' (p.6)), which was more 
preferable to pressure groups*^ As a result, the government decided to launch 
44 SoCO, a well-known pressure group promoting grassroots interests through social action, was one 
of 11 pressure groups monitored by the Standing Committee on Pressure Groups (SCOPG), set up by 
the colonial government during 1978 and 1982. SCOPG was responsible of 'coordinating Government 
surveillance of any protest or campaigning group and of mounting counter-attacks... [and] aim[ed] to 
undermine, co-opt or coerce any of eleven target groups and others' (Campbell 1980: 8). Specifically, 
it was noted that 'As SOCO was not subvented it might be difficult for Government to restrain its 
action through the subvention machinery' (SCOPG 1980). Therefore, in the logic of the government, 
subvention was a tool to restrain radical actions. However, Wong (1989: 49-53) gave another example, 
that is Tsuen Wan Ecumenical Social Service Centre, another non-subvented Christian advocacy 
voluntary association. It successfully obtained subvention in the 1980s. Wong suggested three reasons 
to explain for successful subvention: 1) a credible church background, 2) coordination of NLCDP 
within HKCSS platform, and 3) implementation of the project within a locality, were reasons for 
successful getting subvention. Therefore, the government did not strictly reject pressure groups, as 
long as the criteria satisfied government desire. From the two examples, one can see that the 
government largely determined the extent of partnership with social service sector, whereas there was 
room for negotiation between government departments and SSOs. The fact is that most voluntary 
agencies worried that social actions would affect their relationship with government. Therefore, 
although some agencies respected autonomy of social workers and tolerate frontline workers using 
social actions to a certain extent, most would not adopt social actions as core mission. 
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NLCDPs, run by NGOs, to deal with the problem45. Therefore, the idea of 
'partnership' between social service sector and the government was somewhat 
exaggerated. It would be more appropriate to describe the relationship as 'partnership 
a la government'. 
A more conforming approach when new service began 
YWCA chose a more conforming approach at its start. There were not many 
differences between YWCA from other NGOs in forming a new service. The staffing 
and funding were standardized across all NLCDP teams formulated by SWD. A 
YWCA social work officer supervised several teams, and the Tai O team itself 
headed by a center-in-charge, who supervised two Social Work Assistants (SWAs) 
and a clerical assistant. City and New Territories Administration (CNTA) (now HAD) 
was responsible for overall policy decisions for NLCDP while SWD was responsible 
for monitoring their performance^^. Since 1985, subvention of NLCDP came from 
CNTA (Fung and Hung 2010). 
More difficult for YWCA was to gain local support. This means that it had to become 
integrated into Tai O society, linking its goals and services to people's daily practices, 
Leung (1990:15-16) lists five reasons for the 'surprising' (p. 15) move. The core argument was that: 
The government believed that supervision by Social Welfare Department and voluntary organizations 
could absorb the more radical social workers into existing district consultation mechanisms. The HAD 
or District Office could liaise with pressure groups and the aggrieved people in deprived areas through 
social workers, by subventing community development programs. It indicated that the government 
changed from antagonism to understanding towards pressure groups, recognizing the contribution of 
'moderate' social action (see also Wong 1989: 63-64). 
46 As long as the TOYWCA did not violate the regulations devised by SWD, it gained regulative 
legitimacy. The structure of TOYWCA was similar to other social work terms with the same SSO, and 
most of other SSOs in Hong Kong during 1970s. 
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beliefs, and routines, thus to obtain legitimacy from villagers. 
Due to strong, extensive and complex family and kinship network^?, not to mention 
other relationships like neighbourhood, schoolmates, church members, and members 
of the same dragon boat or other associations, Tai O people have had frequent 
economic and social exchanges among themselves ^^  (Liu and Cheung 2006; 
Mingpao Weekly 2010). Another consequence of the tight social network is strong 
social control49. Maintaining one's good impression to others in a village community 
was important. Tai O is no less an exception. Local leaders, including the TORC 
members, demonstrated their organizational and political skills through festive and 
religious occasions. When these activities can demonstrate their local solidarities, 
attachment to the village, and their territorial boundaries for themselves, the presence 
of government officials further endorse their status in the community (Liu 2003). 
Face, according to Huang (1987), 'denotes an individual's social position or prestige, 
gained by successfully performing one or more specific social roles that are well 
recognized by others' (p. 960). It can be inferred that, if the leaders cannot manage 
47 For the boat people, catching fish was a family business. Marriage in the past done within the 
village. A family usually had several children. Few people found their mates outside Tai O, such as 
Castle Bay (Anderson 2007). Change happened since the 1970s and 1980s, when fishery was in 
decline. Tai O people started to live and work outside, and more men have chosen to find their wives 
from the mainland. 
Liu and Cheung (2006) map out kin relations of over forty shrimp boat people. Three of my 
informants used the same phrase ' interwoven'( to describe. 
49 Instrumentally, their strong ties were effective in solving financial problems (through borrowing 
money from relatives or selling daughters to brothels during 1940s and 1950s (Liu and Cheung 2006)). 
Informants often distinguished 'close' relationship from 'good' relationship. Good relationship 
resulted in mutual help and care. Close relationship sometimes helped spread rumors or oppress 
dissident voices, which would reproduce unequal power relations and enforce conformity. 
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the community well, that is failure to fulfill their roles, or are blamed publicly, they 
would lose face. They will try to prevent this from occurring. On the other way round, 
ordinary people will prefer listening to the rural elites' (land people in majority) 
opinions through obedience and giving face. The trouble-aversion attitude of 
fishermen is another expression of conformity. 
From my interview, the elites regarded those organizations promoting community 
well-being being 'good'. On the other hand, when organizations or individuals 
sought help, they were likely to first look for TORC or affiliated associations, 
whether or not they helped, to give 'face' to the elites. 
Strategies to gain moral legitimacy 
In the foundation period, the relationship between TO YWCA and TORC and rural 
elites was 'friendlier'. TO YWCA behaved like an ordinary voluntary organizations 
like the church or other charity bodies. The NLCDP team members forged 
connections with the rural elites and ordinary residents. This was to build up 
collaborative relationships with local associations, so they would provide resources 
in case TO YWCA needed help. They visited RC members, accompanied with 
Liaison Officers from Islands District Office as a middleman. After it started service, 
the TO YWCA organized a number of activities and projects to encourage social 
participation and community network in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example: 
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• It formed female dragon boat teams with fishermen associations with HKFA to 
increase female participation in society; 
• It conducted a community survey on social needs, then dental healthcare 
projects, and local cultural economic projects. By networking TORC, local 
associations, schools, youngsters, with outside organizations such as HKU 
Department of Periodontology and Public Health, or tourists, it succeeded in 
mobilizing community resources, identifying solutions to social problems, like 
regular dental check, or organizing tours to facilitate local economy and 
employment (although the tourism project was evaluated unsuccessful in the 
end). 
• They also employed local people to be staff members. 
'Filling the service gap' became TO YWCA's point of intervention into Tai O 
community. In a village facing aging population and in need of tangible social 
services, its role as a 'helping hand' with concrete outcomes (Suchman 1995), and 
the fostering of community participation that fulfilled the requirement of social work 
values, surely increased TO YWCA's moral and pragmatic legitimacy, as shown in 
recognition and collaboration of pro-TORC leaders and other villagers. 
Factors that undermined TO YWCA ’s moral and cognitive legitimacy from villagers 
Although TO YWCA obtained residents' support and did not receive any questions 
from other bodies from its start, there were two factors that undermined TO YWCA's 
cognitive legitimacy from villagers. The first one was the misunderstanding of 
government-YWCA relations. The second one was that rural elites could not fully 
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understand its advocacy dimension. More importantly, it was the second factor that 
largely contributed to the dispute in the 1988 election. 
Misunderstanding of government-YWCA relations: Religious charitable 
organizations certainly were not new to Tai O. Therefore, TO YWCA, with a 
Christian background, was not totally alien to Tai O people. The novelty was that it 
was the first formal govemment-subvented voluntary organization in town. My 
social worker informants admitted that residents did not understand very much about 
internal operations, such as service standards, supervision, and the relation with the 
government. The rural elites misunderstood that TO YWCA and YWCA were fully 
subvented by SWD, and should therefore oblige to the government. The conventional 
'social service model' of TO YWCA were not fit with the model that villagers 
expected. 
Manipulating the cognitive environment and its consequence: The community 
development project involved consciousness raising and organizing. The team 
members and a group of youngsters noticed the gloomy future of domination of rural 
elites in rural political structure, such as the impossibility to make changes and 
favoritism. The Tai O team members encouraged and helped residents to use 
alternative yet legal means to express grievances and collectively solve problems. 
They tried to create ‘new legitimating beliefs' (Suchman 1995). Informant Vicky's 
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experience was a clear example. In 1982, when she was married, she moved to Yim 
Tin Pok village to live (Lung Tin Estate today), where water supply and electricity 
were unavailable at that time. The China Light and Power Company Limited (CLP) 
told her that she had to pay 12,000 HKD to connect electricity. Unable to afford, she 
looked for TORC for help, but declined. She then asked Sean, the then 
center-in-charge since 1983, for help. He taught her to write letters to the Water 
Supplies Department and CLP. Serveral months later, WSD promised to provide 
water supply, and three years later, CLP provided electricity for free. She admitted 
that her first experience in striving for a better living drove her to concern 
community issues: 
Social workers enthusiasm and commitment into the community made some of our 
Tai O residents from indifference to being courageous to form concern groups, or 
express our views. This was a great contribution ….Where there is a will, there is a 
way. We need to voice out unfairness. Striving for rights is very important. In the past, 
I only appreciated Tai O. [But] to love Tai O is not just a slogan and do nothing. It 
would result in nothing if we don ’t strive for [elimination] of unfairness and injustice. 
Social workers are my teacher. 
Vicky solved her problems through TOYWCA, which in turn strengthened their 
support to TOYWCA. Sean turned TOYWCA to be more advocacy-oriented, and 
started to challenge TORC and the pro-TORC groups. On the other hand, the rural 
elites did not agree that TOYWCA should engage in advocacy and community work; 
those should be TORC's responsibility. Again, the advocacy work TOYWCA 
pursued was not legitimate in the eyes of TORC, both because the means was not 
6 2 
appropriate, and TORC did not understand a supposedly welfare organization 
carrying rights-based goal. As a result, even though YWCA was granted legitimacy 
from government as regulator, users and a portion of villagers in moral dimension, it 
was not granted moral and cognitive legitimacy from TORC and pro-TORC groups. 
Such 'legitimacy deficit' accounted for the dispute in the subsequent 1988 DB 
election. 
Struggle in 1988 District Board election 
The background: Why election? 
Before portraying the contest of Sean against the incumbent Mr. Chik in the 1988 
District Board election, we need to explain the origin of election, and the goals of 
both contestants. 
District Administration reform 
The early to mid-1980s marked the beginning of district administration. In June 1980 
and January 1981, the colonial government published a Green Paper and White Paper 
respectively on district administration in Hong Kong. In late 1981, the government 
formed a district board in each of the newly divided 18 districts. There are different 
interpretations of the district administration reform. The government stated that the 
purpose was to enhance local participation, government co-ordination and 
responsiveness to district problems (Hong Kong Government White Paper 1981). 
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Certainly, with more people moving into new towns, the government needed to 
reform the administrative system to cater to increasing social needs. Wong (1982) 
argues that the reform would absorb conflicts between indigenous inhabitants and 
new town residents into formal channels (Wong 1982:17). Lo (1997) further argues 
that this was the government's strategy to absorb opposition power by pressure 
groups into formal, peaceful political arena (p. 77). 
Whatever the reasons, the first DB election was held in all 18 districts in 1982. It was 
the first territory-wide political participation through election. DBs were basically 
advisory bodies. Members could give advice on, within their districts, the provision 
and use of public facilities and government programs, and matters affecting people's 
well-being. They could undertake minor works and promote recreational and cultural 
activities when funds were available. The DB comprised three parts: official, 
appointed unofficial, ex-officio, and elected^®. Official members were representatives 
of government departments that were mostly related to district management. The 
government also appointed members of the public to the Board. RC chairpersons 
were the ex-officio members (Lau 1999). 
Candidates for DB election in 1982 were more on individual basis (Miners 1995). 
50 In 1985, the number of elected seats was increased from 132 to 237, all officials were withdrawn 
from membership of the Boards, and the District Officers ceased to be their Chairmen. Until 1994 the 
remaining 140 appointed members gave way to a wholly elected membership. Appointment system 
resumed in 1997. In the past term (2007-2011), the ratio of elected to appointed members was set at 
around four to one. 
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When the British negotiated with China on Hong Kong's future, DBs gradually 
became an arena for practicing democratization agenda and contestation of political 
power (Li 1993). After signature of the Joint Declaration, it was a consensus that 
different layers of representative systems would be more open. In the end, the LegCo 
in Hong Kong would be formed by direct election. Therefore, more injection of 
elective elements in the local level was predictable. Since 1985, DB chairpersons 
have been elected by members. The proportion of directed elected seats also 
increased. Therefore, Tsang (1995) argues that Beijing did not object to political 
reform in Hong Kong, as long as it did not violate Beijing's expectation (p. In 
the 1980s, rural elites (Ip 1988) and social workers were two major groups 
52 
enthusiastic in elections. Others included pressure groups and political groups . 
Reconsolidation of rural forces 
There was clear expression that the status and influence rural elites were under the 
threat of district administration reform (Hayes 1996; Lau 1999). Hence, they 
frequently negotiated with the colonial government for seats in those bodies. After 
series of bargaining, the government granted ex-officio seats to RC chairpersons in 
51 In earlier 1984, the colonial government published a Green Paper consulting the public of more 
representative government, such as indirect election of LegCo members in 1985, and forming a 
Regional Council in 1986 governing municipal services and facilities. 
The categorization was somewhat fuzzy, a major force was pro-democracy camp who called for a 
more democratic political system along the transition period to beyond 1997, later evolved to 
'democracy as anti-Communism'. Social workers at that time more or less shared their idea. On the 
other hand, more grassroots associations emerged to fight for their interests, like improving housing 
conditions. Some were formed with the help with community social workers, some were autonomous, 
while some were pro-Beijing. 
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DBs from the beginning. The government also granted ex-officio seats to HYK 
chairpersons and vice-chairpersons in the RegCo from the start. The HYK, not 
removing totally their worry, finally supported this arrangement (Ip 1988: 110). Also, 
the government also appointed some DB members with indigenous background. On 
top of the safety, the indigenous inhabitants actively joined DB and RegCo elections 
(examples can be seen from the case studies from Chan 2008; Chung 1988; Ip 1988). 
Ip (1988: 114) points out that there was consistently a greater representation of 
indigenous people in the 1982, 1985 and 1988 DB terms than the NT population by 
summing up elected, appointed and ex-officio seats, and concluded that the rural 
influence was not fading but otherwise . 
Table 3 Composition of District Boards in 1982-1991 
O f f i c i a l ~ 
Non-official members 
members 
H I > Is- ^ I a > 
Term of Office Chairperson 8 | o p | ^^  
a l l c = 
a o S- a 
1982-85 District Officers 132 134 27 30 167 490 
1985-88 Elected from among 237 132 27 30 NA 426 
1988-91 DB members 264 141 27 30 NA 462 
(Source: LegCo Secretariat 2006). 
Especially from after WWII to 1980s, HYK showed support of the colonial government, in return 
lobbied for better compensation for land resumption. Negotiations over land prices for exchange 
continued were the major tension between rural villagers and the government. The small-house policy 
was created to pacify them (Bray 2001: 163-167) thereafter. In the negotiation of Hong Kong's future, 
both Beijing and London government made use of HYK as a messenger to gauge the probable 
reaction of the other party (Ip 1988 120-122). These village elites also built a good relationship with 
‘the new protector' (Hayes 2006:157). Finally, HYK itself gained advantages in the bargaining 
process, such as assurance of maintenance of indigenous inhabitants' interest after unification with 
China. 
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The election in Tai O 
The 1988 DB election was the third time. The constituency was Tai O and Tung 
Chung. There were 2,352 electors eligible to vote in Tai O (held in TORC office). 
The term served for three years. The two candidates were Sean, the center-in-charge 
of TO YWCA, and Mr. Chik, the secretariat of HKJFATO. They enrolled in the 
election on individual basis (Sean as social worker, and Mr. Chik as fisherman), but 
since villagers knew that each candidate was the key person of his own organization, 
the election was actually a test of villagers' support for the pro-TOYWCA camp and 
pro-TORC camp. 
The pro-TOYWCA camp 
Sean was concerned about local affairs, such as transportation and leisure facilities. 
But his primary objective of election was to raise Tai O people's social and political 
awareness. He, his colleagues, and a group of members (notably youngsters), noticed 
the lack of channels to express residents' needs, acquire resources, and advocate 
political reform. He attributed the failure to the closure of rural political system: 
The community stagnated, because political participation was dominated by 
established parties. [We] needed to think of a way to break political monopoly, 
whether to use this method (election) to change the distribution of power in the 
community. It was risky. But from another perspective, it brought the society an 
impact. When the community was always persistently led by the same group of 
people, residents felt discontent. At that time, some rural elites had sat for [the 
Committee] for some decades. Other places appeared different. Bringing change to 
the community promoted healthy development. Always with the same parties, with the 
same mindset, it was hard to breakthrough or change. 
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Risky, as he admitted, he decided to ‘break the tradition' by joining election^'^. 
Political participation of social workers in DB, RegCo, UrbCo, and LegCo was a 
trend in the 1980s (Cheung 2008; Leung 1986; Ma 2007), and they got a nice result 
(Zuo 1988). Leung (1986) explained the core idea was to fight for grassroots' 
political participation and sharing of political power: 
Making use of their local connections, skills in publicity and ability to mobilize 
resources, they have been very active in orchestrating election campaigns in the 
recent district board elections. Community workers advocating wider 
democratization, accountable government and redistributive policies are facing 
important challenges, (p. 9). 
Sean was one of the over 41 social workers working in SSOs joining the 1988 
election (Zuo 1988). 
The pro-TORC camp 
Mr. Chik was already a DB member for the previous term, and wanted to contest for 
a second55. His election platform was mainly to improve transportation, such as 
increasing the frequency of bus and ferry services, to demand the government to 
build the second phase of the Lung Tin Public Estate, to demand the government to 
construct a sheltered boat anchorage for mooring of fishing boats and other vessels in 
case of typhoon, as well as a means of reviving the local fishing industry. At that 
54 Even in retrospect, YWCA acknowledges this piece of history. In its review on organizational 
history, YWCA noted the role of social workers in democratization: 
Different sections of the society engaged in political participation. Social workers were the most 
active, because their profession is based on the spirit of democracy, and improve livelihood. They 
would like to strive for rights with the deprived through political participation. (YWCA 2000: 52). 
55 Mr. Chik's motivation for election should be understood as safeguarding rural influence. 
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time, he found DB was an effective channel for reflect residents' needs^^. 
The assistance of NTAS in local election campaign: Mr. Chik and HKFATO were 
closely related to TORC, and TORC strongly supported him. Other supporters 
included other fishermen's associations and rural elites. Facing the opening of 
election channels, the pro-Beijing agricultural, flowery, and fishing associations, and 
their affiliated youth, women and neighborhood groups, re-organized and started the 
New Territories Association of Societies (NTAS) in 1985 (Chau 2009). NTAS was 
enthusiastic in organizing, and 'play[ed] coordination roles in election campaigns to 
assist patriotic camp' (Loh 2010: 186). HKFA was a founding member and long-time 
supporter of NTAS (HKFA 2007). NTAS supported Mr. Chik in the 1985 DB 
election (NTAS 1986). 
Before the polling day 
Long before the election, the TO YWCA already questioned the status quo and called 
for more concern on the composition of TORC, namely no elections since the first 
term in 1959, and the absence of monitoring mechanisms (TOYWCA 1984). 
Obviously, TORC and pro-TORC groups were not happy with the questioning. 
During the contestation stage, disputes grew up. ‘To vote to whom' became a trouble 
to Tai O families. Quite a number of informants answered that kinship mattered. 
56 Until 2011, Mr. Chik was still a co-opted member of Tourism, Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Environmental Hygiene Committee under the Islands DC (the Islands DB before 1999). 
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Sean at that moment believed that his chance of winning was small because residents 
voted along with their family members, and people had known other people's choices 
due to the tightly-knitted kinship network. Sam elaborated that a tight social network 
and the remote setting easily made residents regard Sean as an outsider : 
From the eyes of villagers and rural elites, YWCA is an outsider. The outsiders have their own 
standpoint.... rural elites keep a distance from outsider organizations. 
The local relationship was rather tense. Peggy, the then colleague of Sean, 
remembered that the friendship between him and a member of HKFATO broke up as 
a result of the election. As the election date came closer, the controversy escalated. 
Supporters from both parties started to post ‘big character posts' to attack rivalries 
and defend themselves. Newspapers described the posting place, that is, the arena 
outside the RC, as ‘the Xidan democracy wall with Hong Kong style'( 
H ).One of the accusations from Mr. Chik's supporters was that a newspaper 
report boasted the contribution of TO YWCA and Sean, and smeared Tai O people 
(Wah Kill Yat Po 1989; also see Wenweipo 1989 - See Appendix 2 for the newspaper 
reports). 
57 As the later parts will show, the local / outsider distinction is ambiguous. The rural elites 
considered Eton and Leung Yiu-chung outsiders, but encouraged villagers to vote for Mr. Wan, a Miii 
Wo villager. The identity politics was played to exclude some potentially powerful group or 
individuals who would threaten the rural elites' status. 
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The polling day and election result 
Table 4 1988 District Board election results (Constituency: Tung Chung and Tai O) 
Year 1985 1988 
Number of eligible voters in whole constituency (a) 2,427 2,977 
Number of eligible voters in Tai O (b) 1,894 2,352 
Total voter turnout in whole constituency (cl) 1,417 1,565 
Total number of effective votes in whole (c2) 1,408 1,534 
constituency 
• Mr. Chik (Fisherman) 1,012(71.8%) 899 (58.6%) 
• Sean (Social worker) 635 (41.4%) 
• Mr. Ho (Teacher) 396 (28.2%) 
Voter turnout in Tai O (d) 1,174 1,309 
Percentage of votes from Tai O (e) 82.8% 83.6% 
- ( d ) / ( c l ) x 100% 
Percentage of voter turnout in Tai O (f) 62.0% 55.6% 
=(d) / (b) X 100% 
Percentage of voter turnout in whole (g) 58.4% 52.3% 
constituency 
- ( c l ) / ( a ) x 100% 
Percentage of voter turnout in NT (h) 47.8% 38.7% 
Percentage of voter turnout in HK (i) 37.5% 30.3% 
(Source: Louie and Shum (1995) and unpublished material obtained from Registration and Electoral 
Office. Percentages of (c) to (g) are compiled by the author.) 
The big day came. Tai O was the most fierce 'battlefield' among other places in the 
constituency^^. Table 4 displays some data about the election result. More than 80% 
of votes came from Tai O. Although less than the election in 1985, more than half of 
Tai O voters (55.6%) still cast their votes, which was greater than the percentage of 
voter turnout in Hong Kong (30.3%), the New Territories (38.7%), and even the 
There were altogether five polling stations. The other four stations were located at the conference 
room of Po Lin Monastery, village council of Sha Lo Wan, village council-cum recreation center of 
Horn Tou, and Tung Chung Headquarter of Auxiliary Medical Service. 
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constituency (52.3%). In the end, Sean lost the election, but it was not a landslide 
failure. Evidently, Mr. Chik lost more than 10% support when compared in 1985; he 
got 899 votes, Sean got 635 votes, a ratio of 3 to 2. Recall that the constituency was 
Tung Chung and Tai O, but at that time, Tai O was more populous than Tung Chung. 
Sean did not put much effort on getting support outside Tai O. On the contrary, the 
linkage of Tung Chung and TORCs and fishermen groups was more established. It 
could be safe to deduce that most of Sean's votes were from Tai O people. This 
means that he got about half of voters' support. Voters' age breakdown was not 
available, but from informants' account, a significant portion of Sean's votes came 
from youngsters and those who received TOYWCA's help^^. The winner of DB 
election could represent the constituency in advising district affairs, channeling 
district needs to government departments. The DB member could also join the 
LegCo indirect election. For the rural elites, they could uphold their influence in the 
DB despite challenge from urbanization. For Sean, it meant a demonstration to the 
villagers of the possibility of change through political participation: 
People would make comparison, and believe that my vote could affect 
[something]...[the election] increased the awareness about community problems, 
and added different voices in the community, which indirectly increased the 
opportunity for youngsters... sew the seeds. 
59 However, Mr. Lin and Mr. Chik told me that some youngsters who originally supported Sean 
finally helped Mr. Chik because Sean was in an occasion criticized youngsters as ignorant, which they 
thought they were offended. This comment was echoed by Mr. Chik. 
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YWCA after the election: Complaint by TORC and its repair strategies 
After the election, TO YWCA continued their service, although Sean and his 
colleagues needed some time to adjust their mood. Also, he admitted that 'the close 
relationship became different'. Not long after, TORC complained to the Islands 
District Officer because it made TORC 'discontented'. According to Peggy, one of 
the TO YWCA social workers at that time, said that TORC questioned why YWCA, a 
social service organization, allowed its workers to compete in DB election. It 
requested TOYWCA to close down service. Recall that CNTA was responsible for 
overall policy decisions for community development programs while SWD was 
chiefly responsible for monitoring their performance. Contrasted with the River Crab 
Saga, both the Islands District Officer and SWD rejected TORC's request. Peggy 
remembered that SWD responded that the department had no authority to command 
the closure. The Islands District Officer responded that the department was not 
responsible for the request. In response to the challenge, Vicky initiated a signature 
campaign to support the agency, and received signatures from several hundred 
residents. As for YWCA's reaction, Peggy said the team explained to the residents 
(including TORC), the management, SWD, and the District Office the purpose of 
joining the election, and their effort on Tai O in the past years. The team also 
clarified that Sean joined the election on an individual basis. The management had no 
further inquiry or action. Chris added that it was usually the YWCA Chief Executive 
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and Deputy Chief Executive to deal with complaints, whereas ‘basically the 
complaints did not go up to the level of board members' (interview). Leon, the then 
supervisor for community work, explained that he acted as a 'middleman' to mediate 
the relationship between frontline social workers and the Board and the Chief 
Executive when disputes occured, reducing the chance of 'surprising' the board 
members: 
If colleagues would do something unusual or shocking, I asked them to let me know 
earlier, and write a few words in the report. This helped me explain to the bosses, 
before they knew about it in the newspaper. 
Ah Cheung, the center-in-charge in the 1990s, acknowledged that it was common for 
rural NLCDP teams to receive complaints from rural elites during the 1980s and 
1990s, but 'the agency normally just dismissed the complaints or enquiries from 
District Office and SWD (interview). 
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Section 8 The River Crab Saga from 2008 to 2010 
To understand the meaning and detail of River Crab Saga, twenty years after the 
dispute of DB election, we need to first understand the cause of the Saga, that is, the 
dispute of the TO YWCA and TORC over relief strategies after two floodings in June 
and September 2008. (A detailed chronology of the dispute is shown in Appendix 3.) 
The two floodings in brief 
On June 7 2008, The Observatory reported that the hourly rainfall records had been 
broken since records began in 1884. Worse still, telephone services, water supplies 
and land transportation in Tai O were all damaged. The whole village was in great 
need, especially elderly care. The public was shocked about the chaos after they 
finally knew about it from headlines of mass media. The government was seriously 
blamed for lack of coordination for relief, even though the Chief Secretary replied it 
was already very fast. The Islands District Office also clarified that the staff members 
took a rapid response and started an emergency mechanism to cope with the 
rainstorm, which included providing rescue services and maintained communication 
between TORC, all VRs and residents. In the subsequent days, the Islands District 
Office coordinated relevant government departments to resume daily services for 
people living in Tai O and nearby. Still, on June 11, residents called for a press 
conference to express grievances and criticize the government's slow reaction (Ming 
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Pao 2008). 
If June 7 was a black day for Tai O, then September 23 was the second. Typhoon 
Hagupit hit Hong Kong, bring the tide and swallowed the low-lying village. The 
flooding cut off electricity, causing huge damage to properties, and great loss to the 
local business again. Nobody in Tai O expected of such a high tide. Some VRs 
helped evacuate villagers to safe places, and recorded villagers' losses to Islands 
District Office. TO YWCA also distributed relief materials to residents. The District 
Office started an emergency co-ordination center at TORC on September 24 before 
dawn, coordinating relief works, helped residents clear the mud and debris, repair 
electricity, arrange shelters and food, and other measures in the next few days and 
weeks. Over 560 applications sought for government's emergency financial 
assistance even in October, one month after the typhoon (Tai Kung Pao 2008). 
What were TORC's challenges to YWCA? 
When people conceived that the dispute was set aside when the typhoon season was 
gone, a new wave of community disputes began with a series of letters of complaint 
from the Lantau District Councilor and TORC (Table 5), from October 2008 to 
March 2009. YWCA responded to each compliant, and it tended to comply more 
with the demands from the complainants one after the next. Owing to the importance 
of temporal sequence, I present the challenge and response in terms of three stages. 
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Stage 1 Challenge on strategies, no indication of change in return 
The first letter of compliant (Letter 1) was written by the Lantau District Councilor, 
who was also a member of Mui Wo Rural Committee and NTAS. His reason of 
complaint was that he received residents' dissatisfaction with the work of TO YWCA, 
including 'always mobilized residents to oppose the plans and works that the 
government implemented, which caused quarrels and spoiled the harmonious 
atmosphere in the community'. Residents hoped that TO YWCA should 'adopt a mild 
strategy to implement community work to enhance harmonious atmosphere of the 
community'. Otherwise, it was not what ‘a SWD-subvented nonprofit' should behave. 
His demand to YWCA was straightforward: 'to understand the mission of TO YWCA, 
so that I can explain it to residents...' The recipient was YWCA Chief Executive, 
while copies were sent to Secretary of Labor and Welfare, Director of SWD, and 
Islands District Officer. In response, the Chief Executive restated the mission of 
YWCA and TO YWCA, the contribution that TO YWCA had made in the previous 
thirty years, in particular the effort and appreciation of the two disaster relief. 
The reply letter did not mention any alteration in work principles and strategies, or 
'business as usual' simply speaking. Although YWCA considered the letter as the 
first letter of compliant, it was rather like an enquiry asking for clarification. It 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stage 2: Challenge on strategies and intention, too costly to ignore demands 
This time TORC was the complainant. It listed out three recent examples which 
TOYWCA's strategy in dealing with local affairs was inappropriate and damaged 
residents' well-being, including urging to organize residents' meeting during disaster 
relief, which was ‘radical and confrontational', and destroyed channel of 
communication; and putting up posters to appreciate TORC and government after 
completion of relief as if TO YWCA was the ‘local leader,6 . 
Similar to the District Councilor's compliant but with a stronger tone, TORC 
questioned whether TO YWCA behaved as an organization fully-subvented by the 
government^'. More importantly, TORC accused TO YWCA for deviation of original 
mission, and showed a deep distrust of TO YWCA: 
…social workers Mr. Chong [and] Eton of the office [i.e. TO YWCA] exploited 
villages innocence, to demean TORC, to provoke antagonism between residents, and 
RC and government. What is the intention behind? (Letter 3) 
The demands of TORC were more serious than of the District Councilor. More 
importantly, there would be consequences if YWCA did not respond properly: 
The above cases are just some of the many. [The RC] hereby send this letter to urge 
your Association to seriously monitor the performance of workers of the Office. If 
[TOYWCA] still insist in provoking disputes and damage the cooperation between 
residents and our Committee as well as the government, our Committee and all 
associations in Tai O will not welcome the Office to continue the service. (Letter 3) 
The other case were thwarting the government's suggestion of the new site of refuse collection 
point to improve the appearance of the tourist spot without counterproposals. 
61 In fact, it never received full subvention from the government (see Income and expenditure of 
YWCA 2000-2010). It can imply that TORC did not fully understand the nature of TOYWCA and 
YWCA, even the team had been providing service for 30 years. 
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Also the recipients of the letter were at a higher level: YWCA President, with copies 
to the Secretary of Labor and Welfare, Director of SWD, Secretary of Home Affairs, 
Director of Home Affairs, and YWCA Chief Executive. 
YWCA understood the severity of the complaints, and could not afford the cost of 
dismissal. The President replied four days after receiving the letter, and 'show[ed] 
deep concern and decided to form a special duty group to conduct investigation' 
(Letter 4). 
The group consecutively met the two social workers and TORC representatives^^. In 
the meeting with TORC representatives on January 12, TORC listed eleven reasons 
for complaints concerning the manner and intention of relief strategies for the two 
floodings, stated in reports of the duty group (Cheung 2009): 
1. The Tai O team did not inform TORC about the parking of the water tanker and 
water delivery; 
2. The team held press conference and meetings for the aggrieved without 
informing the TORC and Islands District Officer; 
3. The TORC felt suspicious of the purpose and identity of the team and 
residential association posting acknowledgement posters; 
4. The work and opinions of the team were so outrageous during relief works; 
62 In the first meeting, the duty group members met with the two Tai O workers, Ken and Deputy 
Chief Executive. The group members concluded that the TO YWCA's approach in relief caused 
discontents of Island District Officer and the RC. Moreover, they emphasized the importance of good 
relationship with RC: 
'Members of the special group believed that to effectively provide set^ices to the community, workers 
must maintain good relationship and effective communication with government departments and the 
RC, to let them feel respected and publicly appreciate their merits, hoping that staff members can 
pwactively improve the relationship with Tai O RC and government departments.‘ 
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5. The team was too close with Legislator Leung Yiu-chung, making TORC 
thought that the Association slanted towards certain political orientation; 
6. The team was not courteous enough when borrowing and using TORC office; 
7. The team used loudspeakers inappropriately; 
8. The team obstructed the relief work between government departments and the 
RC; 
9. The team organized residents to lodge complains with the LegCo; 
10. The team disseminated inaccurate message and defamed Tai O; and 
11. The team arranged volunteers and residents to appraise YWCA in public 
occasions and activities. 
In addition, TORC expressed discontents over past conflicts, which occurred in 1988 
DB election, the 2000 stilt house fire, and discontents over the goals and strategies of 
TO YWCA in general^^ TORC suggested that TO YWCA should choose among 1) 
closure; 2) relocating to other places in Lantau where services were needed; or 3) 
changing the work objectives and strategies, minimizing the participation of sensitive 
issues, and improve communication with government departments and TORC. Table 
6 shows the extract of of disputes of TORC, TO YWCA, and others involved in the 
disaster r e l i e f ^ 4 Details and quotes are shown in Appendix 4. 
In this way, TORC could illustrate that 'disputes over floodings relief are just some of the many', 
as shown in the first letter of compliant. 
64 he data is collected from interview and documents. I have elaborated five of the eleven points that 
TORC raised. The rest mainly courtesy issues, which lacked written support. Also, the arguments 
were more or less reflected in the elaborated points. 
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Table 6 Extract of disputes in the disaster relief. 
Item 1: The arrangement of water tankers and water delivery 
Water supply was broken down on the first day of the June flooding. The police was 
not familiar with the environment, and did not know where to park the water tanker. 
The police contacted TO YWCA, and suggested parking the tanker near the old pier. 
The center-in-charge did not object to it. The RC did not agree, because the location 
was far away from where most people lived. 
TORC: YWCA should have consulted TOYWCA: Eton had told the 
the RC, so that RC and fishermen center-in-charge to seek the R C s 
representatives would guide the water opinion, but the center-in-charge finally 
tanker to park in the new pier. This did not do so. (Interview with Eton) 
would ease people's difficulty in getting 
water. (Interview with Uncle Lok) 
Item 3: Suspicion over the purpose of TO YWCA and residents' group to thank the 
community 
In the following few days after the June rainstorm, a group of victims, including 
Vicky, formed the Tai O Post-rainstorm Reconstruction Concern Group to monitor 
the recovery process. TO YWCA was not a member of the Group (TO YWCA 2008), 
but acted as a facilitator, such as offering tangible support and encouraged people to 
participate. The Group thanked the whole community for the effort in the relief, and 
posted posters around the village. TORC was the first organization on the 
acknowledgement list, even though not arranged in order. TORC, not informed 
beforehand, was surprised of such action, and perceived it as inappropriate. 
TORC: The gesture was ‘not logical' in TO YWCA: The organization did not 
the community. TO YWCA as a fully ever ask for compliment, but just helped 
government-subsidized organization victims strive for their needs (Interview 
should not ask for compliment ( with Eton). 
(Interview with Uncle Lok). 
TORC sought to distinguish from 
TO YWCA, by reaffirming its ethical and 
political superiority in Tai O. 
Item 8: Obstruction of relief work between government departments and TORC 
After the September 23 flooding, the 923 Flood Concern Group complained that the 
Islands District Office did not do their job properly, and refused to attend their 
residents' meeting. The District Office responded that they were busy with the relief 
process, therefore they could not attend, and they did attend meetings later. TORC 
believed holding meetings was not helpful but destroyed channel of communication. 
RC: Holding meetings at that time was TO YWCA: The Islands District Office 
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adding workload to the government, was responsible to explain relief work to 
Everyone should assist the government the residents. (Interview with Eton) 
in relief work, but not order her. 
(Interview with Uncle Lok) 
Item 11: Suspicion of arranging volunteers and residents to appraise YWCA 
publicly 
After the September flooding, An SSO held an activity to promote the virtue of 
neighborhood help and community care^^. An old lady expressed gratitude of 
YWCA for helping them solve livelihood problem after the storm. 
TORC alleged that TO YWCA arranged Eton and Mandy denied the allegation. 
volunteers and residents to appraise the Eton further argued that this reflected 
agency publicly. In the first letter of residents' lack of support of the RC. 
complaint, TORC accused that (Interview with Eton) 
TO YWCA 'ignored contribution from 
all groups on local development, while 
claimed that all the contributions were 
made by her'. 
Item 5: Having too close the relationship with Legislator Leung Yiu-chung 
Leung Yiu-chung was the leader of NWSC, and a pro-democratic LegCo member 
representing the New Territories West. He intensively assisted in stilt house 
reconstruction in 2000. The NWSC also collaborated with the Tai O Residents' 
Rights Concern Group to run a CIIF project promoting cultural tourism from 2003 
to 2009. He showed concern of the floodings and supported TO YWCA and Eton. 
The rural elites labeled Eton as pro-democratic, having the same mindset with 
figures like Lee Cheuk-yan (and by extension, Leung). They caused trouble and 
chaos to Tai O in order to become famous (Interview with Mr. Kuai). 
Leung clarified that TO YWCA contacted all eight directly elected LegCo members 
in NT West when needed, and was not in favor of him. It was he who tried to attend 
most of the time (from his speech in a LegCo (2010a) meeting on February). 
65 After the floodings, NAAC Tung Chung Integrated Services Centre collaborated with other parties 
to organize a four-month campaign to strengthen community support, such as home visits and 
gathering with villagers. On Novermber 29, 2008, they orgaized a ceremony in the open area outside 
TORC, to appreciate mutual help and community care (SWD 2010). 
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Response of YWCA: Apology to TORC and adoption of a softer work strategy 
of community work 
After a series of investigation upon complaints by TORC, YWCA replied a letter to 
the complainant on January 19, 2009 (Letter 5), apologized to TORC, due to a 
problem of communication and a lack of political sensitivity. YWCA restated the 
proper internal and external monitoring mechanism, the principle of political 
neutrality, and the cooperation of all the sectors in the society, including TORC and 
government departments. More importantly, the special duty group reminded the 
workers that government subvention constrained work strategy and that maintaining 
cooperative relationship with local associations was crucial: 
‘…the agency accept[ed] government subvention to provide services, it should 
respect relevant government departments, co-operate with the RC, and must consider 
the attitude, to be gentle and kind. Social workers should do practical things; honor 
should be given to them. It is not the time to use confrontational tactics to solve 
community problems ...If unable to change the other parties, then change ourselves, 
actively repair the relationships, intentionally support the other parties ‘ work^^ 
In short, YWCA accepted the third suggestion from TORC after the meeting. 
A move to written warning and redeployment 
Initially, Eton and his colleague accepted a three-month observation period; YWCA 
looked for improvement in their work strategy in due course. However, a dramatic 
change happened on January 30. YWCA President and Board members decided to 
66 This excerpt was from a restricted document. It was one of the points raised in the second meeting 
of the special duty group with the social workers involved. 
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punish Eton and the center-in-charge, including written warnings and redeployment. 
The reason was about TORC's second complaint and the concern of Islands District 
Officer and Secretary of Home Affairs within January 2009: 
The President reported the issue of complaints from TORC against two workers from 
Tai O Community Work Office. Since [YWCA] received complaints from TORC, and 
on January 23 the Secretary of Home Affairs mentioned that our workers have not 
maintained harmonious relationship in working and community in a meeting with 
him. After discussing with the Board members, we believe that our agency's 
reputation was harmed, and unanimously agree that the two workers of Tai O 
Community Work Office are to be punished, including issuing warning letters and 
redeploying them out of the posts in Tai O. (Minutes of YWCA Board Meeting; also 
from LegCo 2010a) 
The meeting with the HAB minister Tsang Tak-sing was to discuss YWCA service 
67 
development and the reconstruction plan of YWCA Kowloon Office . YWCA 
notified the HAB minister about future development of Kowloon Center service, as 
well as the list of assessment undergoing. During the meeting, Tsang said that he 
received a copy of a compliant letter from TORC to YWCA (that is, letter 1) and 
expressed his wish to see YWCA join TORC in the pursuit of the well-being of local 
residents, ‘in line with the government's policy of promoting a harmonious society' 
(SCMP 2009a). 
Meanwhile, TORC lodged complaints for the second time against YWCA because it 
did not see any improvements from TO YWCA. TORC could not tolerate any longer: 
'The center-in-charge and Eton repetitively destroyed community harmony, made the 
67 In interview, Ken maintained that there was no acquisition of resources from the government 
required in the process. 
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RC members and residents feel disgusted. We strongly demand replacing the two 
workers immediately... so as to maintain the harmonious joyful atmosphere in the Tai 
O community ’ (Letter 7). 
Furthermore, on January 13 2009, YWCA Fourth Vice-President, the YWCA Chief 
Executive and other management officials had a lunch meeting with the Islands 
District Officer Bryon Lam Sing-kit, and invited him to attend the opening ceremony 
of a campsite. Noted in an addendum of the special duty report, Lam mentioned that: 
'...the two workers 'could not co-operate harmoniously with local groups 
repetitively caused conflicts, as if they were the host [of the community]( )’ 
and demonstrated that they did not appreciate the government department which 
allocates funding. SCMP 2009c) 
In its reply letter (Letter 8) to TORC on February 2, TO YWCA 'deeply regret[ted]' 
for the 'strong discontent about the work performance of the two workers Eton and 
Mr. Chong'. YWCA promised to handle it 'as soon as possible'. 
From the eyes of TORC, redeployment was a correct arrangement. From its letter to 
reply to YWCA, all the members were 'deeply appreciated and thankful' (Letter 9). 
YWCA, in a reply to LegCo members' request in October 2009, admitted that the 
decision of redeployment mainly because of the series of complaints, the 
impossibility to repair local relationship in the short term, and the worry that 
TO YWCA could not sustain its service. But they denied that redeployment was a 
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punishment, which was different from the Board's decision on January 30 . 
YWCA answered a LegCo member's question concerning the decision of redeployment. The reply 
was recorded in a LegCo restricted document. 
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A turn to expression of regret under public scrutiny 
Stage 3: Under public spotlight, YWCA admitted improper treatment in return 
The same move was regarded by Eton, pro-TOYWCA users, and later 
pro-TOYWCA public as a surprise and unreasonable treatment. First, Eton did not 
accept the punishment and appealed. Second, YWCA President and Board members 
received a letter from a pastor, 270 signatures from residents, and three signatures 
from store owners in February and March that showed support of the work of 
TO YWCA. Feeling sorry for redeployment of the workers, YWCA Board members 
decided to retract the written warning and replaced it with verbal reminder on March 
27. Eton was not satisfied, since he asserted that 'YWCA did not uphold the core 
values of social work, but succumbed to and showed a gesture of good relationship to 
bigwigs' (the Alliance 2009). He finally resigned on April 17. 
What followed were more groups involved in the issue. Eton sought the LegCo 
redress system on May 4 to complain against Tsang Tak-sing and Bryon Lam 
Sing-kit about Tsang's pressure on the deployment (see Appendix 5 for the letter). 
Debate sparked up on three fronts: one around the social work profession, one 
around the media, and one around the council; and the three fronts mingled. 
Somewhat similar to the opinion cleavage in Tai O, there was an overall split of the 
stance in the media and political arena. The pro-democratic media, LegCo members 
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and parties, and social work profession were in support of Eton and TOYWCA, 
whereas the pro-Beijing / pro-establishment media, LegCo members and parties were 
in support of Tsang and Lam. 
The social work front: On August 12, more than 350 social workers attended a forum 
on the issue69. From their responses, almost all participants agreed that Tsang exerted 
pressure on YWCA, and the accusations of TORC were inexplicable. In late August, 
the Anti-False Harmony Alliance (the Alliance) was formed, composed of staff 
associations from individual SSOs, four Tai O residents' groups, some civil society 
groups, individuals affected by urban renewal projects, and a few individual social 
workers. 
In reacting against Tsang Tak-sing's political pressure on social welfare, as it argued, 
the pressure group intentionally chose to use 'River Crab' as its name. The group 
believed that social workers in Hong Kong were highly similar to the netizens in 
China, facing obvious interference from the government. Instead of disguising a 
harmonious society, the group believed that social workers should take the 
responsibilities of collaborating with the underprivileged to strive for social equality, 
and had to withhold professional standard such as advocating social justice, 
democracy, diversity, and respect?^ (the Alliance 2009). 
69 The audience were so many that crowded a lecture hall in a local university, which only allowed 
around 200 people. The organizer had not expected of the high level of attention around the field. 
70 In the mainland, state censorship of the Internet was explicit and common, since the state, like 
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The Alliance demanded a clear response from Tsang and his apology, the formation 
of independent inquiry committee from LegCo, the abolishment of LSGS and 
competitive bidding on services, and revision of NGO governance to enhance 
transparency and accountability (the Alliance 2009). The Alliance also launched a 
march on September 20. Around 900 people attended, mostly consisted of social 
work students and social workers. Later, the Alliance members protested against 
YWCA President having an honor of Silver Bauhinia Star 71 and striving for 
renewing her term of office in the Board. 
The media front: The first piece of media report on the LegCo complaint appeared on 
newspaper article on July 24 (HKDN 2009). The most frequent period was in August 
and September. Graph 1 shows the intensity of the controversy over time, and 
identifies three peaks - whether Tsang Tak-sing needed to explain the details (August 
other undemocratic states, did not allow full freedom of expression and access of information to avoid 
criticism to the party-state and mobilization. As usual, under the 'harmonious society' guiding 
principle, information which was regarded as 'sensitive', 'unpleasant', or 'creating dissent', was 
deleted without consent. Control of online information and expression included blocking of websites, 
keyword filtering, human monitors, and holding Internet Service Providers and Internet Access 
Providers responsible for the customers' behaviors. The CCP set up a Central Propaganda Department 
to disseminate information along the Party line, and the state has an information office to monitor all 
publicized materials (Xiao 2011). But with the increasing number of netizens, their heightened 
awareness on human and social rights, and their technological skills, there was greater resistance from 
the internet against the state, including censorship. Netizens started to create words that stood for the 
sensitive words to avoid being censored, while at the same time ridiculed the state. This brought into 
the invention of the word 'hexie'. When something was censored or somebody is blocked access, one 
can say it or the person is 'harmonized'. Moreover, since the Mandarin pronunciation of 'harmony' is 
the same as 'river crab', and people often use 'crab' to 'refer to a bully who exerts power through 
violence' (Xiao 2011: 52), netizens would post a photo of crab to protest censorship, and people 
would ridicule doing censorship for 'constructing harmonious society' was actually constructing a 
'river crab society'. Therefore, the Chinese name of 'Anti-False' of Anti-False Harmony Alliance is 
literally 'Counter River Crab', which is ’ ’ 
The Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) is a type of award by the SAR government ‘to persons who have 
taken a leading part in public affairs and/or voluntary work over a long period of time' (Protocol 
Division, Government Secretariat 2005). 
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16 - August 22, 2009), reports on YWCA press conference and LegCo case 
conference (September 06 - September 19, 2009), and the protest of YWCA 
President receiving Silver Bauhinia Star and debate over forming the LegCo 
independent commission of inquiry (October 18 - October 24, 2009). One can see the 
controversy was not framed as an employer-employee conflict, but as a scandal of a 
government minister, and to a lesser extent, failure of an SSO to resist government 
pressure and uphold autonomy from the beginning. Newspapers pushed the Saga to 
go on with the urge for more information, at the same time expressed their own 
political stances. Also, their continuous follow-up could be an indirect evidence of 
widespread concern. Table 7 shows the quantity of articles on the Saga for the major 
local newspapers, their readership rate, circulation, political stances, and the stances 
on the Saga72. There was a tendency for strongly pro-Beijing newspapers (shaded in 
grey) to support the government. Those who defended Tsang Tak-sing argued that 
political interference was not possible (e.g. Qiao 2009), and it was nothing wrong for 
the minister to promote harmonious society (e.g. Guan 2009). On the other hand, 
there was a tendency for pro-democracy newspapers to criticize the government and 
support the social workers. Apple Daily (shaded in black), who had the most articles 
72 Readership rate and circulation reveal the popularity of newspapers. Since this issue was reported 
or commented in newspapers of different stances and target groups, I would assume the issue reached 
audience from all social groups. A limitation to such measurement was the failure to capture response 
in the internet using statistics. As for determination of political stance of newspapers, different studies 
use the Chinese co-optation of media executives and owners in PRC-appointed bodies or whether 
owners had strong business interests in Mainland as a political control. Sing Tao and Oriental Daily, 
for example, has shown an editorial shift (see Ma 2007; Lee and Chan 2008; HKJA 2008). 
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on this issue, clearly criticized Tsang because people's interests was unreasonably 
stopped by his guiding principle of social harmony (Apple Daily 2009). The editorial 
of Ming Pao (2009b) succinctly worried that Hong Kong's politics would follow 
Mainland style. There was not a clear relationship between newspapers which were 
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The council front: Facing the demands from the LegCo members and the social work 
field, and the urge of media for more information, HAB and YWCA made frequent 
responses. Of crucial importance were the inconsistent responses. Until mid-August, 
HAB replied that Eton's accusation of political interference was unfounded, and it 
was an internal matter for YWCA to handle the complaint and personnel issues? 
(HAB 2009; Tsang 2009). YWCA responded that the agency did not receive any 
pressure; redeployment was under a normal procedure^^ (MingPao 2009a). However, 
suspicion still p e r v a d e d ? . Y W C A employed a PR firm to tackle the issue (Interview 
with Ken), and decided to hold a press conference on September 10. The YWCA 
Chief Executive for the first time admitted that Tsang's concern was ‘a factor in the 
removal of Eton and his colleague', although 'the minister's influence had been very 
small' (SCMP 2009b). She also said 'the board regretted the [transfer] decision 
which roused speculation and disputes and had caused unpleasantness to Eton' (The 
Standard 2009). Finally, she acknowledged that issuing the warning letter ‘hurt and 
was an improper consideration. She welcomed Eton to join YWCA again (MingPao 
2009c). 
73 HAB (2009) stated that ‘it has been a major policy of the HAB to foster social harmony and the 
SHA has been promoting the message when he meets with various sectors, organizations and 
individuals in the community. Such remarks should not be regarded as putting any pressure 
whatsoever'. 
74 As mentioned before, redeployment was regarded as part of the punishment of the two social 
workers during the January Board meeting. 
75 For example, on September 4, the editorial of Ming Pao (2009b) suggested ‘the government should 
launch a thorough investigation into the affair and make public its findings so as to make obvious its 
credibility'. Also, the Civic Party claimed that Tsang's reply was not satisfactory (Eu 2009). 
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However, the Alliance refuted that YWCA downplayed the effect of HAB and 
Islands District Office (the Alliance 2009; also MingPao 2009d). One week later, 
LegCo launched a case conference, which Tsang, Lam, and representatives of YWCA 
and TORC attended. Tsang reaffirmed that he had no intention to interfere into 
YWCA, and had not made any interference; promoting social harmony did not mean 
exerting pressure. But he admitted expressing his wish to see YWCA join TORC in 
working for the well-being of local residents, 'in line with the government's policy of 
promoting a harmonious society'. Pro-democratic legislator Lee Cheuk-yan criticized 
that Tsang was 'hasty' in expressing his concern without looking into the complaint, 
although Tsang denied (Sing Pao 2009). Eton questioned the intention of raising the 
complaint during discussion of reconstruction of YWCA clubhouse. Lam, in the 
same occasion, said that he did not comment on the work of TO YWCA, and did not 
asked YWCA to appreciate funder. He clarified that he had not made any comments 
on the social workers concerned (LegCo 2010a), but such claim was rejected by Eton 
and Lee, because he did comment on it, recorded on addendum of the YWCA special 
duty report. TORC chairperson continued accusing the social workers for stirring up 
trouble, causing Tai O no longer harmonious (SingPao 2009). 
LegCo discussed several times on the controversy in different panels and committees, 
the pro-democratic legislators proposed to appoint an independent commission of 
9 7 
inquiry, arguing that there were still many doubts to be clarified. The House 
Committee and general meeting voted down the proposal in January and February 
2010 respectively, with the pro-government legislators in majority and voting against 
it, arguing that all issues had been clear after the case conference and special meeting 
of the Panel on Welfare Services, and restated that Tsang Tak-sing had never 
expressed any opinion on the staff deployment (LegCo 2010a). 
Other stakeholders: HKCSS and SWD 
HKCSS, the umbrella organization of SSOs, did not explicitly show support of any 
parties. Yet its Chief Executive, Christine Fang, appreciated the contribution of 
NLCDP, and stressed the importance of local officials to be fair and regular 
communication channels to mediate among different parties for the well-being of 
residents. Social service agencies should also maintain fair and just professional 
principles to deal with disputes. She suggested that government departments should 
be more responsive to the needs of the deprived, in both policy and local levels, and 
should respect professionalism of social workers (HKCSS 2009). 
SWD stated that TOYWCA had fulfilled the requirement on the Funding and Service 
Agreement, and did not receive complaints on the service in the previous three years. 
From the information available, SWD did not make obvious or explicit intervention 
into the controversy. It restated its role in monitoring the performance of service. As 
9 8 
long as 'following the regulations stated in FSA, the SSO could flexibly allocate 
subvention and manpower' (HAB and SWD 2009). 
The effect of the Saga on pro-TOYWCA residents 
When asked of the relationship with TO YWCA after the Saga, Uncle Lok, the first 
vice-chairperson of TORC, did not elaborate much: 
We keep in touch sometimes, but [TOYWCA] does not communicate with us about 
some issues. That s it. 
As for Mr. Kuai, the entrenched image of TO YWCA did not change after the Saga. 
He mentioned the disputes had happened for long and were cumulative. This implied 
that the conflicts could not be solved in the near future. 
While the apology from YWCA stopped further complaints from TORC against 
YWCA, it did not help TORC much in re-accepting its Tai O team either. At the 
same time, the remedial measures failed to regain the support from the original 
pro-TOYWCA residents. Since the Saga, these informants did not place much hope 
on TO YWCA and YWCA, and felt that TO YWCA were further detached from 
community affairs: 
Ward: I've given up my hope on YWCA. 
Chris: I scolded YWCA many times during the case. It's nonsense to hold out an olive 
branch to them. They (TORC) would do something when needed, for example when 
election came. Collaborating with them to do some leisure activities is of no use. 
Finally they will criticize you straight. (Interviewer: So you really think TOYWCA 
have been harmonized.) Completely harmonized. It s useless. 
Ms Fan: I feel some disappointment. This organization seems to lose its direction, a 
little bit not professional. In the past it was OK. I learnt a lot from here. Sometimes I 
did volunteer work, such as camping. Now I think they were passive, staying at the 
99 
back. 
Uncle Wong: The root problem was in YWCA, not Eton. Eton truly committed in 
helping local residents. (His wife: Old people all missed of him after he left.) 
The Saga even reduced the level of community participation for some, since they 
could not withstand the pressure from others within the small village: 
Mandy: After the two floodings I haven ’t touched on any community issues. Even 
though someone does this, nobody will stand up and become the contact person. 
Uncle Wong: I got problem after he left. Feeling discriminated. [Somebody has said 
that] I create trouble. (Interviewer: Other villagers said so.) I know it. (Interviewer: 
Told you in person?) Some said in my back, criticized me. Less involve now. I only 
participate in their (TOYWCA 's) activities, but I won ’t voice out. Let others do it. I 
concentrate on cultural tour guide only. I would seal my mouth and won ’t speak too 
much. 
Ironically, if what this group of residents perceived was correct, which meant that 
TOYWCA gave up its advocacy dimension and became no different from ordinary 
social service centers, TORC succeeded in altering the work approach of TOYWCA 
(and YWCA); the actual practice of TOYWCA perceived by TORC was congruent 
with their mental map of a social service organization. 
The effect of the Saga on YWCA 
The negative impact on YWCA was less serious and long-lasting than predicted. Ken 
admitted that in the course of the controversy, the relationship between YWCA and 
government departments turned bitter. Some government officials did not greet 
YWCA chief executive when meeting together. Soon after the controversy ended the 
relationship resumed. Also, Ken admitted that they had done a test on the impact of 
the controversy on funding. The result was negative. Subvention from government 
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departments, government-related bodies, local groups, and corporate and private 
donations did not decrease76. One thing was certain: the YWCA President was 
persuaded to give up renewing her term of office in the Board, which symbolically 
marked the end of the scandal. 
76 According to Ken, the decrease in government subvention in 2009-10 compared from 2008-09 was 
mainly due to 5% salary cut of government senior officials (LegCo 2010b:21). 
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Section 9 Discussion 
Differences of the two disputes in terms of stakeholder identification and 
analysis^^ 
The two disputes illustrate the struggle of a rural consultative body and a branch of 
social service organization carrying welfare and advocacy mission across twenty 
years. The two disputes highlight the changes in socio-political environment in Hong 
Kong. This discussion compares the two disputes by: 1) identifying stakeholders 
involved; 2) analyzing stakeholder salience, dynamics between stakeholders 
themselves, and the discrepancy of their legitimate model of YWCA and actual 
practice; and 3) legitimacy repair strategies of YWCA and rationale behind. 
Stakeholders involved 
In comparison with the 1988 election dispute, the 2008 River Crab Saga involved 
more stakeholders. In the former case, only the SWD, Islands District Office, TORC 
77 Although this paper stresses on differences between TOYWCA and TORC, their work was similar 
in dealing with community issues: to identify and solve community problems, and provide services. 
The difference lay with the strategy: TOYWCA tended to encourage residents' participation, while 
TORC tended to present officially for residents. Facing with similar ends but different means, friction 
was likely to occur when the two groups encountered the same issue in the community. Barman (2002) 
suggests that competition would lead nonprofits to differentiate from other members in the field, by 
claiming uniqueness and possessing a higher hierarchy in certain dimensions. This paper would argue 
that similar situation occurred in Tai O, especially when TO YWCA's role of advocacy became more 
explicit. Facing the challenge of TOYWCA, TORC and rural elites had to claim itself as the 
government-endorsed advisory body in Tai O (uniqueness), and representative of Tai O community 
(hierarchy). Therefore, TORC regarded TOYWCA as illegitimate when the latter overstepped the 
work boundaries of a social service organization. A consequence of confining the role of TOYWCA to 
service provision was that TOYWCA was subordinate to TORC in the community. On the other hand, 
TOYWCA satisfied the needs and interests of residents (therefore conferred pragmatic legitimacy), 
using appropriate procedures (moral legitimacy). In both disputes, TOYWCA workers thought they 
were more responsive than TORC to cope with community problem and improve community 
well-being. In short, each organization claimed to be more legitimate than its competitor in order to 
obtain external support (namely support from community members). 
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/ pro-TORC groups, and pro-TOYWCA residents involved. In the latter case, 
political parties, media, labor union and activist group, and HKCSS were involved in 
addition to the four appeared in the 1988 dispute (see figures 5 and 6). 
Stakeholder salience, stakeholder dynamics, and discrepancy between their 
legitimate model of YWCA and actual practice 
The latter case differed from the former not only in quantity, but also in complexity 
of stakeholder relations and salience. In the 1988 dispute: 
TORC did not agree that joining election was an appropriate way for a social 
service organization to assist residents to obtain resources and improve living 
situations (moral legitimacy on procedure), and it did not make sense that 
YWCA carried out advocacy (cognitive legitimacy on comprehensibility). The 
normative model of YWCA, in their eyes, should be one providing charity and 
welfare services, and should fully oblige to SWD, and cooperate with TORC. 
In terms of stakeholder salience, since TORC did not have power to give 
pressure on TO YWCA legally, it was only a dependent stakeholder (possessing 
legitimacy and urgency, but lack power to influence) (Mitchell et al. 1997) of 
YWCA. 
The complaint could make Lantau District Office and SWD, the two powerful 
and legitimate stakeholders, involve into the case. However, they did not 
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exercise their power like sanction or condemnation. In the eyes of the two 
government departments, TOYWCA and YWCA did not violate social work 
principles; the votes obtained in election and the signature campaign were also a 
strong evidence of residents' support. The two departments did not take action 
in this particular incident. TORC failed to enhance salience from other YWCA 
stakeholders. Media reports were only scarce, avoiding other parties to 
intervene into the dispute. 
For pro-TOYWCA residents, YWCA deserved support not only due to charity 
and welfare functions, but also promotion of community participation and 
advocacy. Although not fully knowing the real relationship between the 
government and YWCA, they accepted YWCA to demonstrate a new normative 
order in the community. 
YWCA, under the auspices of TOYWCA supporters and government 
departments, could be 'less responsive' to the demands of TORC. It rejected the 
demands of TORC to close down service of its Tai O team. 
In the 2008-2010 River Crab Saga, the challenges of TORC were similar in nature 
but different on consequences: 
• In both disputes, TORC did not make sense that YWCA, an SSO receiving 
subvention, allowed workers to engage in organizing and mobilization against 
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the government (loss in cognitive legitimacy on comprehensibility), and 
accused YWCA of failure to manage the Tai O team and provoked disputes in 
Tai O (loss in moral legitimacy on procedure). The normative model of YWCA, 
in their eyes, should still be one providing charity and welfare services, and 
should fully oblige to SWD and cooperate with TORC. 
This time, TORC became the most salient stakeholder after HAB minister 
expressed concern over community harmony, and Islands District Officer 
expressed concern over violating funder's interest. TORC's claims became 
legitimate, urgent, and most importantly, powerful, after the support of the top 
government officials, which was a powerful and legitimate stakeholder in terms 
of salience. Their portrayal of a normative model of social service organization 
should be one promoting community harmony and an operator of social service; 
the two officials were not satisfied with YWCA's advocacy dimension in 
contradiction of the charity dimension. HAB's more high-profile intervention 
marked the turning point of the incident, and added itself an urgency 
stakeholder attribute. TO YWCA (and YWCA) lost moral and cognitive 
legitimacy from HAB and Islands District Office. 
• However, the apology and deployment of social workers involved disappointed 
pro-TOYWCA residents, and later union, activists groups, media, and 
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pro-democratic political groups. In their eyes, advocacy was essential in 
enhancing grassroots' rights, which should have no conflict with welfare 
provision. They gained prominence in the later part of the Saga and became the 
most salient stakeholders of TO YWCA (powerful, legitimate and urgent), in 
need of response of alleged interference from Tsang Tak-sing, infringement of 
professionalism, and failure to protect grassroots' interests. Media and political 
parties were involved then and divided along their political stances. SWD and 
HKCSS kept low-profile in the incident. 
Legitimacy repair strategies 
YWCA showed widely different repair strategies in legitimacy. In the 1988 case, the 
Tai O social work team drew a distance from the election, yet did not admit that 
social workers joining elections was a wrongdoing. The management had no further 
inquiry or action. Such dissociation and definition of the situation were a kind of 
buffering response for YWCA, in which staff / managers balanced organizational 
autonomy with stakeholder influence. But the repair was not successful in that 
ideological differences and existing competition of local support hindered the 
willingness of TORC and their supporters to confer legitimacy to YWCA (Table 8). 
In the River Crab Saga, repair strategies started with apology to TORC, to the 
decision of YWCA president and the board to divorce (transfer and replacement of 
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staff members) from the problem after perception of pressure from funding bodies, to 
restitution, in the form of compensation to the workers, as a gesture of sincerity to 
Tai O villagers, and finally to apology to the public and express regret of the past 
procedures. YWCA went through the process of board over-involvement to 
responsiveness to public concern, which reflected public surveillance. Evaluating the 
legitimacy repair processes, YWCA succeeded in avoiding TORC from further attack. 
The giving up of advocacy function of TO YWCA ironically matched with TORC's 
and HAB's normative model of social service organization. After the press 
conference and the apology, YWCA obtained some level of understanding from the 
public, and directed the attention to the alleged minister's fault. However, it failed to 
regain the cognitive and moral legitimacy from pro-TOYWCA residents (Table 9). 
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Figure 5 Stakeholders of YWCA during 1988 dispute in District Board election 
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Figure 6 Stakeholders of YWCA during 2008-10 River Crab Saga 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison of the legitimacy repair strategies of YWCA in similar controversies 
helps us capture the changes in socio-political environment, such as 'public policy, 
imitation, network position, power, and historical happenstance' (Dobbin and Baum 
2000: 2, cited from Scott and Davis 2007: 311). This study proposes two reasons 
contributing to more inconsistent responses and more questions, scrutiny and 
condemnation in the 2008 dispute than in 1988. 
Explaining the difference of repair strategies of YWCA legitimacy between the 
two controversies 
Heavy reliance on government funding and stakeholder diversity 
JO 
Heavy reliance of government funding in times offinancial uncertainty heightened 
the need of YWCA to repair legitimacy with the government and other stakeholders 
when controversy happened, but stakeholder diversity increased the difficulty to 
produce consistent and unified accounts. In general, an organization will exacerbate 
crisis situations if it fails to provide consistent messages to stakeholders. 
Stakeholders may challenge the credibility of an account if inconsistent responses are 
given. It would occur more easily when there are more stakeholders with different 
demands. 
An interesting phenomenon was found in the study, in which YWCA was less likely 
78 Uncertainty is defined as 'the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and 
accurately predicted' (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 67, cited in Oliver 1991: 170). 
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to uphold autonomy when reliance on government funding actually deceased in the 
2000s. In contrast, when the proportion of government funding was higher in the 
1980s, YWCA seemed to be less afraid of punishment after controversy, and 
government departments were reluctant to intervene. This seems to deviate from the 
argument of resource dependence theory. The theory informs us that an organization 
engages in exchange relationship with other organizations. During acquisition of 
resources, certain degree of power and control will be delegated to resource provider, 
owner, or transmitter. It is assumed that an organization strives to maintain autonomy. 
Therefore, managers devise a range of possible strategies to reduce dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 45-46) suggest three factors 
that determine the dependence of one organization to another: 1) the importance 
(magnitude and criticality) of the resource; 2) the extent to which the focal 
organization has discretion over resource allocation and use; and 3) the extent to 
which alternatives are available. 
This theory applies to business organizations as much as nonprofits. Various studies 
have illustrated the constraint on nonprofit autonomy due to reliance on government 
funding, such as mission drift, bureaucratization, loss of autonomy, or 
government-induced professionalism (see Froelich's (1999) review). However, if we 
take Pferrer and Salancik's argument into consideration, one can see that it is 
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possible to counterbalance asymmetry in the exchange relationship. In Chaves et al.'s 
(2004) words, 'Even if a nonprofit is dependent on government for its funding, 
government agencies may also depend on that organization to deliver needed 
services' (p. 299). The authors point out that if few alternatives are available to 
deliver social service, the government will increase its dependence on nonprofits. 
Along the same line of argument, increasing nonprofits' control over resources and 
resource provider (the government) can increase the bargaining power of nonprofits, 
whereas diversification of government-related revenues (seeking alternatives) can 
reduce government control and preserve autonomy. 
In the case of YWCA, such deviation does not mean violation of the theory; the case 
did show the tensions between YWCA and its stakeholders due to funding 
uncertainty, but it did not show the dependence-reducing feature. In Section 2 I have 
traced the history of SSO development, in which the government was the largest and 
stable funding sources for large SSOs (including YWCA) in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The resource environment in the 1980s was stable. SWD reimbursed SSOs for the 
actual costs used in delivering social services. There was not an urging need to seek 
alternative funding or other resources. Government and service users were the two 
most important stakeholders for SSOs. The government made use of frontline 
experience and flexibility of SSOs to deal with social problems produced by rapid 
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industrialization and modernization, enhancing political legitimacy of the 
government. SSOs, in turn, needed the government for resources and to enhance the 
quality of social service (Lui 2010: 142). Although not claimed as equal partners, the 
government and SSOs had tacit consent that allowed social workers to do organizing 
and social actions with residents, as long as not radical, by encouraging negotiation 
with rather than direct confrontation against the government when mobilizing 
grassroots to improve their livelihood (Leung 1990). Furthermore, social workers 
joining DB elections was a common phenomenon throughout the 1980s. The 
government expected of social workers creating tense relations with local groups, but 
it could not neglect the advantages brought into the community, such as cultivation 
of civic awareness, distribution of social resources, and having channels to influence 
policy-making (Chan 1986). In case of complaints, YWCA was easier to seek 
understanding from SWD and the District Office. In short, mutual dependence 
between SSOs and the state reduced the potential for either party to dominate the 
other. 
Such mutual dependence started to wane and was replaced by a contractual 
relationship due to the rise of neo-liberal ideology. As mentioned in the Section 2, 
welfare reform (change in funding mode and evaluation system) sought to reduce the 
state's commitment in social welfare. Second, privatization or partnership with 
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business gave the state more choices in service provision other than SSOs. Third, the 
LSGS gave the state larger room to maneuver its relations with SSOs; whereas in the 
past, it was expected to treat SSOs almost like executive arm of the state. 
Social welfare sectors in Hong Kong sought to diversify funding sources after LSGS 
in 2000 as a response to funding uncertainty. Increased fund raising, charging service 
fees, competitive bidding, partnership with business, and social enterprise have been 
strategies to expand SSOs' income sources after LSGS (Rong 2009: 139-157). The 
starting up of WiseGiving in 2007 indicated that SSOs sought out more ways to 
obtain funding through a platform under the umbrella association HKCSS. 
But there is the other side of the story. As mentioned in the HKUCCSG report (2009), 
diversification was not successful; about half of SSOs found insufficient donations 
for achieving their purposes. This meant that reliance on government funding was 
still prevalent79. It is worth noting that SSOs not having full reimbursement from 
SWD did not mean all SSOs would immediately get into trouble. Over 80% of SSOs 
joined LSGS accumulated reserves up to one-third of their operating expenditures in 
2006-07, when the rule was set at 25%. Some NGOs admitted that the reserves were 
'mainly for honoring their commitments to Snapshot Staff , and were 'necessary for 
the NGOs' operation and sustainability in the long term' (LSGIRC 2008: 43). 
79 In Hong Kong, the lack of capacity in raising funds, the lack of incentive in seeking alternative 
sources before colonial era due to funding stability, and the lack of private philanthropy due to low 
taxation were some reasons that led to the difficulty in diversifying funding sources (CPU 2004; Rong 
2009) 
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Obviously this was a strategy of SSOs to cope with funding uncertainty^^^'. 
The Anti-False Harmony Alliance accused YWCA that it was reluctant to 'bite the 
hand that fed it . Therefore the Islands District Officer Bryon Lam Sing-kit and HAB 
minster Tsang Tak-sing s reminders in January alerted YWCA to comply with 
flinders’ will. However, Ken, the social work supervisor of YWCA, did not admit 
this accusation. He denied that YWCA punished the workers because of the need to 
ensure funding. First, he pointed out that the proportion of subvention had reduced to 
less than 60% (see Table 10). Second, it only cost 1.4 million dollars for each 
NLCDP team. YWCA could still self-support the service even if the funding from 
HAB had been cut, owing to the stable source from activity and service fees. YWCA 
could also absorb the workers to other teams. Finally, he pointed out that YWCA did 
not engage in services contradictory to social work principles, such as giving up 
urban redevelopment projects after a few years. In short, Ken maintained the 
autonomy of YWCA vis-a-vis government. 
However, the relationship between the government and SSO did not only rest on 
money, but also on agency support of government policy. There are a few research 
studies that indirectly showed some SSOs did not pay much attention to advocacy in 
Ken, the YWCA social work supervisor, explained that one of the motivations to seek alterative 
funding was the LSG subvention cap with the increasing expenditure to pay for senior employees. 
YWCA needed to reserve money for colleagues. 
It was even reported that some large SSOs, in order to guarantee success in new projects, bid the 
projects for a low price and later subsidized from the reserves (see MingPao 201 lb). 
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social affairs in recent years. In the HKUCCSG (2009) report, less than 10% of local 
SSOs put advocacy as their primary mission in 2009. In Rong's (2009) research, one 
voluntary welfare agency changed from promoting grassroots community 
development in 1970s, to working as a government partner in delivering services in 
the 2000s 'by terminating seven out of nine NLCDP centers from 1995' (p. 185). The 
agency was one among the first many to join the LSG reform in 2001, to make 'the 
government officers recognize [their] transformation' (Rong 2009: 186, a quote from 
the executive director^. Indeed, Rong's research recorded another advocacy SSO 
which adhered to their mission since its establishment, but the strategies were 
inclined to lobbying rather than protests in the recent past (p. 186-188). This seems 
to echo with the HKUCCSG (2009) report that for those which did advocacy, the 
level of activism was fairly low. The same report revealed that less than 2% of 
responded SSOs had a poor relationship with government officials. In my follow-up 
interview, Ken denied that punishment of the two workers was to maintain 
co-operative relationship with government officials, while instead admitted that 
punishment occurred because the YWCA President could not tolerate repeated 
complaints from TORC and the Lantau District Councilor. Still, this cannot answer 
the query, in which the special duty group suggested 'respect [of] relevant 
Ng (2008) argues that TWGHs, being pro-government, was easier to get new service contracts for 
new services, such as gambler counseling, mental health projects (p.45). 
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government departments' and giving up using 'confrontational tactics to solve 
community problems'. This is a clear evidence to show that the Board and 
management team very much concerned the relationship with government. It was 
possible to assume that the government hasda close relationship with SSOs that 
followed its agenda. Thus, apology to TORC and redeployment of the two workers as 
a punishment was a demonstration of YWCA that it wanted to resume the support of 
government and TORC. The purpose of legitimacy repair, though, was not to secure 
one particular funding source, but to maintain favorable relationship with HAB, 
District Office, as well as other government departments and public bodies. A good 
relationship with government officials might entail better chances during competitive 
bidding when competitors of service were of similar levels, or more cooperation with 
government departments, which would enhance YWCA survival. The other side of 
the argument is that, the new funding mode and decreased proportion on government 
funding made YWCA more vulnerable to resource environment. 
Following this logic, YWCA should have insisted on denying government 
intervention until the end. However, it later chose to publicly express regret in the 
press conference about the punishment procedure and ‘shifted’ some responsibility 
with HAB minister, admitting the ‘very small' influence from the minister in the 
removal of the two workers. The purpose of the press conference was to 'clarify the 
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doubts from the public'. Although not elaborating what 'the public' included, it was 
reasonable to assume that the public meant citizens, media, political parties, service 
users, donors and business partners. After social service reform, the latter three were 
more important in terms of resource support. As mentioned before, YWCA increased 
revenue from service and fees from 31% before 2004 to around 36% on average 
afterwards. Obtaining users' legitimacy could safeguard resource input. Also, YWCA 
endeavored to 'strengthen [their] tie with' (YWCA 2009: 32) the business sector, 
such as finding internship opportunities and encouraging social responsibility 
(YWCA 2009, 2010). Negative portrayal of the organization surely undermined 
business partners' impression. Even though Ken clarified that no apparent loss of 
donation and subsidies after the Saga, no one could ensure whether business partners 
would have withdrawn from current or potential projects or donations if YWCA 
failed to handle the scandal during that time. (Indeed, YWCA's internal test was a 
sign of such anxiety.) Therefore, acknowledging wrongdoing, expressing regret, and 
restating responsibility (even though being accused of downplaying the effect of 
HAB and Islands District Office) increased the chance of acceptance from 
stakeholders and the likelihood of cooling down the scandal. 
If the 2008 controversy had been perceived as one between an SSO and government, 
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then media, legislators, and the public would not have framed the issue as a political 
dispute. It was clear that media exposure kicked off public debate about whether 
Secretary for Home Affairs gave pressure to YWCA to punish its two social workers 
for disrupting harmony in a village. In the case description, I have illustrated the 
Board of YWCA received the minister's complaint that YWCA failed to 'maintain 
harmonious relationship in working and community'. Disregard of the minister's 
intention, the organization took his words as well as the complaints from TORC 
seriously. In contrast, the 1988 election did not catch much media and public 
attention, even though the incident was no less, if not more, intense than the River 
Crab Saga in Tai O. Institutional change in social welfare provides us part of the 
answer for the increased questioning and scrutiny in the recent controversy, but it 
could not answer why the Islands District Councilor and TORC drafted three letters 
of complaints consecutively, which finally caught the attention of the minister. Also, 
in the response to the complaints, YWCA specifically mentioned political neutrality 
o o 
but 'maintained a good relationship with the Liaison Office' . I would propose a 
second reason that contributed to the inconsistent legitimacy repair strategies. 
In the interview, Ken supplemented that what the YWCA meant was to maintain good relationship 
with all political groups, rather than a hands-off approach to political groups. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rural force aligned with and strengthened by pro-Beijing force from 
local to governmental level 
Stated in the case description of 1988 DB election contest, rural elites, indigenous or 
otherwise, endeavored to consolidate their power in councils in all levels. Also 
securing a stronger base in DB / DC elections could increase their chance to enter 
LegCo through electoral college or functional constituencies. And surely 1988 was 
not the worst time in rural power. That brings about a question: why could YWCA 
withstand for the challenge from TORC in 1988 but not in 2008-10? The paper 
proposes that: (1) the alignment and expansion of pro-Beijing and rural forces in 
between the two controversies increased their ability to give pressure on YWCA, and 
increased the cost of YWCA to dismiss their claims or to confront with these forces. 
(2) The public in turn was alert of political interference from Beijing into local 
politics. YWCA was subjected to more questions, scrutiny and condemnation in the 
2008 dispute, which attracted territory-wide concern, than in 1988. 
The delicate balance of local political power in the 1980s 
First, the District Office sought to maintain power balance in local politics in the 
1980s. Scholars in general think that District Office, the local representative body of 
government, in general tolerated the work of NLCDP. Wong (1989) believes that 
District Office would prefer organized oppositions to pressures from unknown origin. 
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District Office has been mainly responsible for community building and collection 
and dissemination of information between government and the public (Wong 1982)84. 
At that time the government was promoting community participation and gradual 
democratization, and voting was one of the ways. Therefore, it was difficult to give 
pressure on TOYWCA and YWCA solely because of the conflicts caused by 
contestation. 
Another factor of tolerating NLCDP in Tai O was the need to balance the expanding 
traditional and pro-Beijing groups. In the urban region, NLCDP competed with both 
DBs and CNTA-supported MACs for local people's support within establishment 
(Lai 1994: 283), and competed with kaifong associations for resources and local 
people's support (Leung 1994: 10). This in fact made CNTA unhappy. However, in 
the rural regions, the competition happened more likely between NLCDP or 
pro-democratic leaders and local associations; what the government concerned more 
was the possibility of lopsided local political power. Leung (1990) argues that formal 
political participation of social workers could act as a 'non-official power' to balance 
local politics. In the 1988 case, the opponent of democratic-minded Sean was a 
leader of an explicit pro-Beijing rural fishermen group. Giving pressure to YWCA 
would signify an endorsement of leftist force, which did not match with the will of 
84 Previously, the statutory function of the District Office included social order, welfare, and, most 
importantly, land authority (such as land resumption), but transferred into other departments 
gradually. 
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colonial govemment^^ As a result, CNTA and Islands District Office would present 
themselves as neutral to TORC's complaint. YWCA has a stronger reason to support 
its Tai O team, whereas TORC and pro-TORC groups did not successively attack 
their rivalry. Tai O could maintain the delicate balance of local power. 
• The wane of NLCDP in the 1990s 
The role of NLCDP, and the necessity of balance in local politics, was gradually 
eroded in the 1990s. NLCDPs gradually shrank in number since the end of the 
decade (Table 11). A number of reasons accounted for the decline: 
In service level (Tung 1994; Chui 1999; Fung and Hung 2010), 
The clearance of transient communities such as squatters, temporary housing 
areas and redevelopment estates implied that no NLCDP service should be 
provided there; 
Residents' needs were provided by regular social services, such as elderly or 
family services; 
The 'service gaps' were filled with more comprehensive social welfare policies; 
The proposal of new NLCDP service in rural areas was rejected due to failure to 
identify those areas as deprived; 
The government and SSOs started new initiatives of locality-based support 
(such as Integrated Neighborhood Project or urban renewal projects by URA) 
and functional group support (service for disadvantaged groups)^^. 
It seems that the suspicion of some other RCs rejecting NLCDP due to fear of competition (Tung 
1994) has some proof. 
Fung and Hung (2010) argue that this marked the end of government's need to smoothen the labor 
reproduction process in times of economic and industrial change. 
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In political level, 
Some community social workers and residents went more radical in striving for 
better housing conditions, which exceeded the tolerance level of the 
government. 
• Political parties and council members at all levels competed with and replaced 
the ‘safety valve' function of community social workers, especially in the 
district level. 
The label 'democrats' undermined the effectiveness of community work, 
especially when serving residents who did not favor confrontation and 
organizing. 
Starting from 1995, the government repeatedly proposed termination of NLCDP, 
only opposed by social workers, residents, and political parties (Chui 1999; 
Leung 1990, 1994; Fung and Hung 2010). A portion of community workers 
chose to engage in community development out of the social service sector. 
Looking into Tai O again, although social services were more comprehensive in the 
1990s, and road connection to urban region and tourism business reduced the feeling 
of isolation and deprivation, TOYWCA survived the Audit Commission's 1997 
review on NLCDP team so that it could still be in service despite failure to meet the 
lower limit of service population (LegCo Secretariat 1999: 5-8). Since 2001, YWCA 
had only two NLCDPs, in Tai O and Kennedy Town. During the 1990s and 2000s, 
until 2008, TOYWCA was not in the forefront of critical events, such as demolition 
of stilt houses in 1994 (the government withdrew the proposal finally), the 2000 stilt 
fire (the Residents' Concern Group took up the job) and the dispute over 
128 
redevelopment plan (it was Vicky that stood against rural elites). Hence, the 
relationship between TOYWCA and TORC was less sour during that period. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Escalation of pro-Beijing party penetration of Tai O in 1990s 
The team survived, but the surrounding local political environment was changing. 
The most obvious change was the alignment of pro-Beijing political party and 
interest groups in the rural from the 1990s. Party penetration of society was not new 
in Hong Kong before and after handover. It happened in Tai O, also in Lantau Island, 
and other parts of Hong Kong. Scholars and party members acknowledge that the 
pro-Beijing camp was much more successful in grassroots organizing and 
mobilization than pro-democracy camp (Kwong 2004; Lo, Yu, and Wan 2002; Loh 
2010). In the urban region, party penetration of society was manifested in MACs or 
OCs (Kwong 2004); in the rural, it was manifested in indigenous groups (see Chan 
2006 for a case in Fanling), or agricultural or fishermen's groups, as in Tai O. 
From the 1990s, the pro-Beijing forces integrated with the rural groups. The need of 
the SAR government to maintain political balance in local region became virtually 
nonexistent. Several pieces of evidence in Tai O are shown below: 
87 
More pro-TORC community groups became a member organization of NTAS, 
including TORA, TOCCC, and Tai O Shrimp Boat Sports Association (NTAS 
1999). They, in addition to the Tai O branch of the OIWA (formed in 1992) and 
HKFATO, shared their offices in a village house owned by HKFA (Figure 7). 
87 From its website, NTAS stated patriotism and commitment to prosperity and stability as the prime 
missions: 1) to be patriotic to China and Hong Kong, fully support the Basic Law, protect Hong 
Kong's long-term prosperity and stability; 2) to facilitate the connection between different societies in 
the NT; 3) to concern the life of NT residents, protect their reasonable rights, promote and develop 
social welfare industry; and 4) promote healthy cultural and leisure activities, increase friendship. 
NTAS website: http://www.ntas.org.hk (Retrieved May 29, 2011) 
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Memberships of these community groups were tightly overlapped. A number of 
them had been long-term TORC members. The leadership pattern was quite 
stable before handover. As early as in 1961, there had already been six TORC 
members from the TOCCC (Liu and Cheung 2006). Table 12 shows some 
statistics about TORC from 1995 to 2011. Its chairpersons and two 
vice-chairpersons remained the same throughout the period. Contestation was 
less fierce as times went by. Uncle Lok, one of the vice-chairpersons, was the 
vice-executive director of TORA. Mr. Kuai, an Exco member of TORC from 
1995 to 2011, was the entertainment officer of the Association, and also the 
executive director of the Chamber. Beyond Tai O, Ms. Suen, the chairperson of 
OIWA, was also the vice-chairperson ofNTAS, and a senior member of DAB. 
Mr. Chik became one of the three fishermen's representatives of TORC, and 
was the advisor ofNTAS. 
• During my field visit, TORC's support of DAB was obvious from the setting. 
Inside TORC office, only materials from DAB but not other parties were 
available in the office. Most of the brochures were from HYK and other 
pro-Beijing business and social groups. In the open area outside TORC, which 
was also under its management, only banners with DAB members were hung 
(Figure 8). 
1 3 2 
n _ _ _ i i i i 
m m _ _ _ _ , , J d 
I ' A i _ _ ' W T l 
_ I ’ I ' I • i ' 1 A 
I 
I • _ 
I 
I fc i fe i 
Figure 7 The contact office of NTAS in Tai O was at a village house owned by HKFA, where main 
local associations shared their offices together. (Source: Author's photo taken on February 17, 2011.) 
Figure 8 In the open area outside TORC, which was also under its management, only banners with 
DAB members were hung. (Source: Author's photo taken on October 30, 2010.) 
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Table 12 Statistics of TORC elections from 1995 to 2011 
Before DVHS After DVHS 
Term 1995-1999 1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 
Number of constituencies 25 25 32 32 
Number of seats contested 9 6 7 2 
Number of filled seats at the end 24 25 28 27 
of term 
Number of vacant seats at the 1 0 4 5 
end of term 
Number of voters N.A. N.A. 700 250 
Voter turnout 569 155 
Cumulative turnout rate (%) 81.29 62.00 
(Source: The numbers are compiled by the author from unpublished material obtained from Islands 
District Office. However, the District Office and the clerk of the TORC told the author that they did 
not have the record of the voter turnout, number of voters, and the list of Exco members before 2003 
(email communication on November 12, 2010). It is suspected that systematic recording of elections 
was done since 2003 when DVHS started. Therefore the author asked informant Mr. Lin to mark the 
Exco members for the 1995 and 1999 terms. Errors may be caused due to inaccuracies.) 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What factors could link up pro-Beijing and rural forces since the 1990s? 
Thus far I have argued the alignment of pro-China and rural elite groups in Tai O. 
But what actually bound the two forces together? Two factors can explain the 
success. 
Patriotism, prosperity, and stability as the shared ideology 
Kwong (2004) and Loh (2010) identify patriotism as an ideology could bind the 
relationships with member organizations together. During the 2004 debate on 
patriotism, a columnist from Wenweipo (2004, cited in Loh 2010: 224) listed four 
categories of Hong Kong politicians who could not be claimed as patriotic: 
• those who subverted the authority of the central authority; 
• those who supported Taiwan independence; 
• those who colluded with foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of 
China; and 
88 
those who endangered state security by opposing the Article 23 legislation . 
These statements were very common in media reports, speeches from pro-Beijing 
people, and publications from their groups for a long time. Also, their understanding 
of patriotism was tightly connected to prosperity, stability, and economic 
88 Article 23 states that the SAR government 'shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of 
treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state 
secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the 
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with 
foreign political organizations or bodies' (CMAB 2008). The proposed legislation on national security 
was held at a time when Hong Kong economy was hit hardest and suffered from Special Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). With the hard promotion by ministers without extensive consultation, 
opposition to the Bill grew strong in spite of mobilization for support by pro-Beijing groups. On July 
1, 2003, an estimated 500,000 people joined the demonstration against Article 23, in fear of restriction 
on civil liberties and freedom of speech, religion and press. Demonstrators also expressed a lot of 
other grievances and demanded the stepdown of Tung Chee Hwa. In September, the Bill was 
withdrawn. The rally marked the beginning of Beijing intervention into Hong Kong's politics, society, 
and economy. 
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development. The connection between these ideas was clear in Ma's (2002) portrayal 
of DAB during the political debate in 1992-95: 
First, DAB claimed that it is natural for the ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong to be 
'patrioticor 'pro-PRC. Apart from appealing to nationalist sentiments, they 
purported a pragmatic rationale for being pro-Beijing: China is the future sovereign, 
and we should be less confrontational against it and keep a good relationship or 
dialogue with it. The Tiananmen crackdown is history. It is no use to harp on the old 
themes of Tiananmen. China should look to the future, and, as Chinese, the Hong 
Kong people should help China to develop rather than continually confronting the 
PRC government (as the democrats do). Democracy is a good thing, they said, but its 
development should be gradual lest it should jeopardize the stability and prosperity 
of Hong Kong. (p. 119). 
From their view, pro-democrats were 'unpatriotic', and would subvert the Beijing 
government. Therefore, they were not granted opportunities to communicate with 
Chinese authorities. 
In Tai O, the rural groups largely shared the above ideas, as illustrated in Mr. Kuai's 
criticism of Eton and Legislator Lee Cheuk-yan as troublemaker. Also, Uncle Lok, in 
the interview, expressed his long-time patriotism, and the patriotic orientation 
(towards PRC) of TORC before colonial era: 
Lam:... Do you know the British government was very afraid of the leftists? You 
would be in deep trouble if you were known to be a patriot. We are a patriotic 
organization. They were more hostile towards patriotic organizations. The RC was 
under her (the colonial government s) control. We could communicate through the 
RC. When we entered the RC, we could fight for many things which otherwise could 
not in other arenas. 
The clearest signal of patriotism after handover was the support of legislation to 
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law (CMAB 2003) and constitutional 
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development in 2005. They all supported the government's reform proposal and 
objected universal suffrage, and were against the pro-democracy camp^^: 
'...the conditions of universal suffrage for Hong Kong are not sufficient. Bluntly 
implementing universal suffrage would produce an opposite result(NTAS Islands 
Committee and TORA 2005) 
'...the political reform proposal shows progressive improvement and the principle of 
balanced participation of Hong Kong's democratic political development... A small 
number of so-called 'pan-democrats only considered of their interests and neglect 
public opinion, accusing the reform proposal as a setback of democracy. This 
obviously was irresponsible. [We] hope the government to listen more to public 
opinion, to orient towards public opinion, [so] the implementation of the proposal 
would have popular support . (TOOSFA 2005, emphasis by author) 
‘The Association believes that LegCo members are voted by Hong Kong people, 
whether directly or indirectly. A small number of ‘fighters of democracy neglects 
public opinion, accuses the reform proposal as a setback of democracy. This 
obviously is irresponsible, destroys social harmony and economic development. 
(HKFA, signed by Mr. Chik 2005, emphasis by author) 
From their cross-membership, the rural elites were easy to spread their ideology, 
therefore had a greater chance to affect organizational objectives. The long-term 
connection of HKFA with Chinese authorities further consolidated pro-Beijing power. 
In the words of Lo, Yu and Wan (2002), cross-membership 'constitute[s] an informal 
and a lateral channel of communication between the DAB and its various supportive 
organizations' (p. 154). In this way, the higher coordinative body (NTAS or DAB) 
89 In formulation of the election mechanism of CE Election Committee in 2007 and LegCo 
composition in 2008, the SAR government delivered a proposal in 2005. The proposal included 
doubling the seats of CE Election Committee from 800 to 1600, and increasing the seats of LegCo 
from 60 to 70, in which functional constituency and geographical constituency shared half of the 
additional seats. The pro-govemment camp supported the proposal as it showed a progress of 
democratization, while the pro-democracy camp opposed the proposal as it violated the expectation of 
universal suffrage in 2007/2008. After series of struggle, the proposal failed because the government 
could not obtain 2/3 majority of support in the LegCo. The election mechanism remained the same as 
that in 2002 CE election and 2004 LegCo election. For details of the issue, see Lo (2010: 61-91). 
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could have a higher chance to influence the decision-making process of the member 
organizations (TORA, TOOSFA, and HKFA)9 . Even in times of conflict, it would be 
easier to reach consensus. Moreover, when TORC was a representative body in the 
village and political structure in Hong Kong, the government would be more inclined 
to accept their opinion, even though villagers have diverse opinions actually (Knoke 
1990; Woods 2005). 
The Liaison Office as coordinator 
The linkage of pro-Beijing camp extended to the Liaison Office^^ Uncle Law, one of 
the two advisors of TORC since the 1960s, maintained contact with the Office. 
Similar to Hayes' (2006: 156) account, the staff of the Liaison Office of the NT 
regularly contacted community organizations. The purpose was, according to Uncle 
92 
Law, to 'understand more about the activities in the NT’ . Indeed, scholars and 
media reports revealed that the Liaison Office was responsible for coordinating 
patriotic forces as a whole during both election and non-election time^^ (Kwong 
The interlocks between pro-China camp in Hong Kong and the TORC members were tight and 
long-term. It was not unique in Tai O or Lantau Island, but throughout Hong Kong (see Ma 2007; Lo, 
Yu and Wan 2002; Kwong 2010). 
91 Before renaming to the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in the HKSAR in 2000, 
it was the New China News Agency in Hong Kong. Controlled by CCP, NCNA Hong Kong was 
responsible for resumption of sovereignty during the transitional period, and detached the news 
section from political function in 1986. After 2000, liaison with local people, mainland authorities, 
and support of activities in Hong Kong were its responsibilities. Before and after handover, one of its 
chief functions was to co-ordinate like-minded pro-Beijing candidates and mobilize satellite 
organizations in LegCo and district elections. This was a part of united front strategy. 
92 Actually, inside TORC office, there was a small brass-like plaque carved with words 'Love country, 
love Hong Kong, love Tai O ) given by the Liaison Office in 2008. 
93 Indeed, during my field visit, the officer of the NT Liaison Office was invited by the RC to festivals 
and activities, such as dragon boat festival and Wedding on the Sea (a carnival which demonstrated 
the rituals of weddings of Tai O boat people). 
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2004; Ma 2007; Loh 2010), and was more explicit in recent years. This included 
reducing competition among DAB and other pro-China groups, commanding 
campaign strategies and selection of candidates for elections. 
Advantages of binding together: elections, mobilization, and interests 
With the meticulous division of labor and interlocks, the pro-Beijing groups saw the 
fruits of alignment. During elections, those affiliated organizations mobilized their 
staff and members to support candidates, through disseminating leaflets, ordering 
them to vote for preferred candidates. Since its formation in 1992, DAB was given 
votes and human resources from NTAS during elections. In the 2007 DC election, 
the NTAS, through a leftist newspaper, openly encouraged voters to vote for Mr. Wan 
(and Ms. Suen for Tung Chung) (Wenweipo 2007). 
In District Council, pro-Beijing / pro-government members supported the existence 
of ex-officio and appointed seats, because they believed that these seats could 
represent rural interests and balance different power (which implied diluting the 
pro-democracy force) (Lo 2010:128)94. The pro-democracy camp, for sure, was 
against ex-officio and appointed seats because they were not democratically elected 
(and almost all had affiliations with patriotic organizations). Forming a solid base in 
94 For example, in the debate on constitutional development in 2005, Mr. Lung supported the 
existence of ex-officio seats because 'the process of election was democratic'. The seats 'were more 
representative than DC election due to higher voting rate than some DC elections'. He also maintained 
that appointed seats could 'balance different opinions'. Therefore, he supported appointed members 
had the right to elect CE. (See minutes of Islands DC (2005).) 
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districts could help party penetration and acquiring support. 
Pro-Beijing force was especially strong in the Islands District Council, when 8 out of 
the 22 seats were ex-officio RC chairpersons, in addition to 4 appointed members in 
the 2007-2011 term. Even for direct election, pro-Beijing force gained the majority. 
(Table 16). The two members were from the pan-democratic camp were from Tung 
Chung and Discovery Bay; no pro-democratic members attempted competition in 
rural parts of Lantau and other outlying islands. It was particularly easy for the 
pro-Beijing camp to obtain subsidies for activities organized by satellite groups of 
NTAS, FTU, and DAB which favored their supporters, hoping to receive reward by 
vote in election, and joining mobilization in non-election time^^. 
95 A pan-democracy member from the Islands District Council told me that she and another 
pro-democratic member lacked capacity to form groups to provide activities to residents. Also, they 
were new to the Council (she from 2000 and another from 2004), but the Community Affairs, Culture 
and Recreation Committee under the Council, which consisted of the councilors themselves, preferred 
applicants having 'track record . This favored groups with a longer history and more resourceful 
groups, that is, pro-Beijing political parties and satellite groups. Cases of provision of favors to 
supporters (see MingPao 2010) have been reported in other district councils. Worth noting is that the 
latter case involved pan-democratic members. 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16 Distribution of directly elected seats in Islands District Board / District 
Council by political affiliation (1995-2011). 
Directly elected seats 1995-1997 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 
DAB / FTU / NTAS / 4 (66.7%) 3 (42.9%) 5 (62.5%) 6 (60%) 
other pro-Beijing 
affiliations 
DP / CP / other 0 0 1 (12.5%) 2 (20%) 
pro-democratic 
affil iations 
Independent 2 (33.3%) 4(57.1%) 2 (25%) 2 (20%) 
Total 6 7 8 10 
(Source: calculation by author.) 
Remark: The provisional DB in 1997-1999 did not offer direct election. 
Third, such alignment would protect them from attack in case of political 
controversies. In the River Crab Saga, it was the pro-Beijing legislators and 
newspapers which supported TORC from the beginning through fusion of discourse 
of rurality and harmony (Woods 2005). 
The fusion of discourse of rurality and discourse of harmonious society / social 
harmony in Beijing and Hong Kong in River Crab Saga 
The speaker who raised the term ‘harmonious society’ / ‘social harmony' 
The phrases 'social harmony' and 'harmonious society’ were not alien in Hong Kong, 
but it was the speaker, the timing, and the consequence after the speech that 
generated social anxiety. The speaker, Tsang Tak-sing, had a strong leftist 
background. His father worked in Chinese Chamber of Commerce, while his mother 
taught in a leftist secondary school. He participated in the 1966/67 riots, and was 
sentenced to imprisonment for two years for distributing seditious materials at school. 
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After release, he worked at two leftist newspapers in Hong Kong, respectively. He 
was elected to the to NPC member from 1990. He was appointed into the 
Central Policy Unit in 1998 by Tung Chee-hua (HKHeadline 2007). Until 2007, he 
was appointed to the Secretary for Home Affairs. More importantly, he was one of 
the rumored CCP members in Hong Kong (Loh 2010). His brother was Tsang 
Yuk-shing, the foundation chairman of the DAB, and is currently the President of the 
LegCo (2008-2012). He taught at a leftist school for almost three decades (Loh 
2010). 
Commentators believed that his appointment to HAB was to facilitate the 
communication with the Chinese government due to the trust from Beijing, as well as 
a test of whether Hong Kong people accepted leftists taking up government posts, in 
preparation for more pro-Beijing people to join the administration team (HKEJ 
2007a; SCMP 2007a). Furthermore, a news report from the Standard (2007) 
mentioned that an anonymous Beijing official perceived HAB as analogous to the 
United Front Work Department, and should play a role in social harmony. 
"The Home Affairs Bureau is an important tool for governance. It can be compared 
with the mainland's United Front Work Department which aims to foster social 
harmony and good ties between the government and society. The bureau chief is an 
important political post that demands great political wisdom, a Beijing official said. 
"It's a pity the government of Tung [Chee-hwa] failed to deliver on this. It's a role to 
gamer feedback on public policies, strengthen social networking, take the public 
pulse in changing circumstances, in particular, and collect intelligence on social and 
political groups and luminaries, “ the official said in 2005. 
1 4 5 
Although the speech was in 2005, it implied that Beijing agreed that Tsang was the 
right person to take up the role. Indeed, he was an advocate of civic and national 
education, and enhanced the promotion during his term, which tilted in favor of 
advocating 'the progress made in our country in recent years' (SCMP 2007b; see also 
Kan 2011). 
Substance and implied meaning of the speech 
The timing of usage of the term 'harmonious society' / 'social harmony' was also 
important in stirring up the controversy in 2008, which did not happen in the 1988 
election. The origin of social harmony comes from Confucian philosophy. Although 
the Confucian school is subject to different interpretations, the mainstream one is that 
to achieve social harmony, one needs to cultivate his / her moral character. Then, 
both leaders and subject should 'behav[e] with propriety and conduc[t] their 
relationships in conformity with social rules and without coercion^^' (Wong 2009: 
240). Some scholars argue that social harmony and Confucianism legitimizes 
paternalistic rules by Chinese imperial emperors and social hierarchy (Baum 2005). 
The effect of Confucian culture today has varied. Filial piety remains strong. But the 
urge of democracy and individual rights has become higher in recent decades, which 
originally seemed to contradict with the norm of blind obedience to parents and 
9(’ Some scholars argue that Confucianism should be examined under different traditions. Bell (2011), 
for example, suggests that one can interpret it from a critical perspective. In the Analects of Confucius, 
'exemplary persons should pursue harmony but not conformity' (p. 94). 
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emperors and women subordination. 
The promotion of social harmony / harmonious society revived and has become the 
leading agenda of the Beijing government, but the meaning of the expression was not 
the same as the traditional conception. It at least included 'democracy and rule of 
law' and 'fairness and justice' under the new concept. It first appeared in a speech by 
President Hu Jintao in 2005^^. In addition to his notion of 'harmonious society', the 
CCP government also threw out 'preserving stability' and 'scientific development' to 
achieve altogether economic construction; political construction; cultural 
development and social development. The presentation of such concepts was against 
a background of mounting conflicts between the rich and poor, the urban and rural, 
and the people and government after economic reform. Fostering competition and 
creativity, providing a fair level-playing field, ensuring adequate protection for the 
disadvantaged, were crucial steps towards a harmonious society, as well as 
elimination of social turmoil and regime instability (Chan 2009). 
However, in practice, the 'harmonious society' agenda was distorted from the 
principle. In the 2005 Chief Executive Policy Address, Donald Tsang adopted the 
agenda, yet emphasizing on strong government, harmony and economic development 
than democracy or fairness: 
97 According to President Hu (2005), a harmonious society is a society that is 'democratic and ruled 
by law, fair and just, trustworthy and fraternal, full of vitality, stable and orderly, and maintains 
harmony between man and nature' (p. 3, quoted in Chan 2009:821). 
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^ harmonious society, itself founded on strong government and economic 
development, will create a favorable environment to achieve these goals. These three 
elements are interwoven, and of equal importance (Information Service Department 
2005). 
Tsang Tak-sing also stressed the community dimension when making use of 
harmonious society. For example, cooperation with District Councils, or racial 
harmony, was a pre-condition for harmonious society (HAB 2007, 2008). More 
importantly, his honor to be a Great Bauhinia Star was from, among other things, 'his 
capacity as the Secretary for Home Affairs' and ‘exemplary efforts in fostering social 
harmony' (Information Service Department 2010). 
Fusion of discourses 
The discourse of harmonious society fused with discourse of mrality which served 
the interests of rural elites. Discourse of mrality promoted a conception of 
countryside which was stable, orderly, and harmonious. Woods (2005) argues that 
'the propagation of the myth of the apolitical countryside helped to shore up the 
traditional power structure in rural areas at a time of great social and economic 
change and political uncertainty' (p. 5). The fusion of discourses was evident in the 
letters of complaint against the TOYWCA. In the leaders' eyes, local organizations 
should maintain peaceful relationship with the government. Maintaining social 
stability is at the forefront of government policy: 
Uncle Lok: Tsang Tak-sing as a leader of Home Affairs Bureau, is legitimate to 
promote harmony. Isn ’t it good that the society is always in dispute? You see in The 
National People's Congress and People's Political Consultative Conference, the 
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President [Hu Jing-tao] always promotes harmony. Its mandarin pronunciation is the 
same as 'river crab ’. The 'river crab issue . I think these people make trouble, no 
good to the society. 
Interviewer: What do you mean by 'making trouble ’? 
Uncle Lok: Tsang Tak-sing suggests that we should be more harmonious. What's 
wrong with it? Why criticize Tsang Tak-sing, including the media? You argue that 
Tsang is giving pressure? I don t think so. 
Tsang Tak-sing s reminder re-affirmed the status of the TORC being a legitimate 
channel for promoting community well-being. This implies that YWCA as well as 
other organizations should not overstep the boundary of TORC. In other words, 
overlap and competition among the two organizations' functions were not preferred. 
In short, although leftist force existed since Anti-Japanese struggle, and its 
connection with the pro-TORC camp became obvious since 1980s when district 
elections began, the above paragraphs have shown further integration in the 1990s 
and afterwards. After the handover, the necessity of balancing local politics was 
dismissed. The pro-Beijing groups obviously saw the benefits of strengthening their 
political orientation. With the chairperson of HYK Lau Wong-fat being nominated to 
the Executive Council of HKSAR, a strong and clear line-up from local politics to 
the top SAR government: from the elite-led local community organizations, to the 
RC, DC, HYK, NTAS, DAB, and up to the Liaison Office. Although HAB, HAD, 
and each district office should not be regarded as a unified whole, their main 
responsibility of promotion of national education, with the minister's strong leftist 
background, made people easy to associate the bureau with a gatekeeper of Beijing 
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on local affairs. We need to be mindful not to exaggerate the closeness of the rural 
camp and pro-Beijing camp^^, but most of the time when the two camps had common 
interest, or needed to support policies from Beijing, or needed to attack the 
pan-democratic rivalries, they would collaborate and express similar viewpoints, 
such as in support of Article 23 legislation, and the constitutional reforms in 2005 
and 2010, often with the coordination of Liaison Office behind the scene. Taking into 
account the change of political environment surrounding social organizations from 
1990s, this essay explains TORC's intention of the formation of influence chain 
towards HAB (by sending copy of letter of complaint to the Bureau minister that 
could control resources over YWCA (Zietsma and Winn 2008)), and enhanced its 
salience from a legitimate to a powerful, legitimate and urgent stakeholder. It resulted 
in the swift and firm reaction by the YWCA Board to pacify dissatisfaction from 
TORC, Island District Office and HAB officials, until the bounce-back from the 
There have been occasions that the will of HYK members ran against that of DAB. An obvious 
example occurred in 2008 LegCo election, when Lam Wai-keung had to make way for DAB member 
Ip Kwok-kim for the District Council functional constituency. Also, HYK chairperson-cum-then-LP 
member Lau Wong-fat openly supported HYK-cum-DAB member Cheung Hok-ming, but not his 
party colleague Selina Chow in the New Territories West geographical constituency. Chow lost the 
election and complained Lau. Lau finally left the party (see Loh 2010 for more detail). Another 
incident of discord was that DAB supported DVHS in 2003 (Wenweipo 2003a), which raised 
oppositions from a group of HYK members, who formed a new representative body led by Kan 
Ping-chi (but demised in a few years' time). In December 2000, the Court of Final Appeal delivered a 
judgment that non-indigenous villagers should be granted rights to join VR elections. It created 
opposition of village elites after the ruling. Cheung's (2004) survey reveals that over half of the 
responded HYK members worried that the DVHS would accelerate the split between indigenous and 
non-indigenous villagers, speed up party penetration, spark off another legal dispute and court cases 
because of deprivation of traditional rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in N.T., and cause 
disputes over the over-representation of indigenous villages. In retrospect, the privilege and status of 
indigenous inhabitants are maintained after DVHS. Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (2011) 
recently conducted a survey on 2011 VR election, and finds out that among the 739 residents' 
representatives, over 70% (536) was indigenous inhabitants. 
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pro-YWCA residents and social workers. 
Public debate on political interference from Beijing into local politics 
It is easier to account for the resistance for Tai O people to oppose YWCA's decision 
to punish the two workers in the River Crab Saga, because of their past contribution 
to the village. What we need is an explanation for the territory-wide concern in 2008, 
because in principle the Saga did not involve people outside Tai O. I argue that what 
called forth public attention was the debate whether political interference from 
Beijing into local politics occurred. Specifically, a portion of Hong Kong people 
worried the penetration of 'harmonious society' propaganda into Hong Kong. First, 
we should illustrate the increasing political awareness and participation from the 
1980s. 
Rising political awareness and participation from 1980s onwards 
Although the argument that the political awareness and participation of Hong Kong 
was lower before the 1980s and increased afterwards became debatable (see Lau 
(1984), Lau and Kuan (1988), Kuan and Lau (2002) and Lam (2004) for different 
viewpoints), it was obvious that there have been rising number of protests and 
demonstrations to strive for rights, and more channels for expression of public 
opinion since the 1970s. With the democratization agenda began, political 
associations blossomed from 1982 (Chan 2010). Voting turnout for all levels of 
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elections has shown a general increase. Hong Kong experienced three large-scale 
demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, calling for opposition of Article 23 legislation, 
direct election of SAR Chief Executive and LegCo, and a variety of other demands. 
Although people rarely actually take part in political groups (Chan 2010: 179), and 
the mobilizing power of those groups remained low, news media played an important 
role to channel messages from the government and political groups to the public. 
Political awareness and participation of Hong Kong people has been more and more 
enthusiastic after 2003. 
Another indicator of increasing political awareness and participation is the gradual 
party penetration of society. When Lo (2004) suggests party penetration of society in 
the local MAC level, this study argues for similar situations in rural areas, that is the 
penetration of society to rural associations. In both cases, contestation of the two 
camps on ideology and ideals of society grew up and dominated in the political arena. 
Opinions of political issues often dissect along pro-Beijing / pro-democracy factions. 
Debate on Beijing 's interference into local politics 
The purpose of arguing increase in political awareness and participation is that it has 
been easier to politicize public issues, associating certain gestures and policies in 
relation to government (SAR or Beijing) strategies behind the curtain. The worry of 
Beijing's political interference came after the proposal (and deferral) of Article 23 
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legislation in 2003, when Beijing's concern on Hong Kong affairs was more 
conspicuous, notably on political and economic strategies (So 2011; Yep 2011). This 
was a contrast from pre-unification and even the first few years after handover., when 
the Beijing government kept the promise of 'One Country, Two Systems'. The 
promise faded when Beijing compromised SAR's autonomy over stability and 
sovereignty control. Beijing initiated economic benefits, such as CEPA and 
Individual Traveler's Scheme to earn Hong Kong people's support. Moreover, the 
Liaison Office became high-profile in commenting political affairs. A most widely 
discussed issue was about the article of Cao Erbao, the head of research of the 
Liaison Office in 2008. He stated that Hong Kong was governed by two teams, one 
was the SAR government; another was a team of cadres from the Central 
Government to carry out Hong Kong affairs. He also clarified the meaning of 
'autonomy that the extent of autonomy should not supersede Chinese authority: 
...the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Hong Kong SAR, and its being an 
administrative region directly under the Central Authorities which has constitutional 
authority over it, are the two aspects of inseparable unity within ‘one country and at 
the same time non-interchangeable with each other. (Cao 2008, translated by Ng 
2009) 
The River Crab Saga exploded one year later. Whether the public defended or 
criticized Tsang Tak-sing's speech, they discussed about the alleged shrinking of 
political autonomy of the SAR vis-a-vis Beijing. In particular, the pro-democratic 
Hong Kong people worried that the principle 'One Country, Two Systems' that 
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promised in the Basic Law finally became a myth: 
Some therefore fear that River Crab has crossed the Shenzhen River. They are 
worried that Hong Kong may become as hexie as a place where one person alone 
has the say and all others stand mute. The only thing the government can do to dispel 
their worry is to find out what has actually happened in the River Crab affair and 
reinstate the true meaning of hexia in Hong Kong. (MingPao 2009b) 
Under strong economic and social dependence on / inter-dependence with the 
Mainland, and scrutiny of local politics by central government, the River Crab Saga 
actually reflected the anxiety of loss of distinctiveness of Hong Kong (and Hong 
Kong identity), when the governing strategy and mentality was no different from 
other Mainland cities. 
In sum, the institutional environment of social service sector was more stable in 1988 
in terms of funding. In case of controversy, YWCA would be less worried of 
resources and adopt a more defensive approach and recognized the role of advocacy. 
Available evidence reveals that the response to TORC challenge on legitimacy was 
more consistent. After LSGS, the funding environment of social service sector 
became more uncertain. Government-SSO relationship was more contractual. Heavy 
reliance of government funding in times of financial uncertainty heightened the need 
of YWCA to repair legitimacy with the government when controversy happened. 
Social service reform also forced YWCA to explore more stakeholders and establish 
relationships with these stakeholders to capture more resources. Moreover, YWCA 
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had to deal with three groups of important stakeholders: 1) TORC and pro-TORC 
groups, 2) pro-TOYWCA residents, and 3) media, legislators, unions, and social 
service groups. Those parties, being influential to YWCA, became the most salient 
stakeholders of YWCA in different stages. Politicization of controversy over 
post-disaster relief by both TORC and the aggrieved social worker was a crucial 
element. First, TORC sought HAB minister to strengthen its capacity to give pressure 
to YWCA to sanction its Tai O team, an exercise of stakeholder multiplicity. Second, 
pro-TOYWCA residents voiced against YWCA's decision to appease TORC. Third, 
and unexpectedly, the doubt of practice of Beijing's ruling agenda in the Hong Kong 
sparked off public debate over SAR autonomy, which was a sensitive topic for both 
pro-Beijing and pro-democracy camps. When a local dispute evolved into a 
territory-wide political debate, it was inevitable to get the attention of media, 
pressure groups, politicians, as well as government departments and labor unions. 
This impeded the effectiveness of YWCA in repairing its legitimacy, since 
stakeholder salience changed during the repair process, and those salient 
stakeholders' interests were so contradictory that, in the case, satisfaction of TORC's 
demands caused opposition from pro-TOYWCA residents. The discovery of 
legitimacy strategies in violation of organizational mission exacerbated the crisis. In 
comparison, complaints of TORC against YWCA about 1988 DB election received 
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far less attraction. The relative political balance in local politics, plus the seemingly 
hands-off approach of government departments, and the less intense struggle 
between political camps helped avoid the dispute transforming to a public event. As a 
result of persistent variation in stakeholder salience and stakeholder multiplicity, 
YWCA experienced inconsistency in responding to the Saga in 2008: from defending 
the Tai O team, to apology to TORC, to restitution to pro-YWCA Tai O residents, to 
apology to the public. This contrasted with dissociating election from the 
organization, and defining the purpose of election in 1988. 
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Section 10 Conclusion 
The case and argument revisited 
The study set out to capture the dynamics between government and social service 
sector in Hong Kong through the analysis of a case study, which illustrates how 
YWCA, a government-sub vented social service organization reacted differently to 
challenges from government departments and other social groups in two time periods. 
Such differences lie in the nature and consistency of strategies. Organizational 
legitimacy is an appropriate conceptual tool to assess how the focal organization 
reacted to changes within its resource and institutional environment. This sets forth 
the research question: why YWCA differed in legitimacy repair strategies between 
two similar challenges by TORC and pro-TORC groups, mostly on moral and 
cognitive grounds, with the strategies during the dispute in 1988 District Board 
election more consistent than that in 2008-2010 River Crab Saga. In-depth interviews, 
archival research, observations are useful in organizing data coherently, and in 
understanding organizational strategies in the social context. 
The thesis shows that, from Breitsohl's (2009) typology on legitimacy repair, 
multiple strategies were available to an SSO when confronted with a crisis. The 
actual strategy employed was a function of organization's perception of stakeholder 
salience. I have argued that in the 1988 case, stakeholders showed less variation in 
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salience. Fewer stakeholders involved, and the complainant TORC only possessed 
urgency and legitimacy attributes towards YWCA. Relevant government departments, 
even though having power and legitimacy, had no obvious gestures to intervene into 
the dispute. Stakeholders and their salience remained throughout the dispute 
Therefore, YWCA was able to provide a more consistent and unified account to 
stakeholders. Alternatively, in the River Crab Saga during 2008-2010, stakeholders 
showed more variation in salience. More stakeholder groups were involved. TORC 
sought to and succeeded in gaining support from leading government minister, which 
substantially enhanced its salience perceived by YWCA. YWCA complied with 
demands of TORC, but resulted in opposition from pro-TOYWCA residents, and 
later from media, unions, legislators, and social workers. They were all most salient 
groups in the later period of the dispute. The situation was exacerbated due to the 
contradictory demands among stakeholder groups. Fluctuation of salient stakeholder 
groups and the difficulties in satisfying all their demands led to YWCA's inconsistent 
legitimacy repair strategies. 
From the available evidence, this study identified two factors that contributed to 
difference in changes in stakeholder salience. One is resource-oriented, another is 
politically-oriented. And the two factors are subjected to broader political and 
economic changes. I have argued that implementation of Lump Sum Grant funding 
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policy de-stabilized the resource environment of SSOs. Beforehand, government 
subvention (mostly by SWD) was adequate for SSO operation and was the largest 
funder of YWCA. It did not have an urging need to seek alternative funding, which 
implied fewer stakeholder groups. YWCA could assert its legitimacy mostly by 
displaying its ability to provide adequate services, complying with rules and 
regulations, and fulfilling voluntary mission, even though it engaged in conflicts with 
other parties. As the service reform began, the government put a ceiling on 
subvention, even though the government remained the largest funder. YWCA needed 
to acquire other resources to expand services, or redeploy existing resources to fill up 
underfinanced projects or expense items (such as remuneration). This implied 
involvement of more stakeholders which YWCA needed to address. The organization 
needed to maintain cooperative relationship with government to avoid sanction or 
budget cutback. YWCA complied with complainant's demands and apology as repair 
strategy to those stakeholders, even though it deviated from its mission, to settle the 
dispute in the early stage of the River Crab Saga. 
The second factor concerns the level of contestation between pro-Beijing and 
pro-democracy camps in Hong Kong. In the 1988 District Board election, the 
conflict in Tai O was intensive but localized. Contestation between the two camps 
existed but not as strong as what we see in the election today. Two significant 
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changes elevated the contestation in the subsequent two decades. One was party 
penetration of society brought about by electoral politics. Lining up of rural patriotic 
organizations with the pro-Beijing camp existed long ago, but personal and 
organizational connection with political parties became more obvious in the 1990s 
when DAB was formed. Resumption of sovereignty made the logic of maintenance 
of local political balance meaningless. Tsang Tak-sing's appointment of minister 
provided a chance for TORC to enhance its salience by establishing links with Tsang, 
politicizing the dispute. Alignment in stances towards political issues, coordination 
of rural and patriotic district associations by the Liaison Office, and fusion of 
harmony discourses were examples of the affiliation between rural and pro-Beijing 
forces. Social workers, who were in majority pro-democratic, had little role to play in 
counterbalancing the leftist force after handover. Another change was the ongoing 
increase of political awareness and participation among the public, who became 
more sensitive to current affairs and had more channels to express their opinions. 
Thus, the Saga became more politicized in the later phase, when the pan-democratic 
parties and legislators expressed concern. They framed the issue as a sign of adoption 
of 'harmonious society' policy from Beijing through a leftist-background minister 
managing district affairs, and made use of the dispute to attack the government and 
pro-govemment / pro-Beijing camp for suppressing social conflicts, infringing their 
1 6 0 
idea of ‘One Country, Two Systems' and 'High Autonomy' as promised in the Basic 
Law. Subsequent media reports fueled up the controversy and increased the salience 
of the above stakeholders. YWCA was required to make frequent responses. The 
allegation of conforming to demands of pro-Beijing force was serious enough to 
undermine public impression of YWCA. YWCA needed to find ways to reaffirm 
control over the issue and address public concern. The apology did alleviate the 
attack thereafter, and the focus shifted to allegation of the minister's interference, and 
the loss of YWCA was less than expected. Whether or not the interference was 
intentional, the issue was highly politicized beyond the control of YWCA and TORC. 
The issue itself and the impossibility to satisfy all stakeholders with conflicting 
demands created trouble to YWCA. 
The two factors are not isolated but intertwined with each other. In the River Crab 
Saga, the services provided by frontline community workers in Tai O were 
disapproved by government officials. Such disapproval was produced by 
contradiction with the new 'harmonious society' policies initiated by Beijing and 
followed by HKSAR. When the government maintained as the largest funding source, 
YWCA could not escape from resource dependency; its board and management was 
afraid of spoiling relationship with the government, which might negatively affect 
funding. YWCA internally was in great tension. Because community work was not a 
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major division in YWCA (and other SSOs), YWCA chose to sacrifice YWCA to 
rescue its relationship with the government in the first place. Only after widespread 
criticism from the pro-democratic camp in the public arena did YWCA reassess the 
strategy and conciliate the critics. The reason was to avoid loss of recognition and 
donation from the public or business sector owing to the unfavorable image (Figure 
9). 
1988 District Board election 2008 River Crab Saga 
High degree of Low degree of Low degree of High degree of 
stability in struggle between stability in struggle between 
funding pro-Bcijing and pro- funding pro-Beijing and pro-
environment democracy factions environment democracy factions 
\ /,_\\ / 
Low level of L u m p S u m G r a n t Sys tem \ High level of 
change in \ change in 
salience among Par ty p e n e t r a t i o n o f soc i e t y / salience among 
stakeholders r , - , / stakeholders 
+ Rise of political awareness / 
V / W / 
High degree of Low degree of 
consistency of YWCA consistency of YWCA 
legitimacy repair Icgil imocy repair 
Figure 9 Funding instability and involvement of more divergent groups increased the difficulties to 
manage conflicting demands. This would made legitimacy repair inconsistent. 
This investigation is a case study of the change in relationship between the 
government and social service sector from the 1980s to 2000s. Welfare reform, 
combined with a series of local political and economic change, altered the mutually 
dependent relationship into a more contractual one. The government imposed stricter 
control on service performance. The absence of guarantee of financial input from the 
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government to SSOs, coupled with the difficulties to seek alternative resources 
increased the dependence of SSOs on government support. The increased uncertainty 
and pressure from resource and institutional environment along the two decades 
resulted in the more vulnerable position of YWCA (and other SSOs with similar 
background). Compliance or appreciative strategies after challenges better ensured 
organizational survival. Therefore, SSOs were less autonomous in social activism or 
organizational development. At the same time, increased public scrutiny has given 
pressure to SSOs to demonstrate responsiveness and transparency to meet social 
expectation and gamer legitimacy. 
Theoretical input 
Sociological and organizational theories enrich our understanding of factors that 
shape the relations between organizations and the wider society, and strategic 
decision making by nonprofits and other organizations. Literature on organization 
legitimacy rightly provides a conceptual tool to analyze the repair process. 
Legitimacy is particularly crucial to non-profit organizations because efficiency is 
not the most appropriate assessment of organizational success, and emphasizes the 
social construction of consensus regarding the appropriateness of an organization's 
action. Recent literature of legitimacy balances the institutional and strategic views, 
meaning that organizations attain legitimacy by converging with prevalent cultural 
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and social definition, while there has room for organizations to select or even 
manipulate the environment. Resource dependence theory highlights the 
responsiveness of an organization to the demands of external actors for resources, 
especially for nonprofits, to manage environmental uncertainty. Theoretical 
perspectives on stakeholder identification and prioritization illustrate that managers 
often obtain the concurrence of salient stakeholders rather than appealing to all 
stakeholders. Also, stakeholder groups may seek support and engage with important 
stakeholders to give pressure onto the focal organization. This brings dynamism to 
stakeholder analysis, which involves a deeper investigation of environmental 
changes outside the focal organization. Finally, nonprofit studies emphasize the 
possible relationships and reasons for changes between the government and social 
service sector. 
Significance of the study 
Recognition of the dynamics of legitimacy and variation of stakeholder salience 
This study has confirmed the dynamic nature of legitimacy, not only indicated in the 
acquisition and repair processes, but also the shifting legitimacy strategies through 
time. Examining stakeholder politics enables us to study the contextual factors that 
facilitated TORC and pro-TORC groups to gain leverage by initiating connection 
with the pro-Beijing top government official to strengthen their own capacity to exert 
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influence on YWCA in River Crab Saga. There was no such gestures during the 1988 
DB election. When an organization cannot satisfy all stakeholder demands and obtain 
legitimacy, a likely strategy is to obtain concurrence (Pferrer et al. 2008) from salient 
stakeholders. 
An (incorrect) perception of organization caused a real challenge 
Also, the case of YWCA reveals that while the typology is 'analytical in the sense 
that concrete institutional arrangements will be found to combine regulative, 
normative, and cognitive processes together in varying amounts' (Scott 1995: 
143-144; cited in Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 68), in reality people and 
organizations will incline to lump the distinction together. My study has clearly 
shown that even though TOYWCA and workers did not show any violation of laws 
and codes of ethics (regulative legitimacy), TORC still questioned its existence; 
legality does not warrant legitimacy. On the other hand, the peculiar dual role of 
social service and advocacy caused ambiguity in the rural elites' eyes. Informants 
admitted that TOYWCA did not try their best to make others understand the rationale 
of advocacy and community development. Until now, my rural elites informants still 
misunderstood that YWCA was wholly subvented by the government (SWD). Such 
illusion became an important reason to attack YWCA. 
The ambiguity of SSOs in Hong Kong: Tension between role of operator and 
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advocator under high government subvention 
Social service sector are situated between the government and civil society spheres. 
Members of the sector are not government agencies, but their income is largely come 
from government and public bodies. Also, in many times they are the operator of 
government policies, providing social service for the need. Therefore, the illusion of 
lay public (including the rural elites) about the funding structure and position of 
SSOs as 'part of the government' is understandable and not unfounded. The 
discussion section explained the apparently counter-intuitive phenomenon, that 
YWCA was less tolerant of its advocator role even though antagonizing local groups 
or the government itself when government subvention was actually fewer. While the 
operator and advocator roles are not mutually exclusive, if a social service 
organization wants to preserve its advocator role, reduction of government 
subvention and endeavor to acquire support from funding bodies which identify with 
empowerment and social justice would be an important step to demonstrate its 
autonomy, and gain trust and support from service users. 
The specter of Beijing s intervention and undermining of political autonomy, and its 
limitation 
We turn to the implication of the case on Hong Kong's politics. Given that social 
service sector is an important member of civil society, and civil society is an arena 
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where members to pursue collective or personal goals without taking power of the 
state, the present study shows that 'self-censorship' in the sector undoubtedly 
confirms again the arena is under encroachment (Ma 2007). 
Yet, Ma (2007) immediately follows to argue that state control 'will be met with 
resistance from the autonomous parts of the civil society' (p. 197). The Anti-Article 
23 legislation campaign and the new series of social movements on environmental 
and heritage conservation throughout these years have given birth of new front 
against the pressure. Unlike in the 1980s, social workers, whether working in SSOs 
or not, are no longer leaders of social movements (except issues directly related to 
social service sector); politicians, political parties, and the mass public (sometimes in 
the form of netizens) have taken up the position. The study clearly shows that after 
the River Crab Saga was publicized, pressure groups were formed subsequently in 
support of the involved social workers and opposed suppression of dissident voices 
in the name of harmonious society. 
Unintentionally, this issue shows the limits of Beijing's co-optation strategy by 
economic favor and promotion of patriotism (See also Lo 2010). The portion of Tai 
O residents in support of TO YWCA against TORC, and casting the votes to 
pan-democratic legislators were an example (refer to Tables 14 and 15). The framing 
of the issue as a penetration of Mainland policy helped attract a portion of Hong 
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Kong people, most of them arguably pro-democratic, who emphasized the need to 
maintain political autonomy. Their demands were propagated in the media and the 
internet. Cao's speech on two governing teams, together with debates regional 
development in Pearl River Delta stipulated in the Five Year Plan of CCP, and 
inability to exercise control over right of abode issue of Mainlanders in 2010 and 
2011 again questioned the ability to determine policies in the hands of Hong Kong 
people (especially when the government is not elected by general public). So far 
there have been no one standing out to call for Hong Kong independence, even for 
hard-line democrats. But Beijing's growing involvement in Hong Kong's governance 
surely make democrats worry that Hong Kong would be directed closer to the ‘One 
Country' track. It is difficult to clearly stipulate the substance of autonomy, and 
Beijing does want to leave room for it. But as long as the SAR does not have a full 
democratic system that practices autonomy, the meaning of autonomy will be subject 
to own interpretation of Beijing and Hong Kong. From Beijing's growing 
involvement of in Hong Kong's governance after 2003, Hong Kong people will only 
further sensitize to each and every policy that directly or indirectly affects Hong 
Kong. 
Research limitations 
There are limitations to this study that warrant consideration in future research. The 
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study admits that retrospective accounts on past events, in particular about the 1988 
DB election, are inevitably not comprehensive. One reason is the lack of written 
evidence. The second is that it happened more than two decades, thus restricted 
informants' ability to remember. Perhaps the third was more important than the first 
two: there might be 'deliberate distortion designed to protect moral standards or 
furnish a particular image' (Neuman 2000: 401). The two candidates and many of 
their supporters were still alive and living in Tai O. It was possible that they might 
offer information favorable and desirable to themselves, which distorted the integrity 
of the event. 
The scope of this article has been limited to the analysis of a single organization at 
two different points in time. As briefly mentioned in the findings, there were other 
types of conflicts, though less intensive than the two in this study. Omission of these 
incidents may neglect some of the reasons that contributed to the conflicts. 
Suggestions for further research 
Factors affecting consistency in legitimacy repair may or may not differ based on the 
type of organizations, and the socio-political environment under study. One can 
conduct further research to compare similar cases in non-govemment-subvented 
voluntary organizations, government departments, and for-profit organizations, or 
compare similar cases across a range of social service sectors in different places. A 
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typology can be constructed to see whether organization forms and types of resource 
dependencies will have different patterns of response on challenges. 
Social work is a profession which emphasized autonomy and voluntarism. But very 
often when implement such ideals into practice, practitioners behaviors are bounded 
by organizational regulations and norms. Tensions are easily to occur among 
frontline workers and executives and board members (who are often trained social 
workers, too). The River Crab Saga illustrates a work team which caused trouble to 
the management and board members. While this study concentrates on organization 
as a whole dealing with environmental pressure, but equally important is the conflicts 
within the social service organization, such as staff associations (not yet a union), 
individual workers, the YWCA President, the supervisors. As mentioned in the 
beginning of the essay, a major difficulty is to explore the power relations. This poses 
a research limitation. An in-depth investigation focusing on negotiation of meanings 
of professionalism, voluntarism, autonomy, stability within the workplace will surely 
contribute to literature. 
The wave of new public management enhances the requirement of government, 
public bodies, and NGOs on transparency and accountability. The pro-social motives 
of NGOs are no longer an excuse to public scrutiny. Extensive information channels 
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made concealment of wrongdoings more difficult and its consequences costly. The 
situation is no less frustrating when an NGO encounters controversial issues, as in 
the case of River Crab Saga. Satisfying demands from one side would cause defiance 
from the other, such as users versus resource providers, or users versus regulators. 
Stakeholders can also use urgency or ally with important parties to increase their 
salience, in particular when they do not have much power. In an era when social 
issues are easily politicized, organizations will find increasingly unmanageable to 
crisis. Providing well-constructed account in prompt (which certainly does not mean 
telling lies) is a way to resolve public criticism and questioning, as informed by 
organizational impression management studies. But decoupling from actual routines 
runs the risk of inconsistencies. Equally important are to redefine the position of 
NGOs and their relationship with government and civil society. This helps reducing 
the possibility of fluctuation of strategies facing contradictory demands while 
preserving autonomy. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Informant selection process 
At the onset of informant selection, I had no clues but to rely on Eton and Sam, the 
two Tai O residents I knew, to suggest or refer suitable informants. This began the 
first round of snowball sampling, in which informants were provided and contacted 
by other informants (Noy 2008: 330). Because the two residents were member of the 
Alliance, I needed to search for people from the pro-TORC camp, and found Uncle 
Lok, the first vice-chairperson, being the first informant in their circle. 
An expected consequence of the above route of snowball sampling was that the 
informants would be more related or sensitive to the River Crab Saga or community 
controversy. Furthermore, during fieldwork, I was informed that two of my friends 
had relatives who were Tai O old-timers. Therefore, I expanded my search by 
making more first-time contact, which found Tumin and Glen; and utilizing my 
friends' kin ties, which found Uncle Kuen and Mr. Lam. On the other hand, I looked 
for past and present TOYWCA workers like Sean, Otto, Leon, John, and Daniel to 
understand decision making within the SSO. One discovery about the network 
characteristic was that the pro-TORC camp and the pro-TOYWCA camp were two 
distinct clusters. Even though members knew each other, each cluster had its own set 
of ideology and therefore, own way of interpretation on the same issue. Overlapping 
of membership was uncommon. 
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Tumin's and Annie's accounts revealed that they did not involve much in 
community controversies. However, this does not mean they were useless in this 
study. This shows that not all Tai O people took part in the events, and not belong to 
either camp. 
In short, the study does not aim at informant representativeness, but to provide 
meaningful information about how the YWCA, TOYWCA, TORC, and the 
government dealt with controversial issues, and the reasons for changes over time. 
Snowball sampling rightly illustrate the dense and interlocking interpersonal 
networks (Noy 2008), and is not merely a method. 
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Appendix 3 Chronology of the 2008 River Crab Saga 
Date Description 
2008 
J u n e 7 Lantau Island was suffered by heavy rainfall. The road to Tai O was blocked, 
and water supplies and telephone services were cut. Flood and landslides were 
occurred. 
J u n e 11 A group of Tai O residents (Tai O Post-rainstorm Reconstruction Concern 
Group) held a press conference to describe the difficulties they had faced since 
the rainstorm. Residents said that the relief efforts and information channels 
were far from adequate. 
September 23 Typhoon Hagupit with high tide flooded Tai O. 
L a t e S e p t e m b e r The 923 Flood Concern Group complained that the District Office did not do 
their job properly, and refused to attend their residents' meeting. The District 
Office responded that they were busy with the relief process, therefore they 
could not attend, and they did attend meetings on September 28 and October 
17. 
October 29 Lantau District Councilor sent a letter of complaint to YWCA. 
November 14 YWCA Chief Executive replied a letter to Lantau District Councilor. 
December 11 YWCA President received first letter of complaint from Tai O Rural 
Committee. The copy was also sent to Home Affairs Bureau, Home Affairs 
Department, Labour and Welfare Bureau and Social Welfare Department, and 
YWCA Chief Executive. 
D e c e m b e r 15 YWCA replied to TORC and set up a special duty group to follow up complaint 
after receiving complaints. 
December 23 The special duty group met the social workers involved. 
2009 
J a n u a r y 12 The special duty group met TORC representatives. 
January 13 YWCA Fourth Vice-President, Chief Executive and other management officials 
had a lunch meeting with the Islands District Officer, and invited the Officer to 
attend the opening ceremony of a campsite. He mentioned that Eton and his 
colleague 'could not co-operate harmoniously with local groups, repetitively 
caused conflicts, as if they were the host [of the community]( ) and 
demonstrated that they did not appreciate the government department which 
allocates funding '• 
J a n u a r y 15 YWCA reminded the two workers to improve community relations. 
J a n u a r y 19 YWCA replied a letter and apologized to TORC. 
YWCA received the second letter of compliant from Lantau District Councilor. 
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J a n u a r y 2 2 The special duty group met the social workers involved for a second time. 
J a n u a r y 2 3 YWCA met with Secretary of Home Affairs to introduce service development 
and redevelopment plan of Kowloon Office. The Secretary raised the issue of 
social harmony at the end of the briefing. 
J a n u a r y 2 4 YWCA received the second letter of complaint from TORC about Eton 
damaging community relations. 
J a n u a r y 3 0 The board of directors of YWCA suggested redeploying the two employees to 
another center, and suggested issuing them written warnings. 
F e b r u a r y 2 The two employees were moved to another center. 
YWCA President replied a letter to TORC, deeply regretted for the 'strong 
discontent about the work performance of the two workers'. 
F e b r u a r y 18 YWCA received a church pastor of Tai O, acknowledging the contribution of 
TOYWCA. 
M a r c h 2 YWCA received 270 resident signatories in support of Eton. 
M a r c h 13 YWCA received a third letter from TORC, feeling appreciated and thankful of 
redeployment. 
M a r c h 2 7 The Board of YWCA discussed the issue again, and agreed to substitute verbal 
reminders for written warnings. 
A p r i l 2 YWCA substituted verbal reminders for written warnings, but maintained the 
punishment. 
A p r i l 14 Eton resigned. 
M a y 4 Eton lodged complaints to LegCo Redress system. 
M a y 2 2 HAB replied LegCo that the Home Affairs minister mentioned the letters during 
meeting YWCA on January 23, but denied giving pressure. 
J u l y 2 4 The first piece of newspaper report on the LegCo complaint appeared. 
A u g u s t 12 More than 350 social workers attended a forum on the issue. 
A u g u s t 19 The Anti False Harmony Alliance was formed. 
S e p t e m b e r 4 YWCA denied the allegation that the Home Affairs Minister had given pressure 
for the removal of the two social workers. The decision of moving came from 
the last complaint letter. 
September 10 YWCA held a press conference, denied the allegation again, but admitted that 
the minister's concern was ‘a factor in the removal'. The Home Affairs Bureau 
also dismissed interference, replied that the minister had no prior knowledge of 
the move. 
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September 18 LegCo redress system held a case conference. The minister denied giving 
pressure to YWCA. 
Chairperson of TORC said the Committee was not satisfied with Eton's work, 
accusing him of inciting Tai O residents. After his removal, the Committee 
co-operated with the RC, the community was harmonious. 
Eton denied inciting residents. 
September 20 Several hundred social workers, social work teachers and students joined the 
protest organized by the Alliance. They protested against the Bureau putting 
pressure on the YWCA to move Eton, and interfered the operation of social 
welfare organizations. They agreed that their professionalism was seriously 
eroded. 
September 2 8 LegCo Panel on Welfare Services agreed to urge the Chief Executive to set up 
an independent commission of inquiry to investigate whether professionalism 
of social workers was interfered. 
December 14 LegCo Panel on Welfare Services voted for the motion of proposing to appoint 
a select committee by the LegCo to inquire into issues relating to this case. 
2010 
January 8 The LegCo House Committee voted down the proposal that a select committee 
be appointed by LegCo to inquire into the issue, with pan-democratic 
legislators voted in favor, and pro-establishment legislators voted against. 
February 3 The LegCo meeting voted down the motion of a select committee to inquire 
into the interference with the professionalism of social workers, with majority 
of functional constituency members against the motion, and majority of 
geographical constituency members in favor of the motion. 
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Appendix 4 Debates over disaster relief process in 2008 in detail 
Item 1: The arrangement of water tankers and water delivery 
TORC suggested parking the tanker at the new pier for the convenience of the 
residents: 
We agreed that we would go to Hong Kong by ferry on talk to HAD. The first priority 
was to solve water supply. The supply suspended in the morning, and they would 
transport water here. But we could not contact with each other. HAD contacted 
YWCA. The problem was [YWCA] did not tell us. They told others when water 
tankers would arrive here. It seemed that they had completed the job. It ’s fine. It 
didn ’t matter who did it. As for water, [the police] had never shipped water tankers to 
here before, so they did not know the environment of the creek. They did not dare 
enter here. Then they parked the tankers near the old pier, and called residents to 
carry water. You see, when people carried water along the road, a portion of the 
water had been spilt o f f . Then we proposed the tankers should be parked in the new 
pier. We had lots of fishermen representatives familiar with the sea route. Finally the 
police adopted our proposal The water tankers were parked nearer, and the problem 
was solved... What YWCA should do was to inform people water was available…That 
means if you (YWCA) had discussed with us, the problem would have been solved. 
(Interview from Uncle Lok) 
Eton had told the center-in-charge to seek the R C s opinion, but the center-in-charge 
finally did not do so. 
I told the center-in-charge to discuss with RC, but they had their pre-established 
thought, that they questioned why we asked the tankers to park outside. It was not 
our business. We had asked them to park them here (the new pier). We even lent our 
walkie-talkie to the police to contact with RC. I think, I...think...I told him (Uncle 
Lok) face-to-face that it was the problem of the center-in-charge. He did not know 
how to improve the relationship. I went to the RC to ask Uncle Lok to sit down and 
discuss. He said OK. But later the telephone connection was down. He looked for the 
center-in-charge. The discussion was left to them, and I left [to do other things]. We 
got problems in the detail, a little bit grumbles. It was better to discuss with them. 
They subjectively criticized us for messing up all the things, and [it] was our 
responsibility. The fact was that many things were not in our control. 
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The central debate was 'who was more capable of responding to community needs'. 
The reply ‘the problem could have been solved if YWCA had discussed with us’ 
implies that TORC should be informed of crucial affairs in the community. TORC 
should have the right for decision-making. 
Item 3: Suspicion over the purpose of TO YWCA and residents' group to thank 
the community 
In the following few days after the June rainstorm, a group of victims, including 
Vicky, formed the Tai O Post-rainstorm Reconstruction Concern Group to monitor 
the recovery process. TO YWCA was not a member of the Group (TO YWCA 2008), 
but acted as a facilitator, such as offering tangible support and encouraged people to 
participate. The Group thanked the whole community for the effort in the relief, and 
posted posters around the village. The RC was the first organization on the list, even 
though not arranged in order. The RC, which was not informed beforehand, was 
surprised of such action, and perceived as inappropriate. 
Uncle Lok: It seems that it is not logical in the community, because YWCA is fully 
subsidized by the government, from office cleaners to social workers, the rent, all 
with the subvention of the Social Welfare Department. Where does the Department 
get money? From the Community Chest. You are fully subsidized. You should serve 
the community, with no other goals. You should assist the government. Of course, you 
need to remind the government... Serving the residents should not ask for compliment 
mm-
In the first letter of complaint, the RC mentioned this point, and stated that 
TO YWCA workers had no reason to claim to be the 'leaders' in Tai O in the posters. 
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Finally, the RC asked what 'a fully government-subsidized organization should do in 
handling social problems properly'. 
Since members of the Group were closely related to TOYWCA, it was 
understandable, though not fully reasonable, for the RC to believe the motive was 
initiated by TOYWCA. In the interview, Uncle Lok then contrasted YWCA with 
TORC: 
We the RC, are not fully subsidized, but only had subsidies for salaries for some ten 
thousand dollars and allowances for electric bills and the like. We can't compare 
with them. But all of our RC members provided help. We cannot ask for compliments 
when serving with residents. We certainly have the right to monitor YWCA. When 
they do not do well, we need to criticize, not just changing staff. [Not just YWCA], 
but also the police and the clinic. When they do badly, we have the right. Whether or 
not to transfer staff members is another issue. 
Eton defended their work, arguing that they did not, arguing that they did not ever 
ask for compliment, but just helped victims strive for their needs, even it might result 
in confrontation with Islands District Office: 
As a government-subvented organization, we did not ask for compliment. But 
residents expressed gratitude. They could do better. We could cooperate with them; 
they just did not like it. I tried to invite them to do something, such as disaster relief. 
Residents tried to look for their help. I think...residents have been fully aware that 
RC members were so mean. So residents knew that they had to ask them (TORC) for 
help first. It was after they turned me down that I look for other people. That is why 
after the [June] landslide, people at the first time sought their opinion. But they 
(TORC) replied that they could deal with it with the District Office. Not many things 
had been done in the following days. 
Second, there is not much progress in repairing roads for several years. How do they 
try their best, at the expense of confronting the government, to achieve something? 
They just express some opinion, and [the officials] keep putting them o f f . They then 
tell residents that they have done their job. I think TORC and the government are 
mutually supportive. Sometimes the government will provide benefits to you (TORC), 
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in exchange for less criticism to the government. 
Item 8: Impedance of relief work between government departments and TORC 
This was the disagreement after September flooding between the RC and Islands 
District Office, and TOYWCA and the 923 Flood Concern Group (ad hoc group 
formed to monitor the recovery process). The first one was about whether the Islands 
District Office effectively coped with the flooding. But the Flood Concern Group 
complained that the District Office did not do their job properly, and refused to 
attend their residents' meeting. The District Office responded that they were busy 
with the relief process, therefore they could not attend, and they did attend meetings 
on September 28 and October TORC sided with the District Office, and 
believed that holding meetings at that time was adding workload to the government: 
Uncle Lok: Then YWCA called the meeting, and call government officials to attend 
the meeting. At that time we thought that they just started the command center, and 
had not begun many works. We should assist them, giving them suggestions for relief, 
but not hold meetings and ask officials to attend and listen to order. It seemed that 
the operation was encumbered... The meeting should be held later and by the 
government. If the government conducted the operation for some time, say one week, 
but found unsuccessful, then it was time to call for meeting to look into the failure. 
Eton did not agree, and stated that it was their responsibility to engage with the 
victims: 
99 Meanwhile, similar disagreement happened in the June flooding. The Tai O Post-rainstorm 
Reconstruction Concern Group felt most dissatisfied with the transportation, which made commuters 
and students difficult to travel three weeks after the rainstorm. They requested a meeting with the 
director of the Transport Department and the Island District Officer Bryon Lam Sing-kit to explain 
any contingency measures. The Islands District Office replied that they were ready to attend the 
meeting, but was later called off because the Group did not arrange the time. The Islands District 
Office clarified that she had already ordered the Transport Department to increase the frequency of 
ferry, and ‘continued reflecting residents' requests'. Furthermore, the Islands District Office 'did not 
alter relief work because of the political orientation of different organizations', and 'was given credits 
by the Group in coordinating the relief work'. 
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They (the District Office) planned to start operation. Did I block their operation in 
any ways? We held an urgent meeting Sunday afternoon (September 28), and asked 
officials to explain relief policies. To what extent that we hindered the relief work? 
They were obliged to explain. We asked villagers to say rubbish had been piled up. 
The RC then ordered a team to clear the rubbish. We helped them. They just failed to 
do their job, and scolded by villagers (see the report from the Standard 2009a). 
Item 11: Suspicion of arranging volunteers and residents to appraise YWCA 
publicly 
TORC alleged that TOYWCA arranged volunteers and residents to appraise the 
agency publicly after the September flooding. Eton and Mandy denied the allegation. 
He elucidated that it was an event organized by another social service organization, 
whose aim was to promote the virtue of neighborhood help and community care. An 
old lady expressed gratitude of the YWCA for helping them solving livelihood 
problem after the storm. But that made the rural elites unhappy: 
Mandy: ...He (Eton) already told the lady to thank the RC, But it just cannot help. 
She was no innocent. When asked who should give thanks to, she answered the social 
workers in YWCA. [TORC members] pulled a long face immediately. 
Eton, on the one hand, asserted that the agency did not ever ask for compliment; on 
the other hand, he argued that this reflected residents' low support of the RC: 
‘Asking for compliment is negative. But it can also mean our work being recognized. 
Why did the residents not seek for their help? If they did good things, they would 
have received the same appreciation. 
Item 5: Having too close the relationship with Legislator Leung Yiu-chung 
Leung Yiu-chung was the leader of NWSC, and a pro-democratic LegCo member 
representing the New Territories West. He intensively assisted in stilt house 
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reconstruction in 2000. The NWSC also collaborated with the Tai O Residents' 
Rights Concern Group to run a CIIF project promoting cultural tourism from 2003 to 
2009. He got considerable support from residents, especially fire victims, as shown 
in achieving second in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 LegCo election in Tai O. (The first 
was DAB). Despite providing help, the rural elites regarded him as an outsider. The 
pro-democrat identity was a negative label among the pro-China rural elites, 
equivalent to 'trouble-maker', ‘rival, to their camp. Indeed, Leung and a few 
pro-democratic and DAB LegCo members showed concern with the flooding, but it 
was Eton who were in touch with Leung more frequently during the two floodings. 
Leung clarified that TOYWCA contacted all eight directly elected LegCo members 
in New Territories West when needed. He tried to attend most of the time (from his 
speech in a LegCo meeting on February 2010). Such perception was not unique in 
Tai O or rural areas; social workers were perceived as pro-democrats for long (Chui 
1999: 99; also from social worker informant Otto), due to similar ideology and 
political orientation. It was a potential threat in securing local power from the eyes of 
pro-Beijing groups. 
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決 社 區 問 題 ， 以 提 高 生 活 質 素 ， 培 養 社 區 歸 屬 感 。 
根 據 民 政 事 務 局 2 0 0 5 年 6 月 的 「 社 區 發 展 政 策 聲 明 」 ， 社 區 發 展 主 要 是 鼓 勵 居 
民參與影響他們生活的議題……。這是一個提高公民和社會意識的過程；社區 
發 展 服 務 應 以 弱 勢 社 群 為 優 先 對 象 ° 社 區 發 展 的 目 標 包 括 ： a ) 建 立 社 區 力 量 ； 
b ) 培 養 社 區 內 的 互 助 精 神 ； c ) 解 決 弱 勢 群 體 的 需 要 ； d ) 提 高 社 區 凝 聚 力 及 和 
諧 ； e ) 推 動 社 區 參 與 。 













過 1 0 0 小 時 ( 約 5 天 ) 斷 絕 自 來 水 供 應 、 超 過 3 0 0 小 時 ( 約 1 3 天 ) 斷 絕 陸 路 交 通 ， 
居民發揮社區互助自助的精神，凝聚力量，積極參與解決兩次災難所引起的問 
題 。 在 6 月 7 日 的 山 泥 傾 瀉 事 件 ， 工 作 隊 協 助 居 民 自 發 成 立 「 居 民 小 組 」 ， 關 
注 及 跟 進 緊 急 應 變 及 互 助 自 助 的 工 作 ° 
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由 於 有 關 救 災 協 調 工 作 主 要 由 離 島 民 政 事 務 處 負 貴 ， 該 處 於 6 月 8 日 晚 上 才 開 
始 在 大 澳 設 立 緊 急 應 變 中 心 。 居 民 小 組 多 次 要 求 離 島 民 政 事 務 處 出 席 小 組 會 
議 ， 或 協 助 聯 絡 及 協 調 的 工 作 ， 卻 多 次 被 拒 或 沒 有 積 極 回 應 ； 居 民 提 出 消 息 發 
放 的 建 議 及 主 動 提 出 協 助 ， 但 離 島 民 政 處 仍 表 示 只 會 與 大 澳 鄉 事 委 員 會 聯 繫 ， 
完 全 不 能 發 揮 民 政 事 務 處 的 協 調 及 橋 樑 的 角 色 ， 反 而 有 政 治 傾 斜 之 感 。 
9 月 2 3 日 的 水 災 ， 離 島 民 政 事 務 處 被 指 「 輕 視 災 情 、 延 誤 賑 災 」 
離 島 民 政 事 務 處 被 居 民 指 責 沒 有 汲 取 6 月 7 日 山 泥 傾 瀉 的 經 驗 ， 輕 視 災 情 ， 延 
誤 賑 災 ， 未 能 在 9 2 3 水 災 後 的 黃 金 7 2 小 時 ， 妥 善 安 排 有 關 善 後 的 工 作 ， 以 致 五 
百 多 個 災 戶 要 在 十 天 至 一 個 多 月 後 才 獲 經 濟 援 助 。 居 民 指 離 島 民 政 處 輕 視 災 
情 ， 以 致 賑 災 延 誤 、 區 内 環 境 衛 生 惡 劣 、 欠 缺 暫 住 居 所 的 安 排 、 商 戶 不 獲 現 金 
支 援 等 問 題 。 「 工 作 隊 」 協 助 居 民 成 立 居 民 小 組 ， 作 出 爭 取 ， 並 於 2 0 0 8 年 1 0 
月 2 7 日 前 往 立 法 申 訴 部 ， 提 出 關 注 事 項 及 改 善 建 議 。 
兩 次 災 情 ， 「 工 作 隊 」 皆 持 守 社 區 發 展 工 作 的 目 標 及 社 工 的 專 業 守 則 ， 促 進 居 
民 參 與 社 區 ， 積 極 發 揮 互 助 自 助 的 精 神 ， 凝 聚 力 量 ， 改 善 社 區 。 
可 惜 ， 大 澳 鄉 事 委 員 會 卻 認 為 「 工 作 隊 」 製 造 事 端 ， 引 致 社 區 不 和 諧 ， 遂 去 信 
香 港 基 督 教 女 青 年 會 會 長 ， 作 出 投 訴 ， 要 求 會 方 督 促 「 工 作 隊 」 的 事 工 ， 有 關 
信 件 的 副 本 抄 民 政 事 務 局 局 長 曾 德 成 先 生 、 民 政 事 務 署 署 長 陳 甘 美 華 女 士 、 勞 
工 及 福 利 局 長 張 建 忠 先 生 及 社 會 福 利 署 長 余 志 穩 先 生 。 「 女 青 」 會 長 收 到 投 訴 
後 ， 成 立 專 責 小 組 認 真 處 理 ， 在 處 理 過 程 中 ， 涉 及 離 島 民 政 事 務 專 員 及 民 政 事 
務 局 長 曾 德 成 的 干 預 ° 雖 然 專 責 小 組 認 為 「 工 作 隊 」 在 救 災 的 工 作 中 表 現 出 色 ， 
惟 因 有 關 工 作 引 起 大 澳 當 地 鄉 事 委 員 會 及 民 政 事 務 署 之 不 滿 ， 結 果 ， 兩 名 社 工 
於 2 0 0 9 年 2 月 3 日 被 即 時 調 離 大 澳 社 區 工 作 辦 事 處 ， 同 時 被 書 面 警 告 ， 最 後 ， 
經 本 人 上 訴 後 ， 「 女 青 」 撤 回 警 告 信 ， 改 以 口 頭 訓 示 （ 本 人 並 不 接 受 ， 故 沒 有 
簽 署 ） ， 維 持 即 時 調 職 的 安 排 。 
「女青」董事會脅於權貴、犧牲專業、出賣同工、換取關係固然是欠缺道德勇 
氣 ； 然 而 ， 離 島 民 政 專 員 及 民 政 局 長 的 介 入 ， 有 政 治 施 壓 ， 干 預 專 業 自 主 及 社 
福 機 構 的 服 務 取 向 ， 令 服 務 的 理 念 與 手 法 達 致 「 政 治 正 確 」 之 嫌 ° 本 人 用 以 下 
文件的内容印證： 
1. 
2 0 0 9 年 2 月 2 日 —「女青i向本人發出的書面警告： 
「 閣 下 服 務 大 澳 工 作 辦 事 處 時 引 起 大 澳 當 地 鄉 事 委 員 會 及 民 政 事 務 署 之 不 滿 、 
雙 方 關 係 破 裂 ； . . . . 管 理 層 及 獨 立 調 查 委 員 會 亦 曾 多 次 對 閣 下 作 出 勸 喻 ， 閣 下 需 
要 立 即 努 力 修 補 與 鄉 事 委 員 會 及 民 政 事 務 署 之 關 係 ， . . . . . 惟 到 目 前 為 止 ， 單 位 與 
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有關部門之關係仍未見顯著改善。」 
「鑑於閣下未能與大澳鄉事委員會及政府部門重新建立良好工作關係， . . .董事 
會 . . . .向閣下發出書面警告，同時要求閣下儘早調職至其他單位工作。」 
2. 
「 女 青 」 大 澳 投 訴 事 件 專 貴 小 組 報 告 一 （ 五 ） 會 後 補 誌 





2 0 0 9 年 3 月 6 日 「 女 青 」 總 幹 事 發 出 的 「 大 澳 社 區 工 作 辦 事 處 事 件 報 告 」 
- 大澳投訴事件曰誌 
2 0 0 9 年 1 月 1 3 曰 ： 第 四 副 會 長 偕 同 總 幹 事 、 副 總 幹 事 、 一 名 總 監 及 一 名 督 導 主 
任會晤離島政務專員林聖傑。 
2 0 0 9 年 1 月 2 3 日 ： 與 民 政 事 務 局 局 長 會 面 時 提 到 本 會 員 工 於 大 澳 未 能 維 持 和 
諧之社區關係。 
4. 
2 0 0 9 年 3 月 1 8 曰 —口頭訓示會面紀錄 
「閣下服務大澳社區工作辦事處時，為協助及維護當地居民權益引起來當地鄉 
事 委 員 會 及 民 政 事 務 署 之 不 滿 ； 及 後 令 本 會 由 2 0 0 8 年 1 1 月 起 曾 四 次 接 獲 有 關 
方面投訴書函。」 
5. 
2 0 0 9 年 4 月 2 日 一 撤 回 書 面 警 告 
「 有 關 閣 下 服 務 於 本 會 之 大 澳 社 區 工 作 辦 事 處 時 ， 本 會 曾 分 別 接 獲 當 地 鄉 事 
委 員 會 及 民 政 事 務 署 之 投 訴 表 示 對 本 會 大 澳 社 區 工 作 辦 事 處 有 滿 之 事 ° 經 會 
長 . . . . . . ， 最 後 議 決 通 過 將 早 前 之 『 書 面 警 告 』 之 懲 處 修 訂 為 2 0 0 9 年 3 月 1 6 




























聯 署 ： 大 澳 文 化 工 作 室 負 貴 人 [ V i c k y ] 
職工盟資助機構委員會 
2 0 0 9 年 5 月 4 曰 
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